THE VERIFICATION OF CHRISTIANITY

LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET

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Roman Emperor Worship

The Verification of Christianity

Divination and Prophecy—A Study in Comparative Religion

A Critical History of the Theory of Evolution

A System of Christian Theology

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THE VERIFICATION OF CHRISTIANITY

INTRODUCTORY STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

BY

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TO

MARGARET STUART SWEET

COMRADE AND HELPER

THIS BOOK

IS

LOVINGLY INSCRIBED

FOREWORD

The title and sub-title prefixed to these pages exactly describe their contents as the author understands and interprets them. The book consists of a group of closely related studies converging upon a single point, the verification of the Christian religion as the true and divine interpretation of human life and as the fulfilment of human destiny.

It must be clearly understood that the writer has not essayed a scientific or systematic treatise on Apologetics. In his judgment, the time for such an undertaking has not yet arrived nor is it the pressing need of the hour. In any case, this book is not an attempt to perform this larger task. It is strictly introductory. In the final analysis, the verification of Christianity is every man's task for himself. One can do no more for another than to point out the path along which his own thought has travelled toward conviction. Having done this he can but wish the traveller, faring forth, God-speed on the King's Highway which leads, level and straight, through that which

otherwise would be a weary and trackless wilderness. The author is indebted to the Editor of the Biblical Review for permission to make use of articles already published.

New York, May 1919.

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CHAPTER I

THE TASK OF THE MODERN APOLOGIST

AN undertaking of a character so serious and responsible as the advocacy and recommendation of the Christian religion to the rational consideration of mankind demands a whole-hearted and unequivocal dedication to the service of righteousness and truth. The advocacy of Christianity on the part of one who is not unreservedly committed to the Christian position, *historically defined,* is, of course, an absurdity. The advocacy of Christianity, even by one sincerely persuaded of its truth and permanent value to the world, by the *ex parte* methods of the hired attorney or special pleader, is an impiety the deep disgrace of which is only increased by the sacredness of the subject.

The Christian apologist, in view of the fact

that his undertaking is justifiable only on the ground of sincerity of conviction, is pledged in detail to a flawless, corresponding sincerity of utterance throughout. Nothing less than this high dedication to the service of truth is worthy of so great and noble an enterprise. In laying such stress upon sincerity as a demand of the new Christian defence, we do not intend to cast a slur upon the apologetics of the past nor to suggest that previous defences of Christianity have been lacking either in sincerity of conviction or candor of utterance. We do not believe this to be true. In fact, we believe that the easy condemnation of all apologetic writing as special pleading is the outcome of a peculiarly subtle and dangerous tendency of our day, to identify the modern and scientific method with a given set of results and to arrogate to denial and radicalism a monopoly of the spirit of free and genuine research. We simply wish to remind our readers that the advocacy of Christianity as true is a task undertaken in the interest of truth. Christians, surely, do not need more than a reminder that it is the truth which makes us free.

The danger is that the most sincere advocate may forget, in the intensity of his conviction, to look at intellectual issues broadly, and, in the enforcement of what he sincerely believes to be true,

may lose his perspective and do violence to the balance and harmony of truth. All that we have to say in this chapter as to the work of the defender of Christianity in our day is really the expansion and application of this text: If Christianity is true, then *ex necessitate* it is in full harmony with all else that is true. The task of the Christian apologist is simply to exhibit and expound this primary and comprehensive fact. There need be no uneasiness as to the possibility of discovering and exhibiting the broad and basic truthfulness of the Christian system, historically, psychologically, and philosophically.

I. The Christian apologist of to-day must believe in the capacity of the human mind to receive and interpret the revelation of God.

Apologetics is an address to the human intelligence on behalf of Christianity. The undertaking itself implies a conviction that Christianity is true; that is, it is a rational system capable of rational interpretation and vindication. Such a belief involves, as its logical *prius,* a deep-seated conviction of the essential worth and constructive power of human reason. A belief in Christianity as a divine revelation, given through supernatural acts and recorded through inspiration, implies a thoroughgoing confidence in human reason as being capable of receiving and interpreting a reve-

lation from above, of recognizing supernatural acts, of being inbreathed of God and brought to a knowledge of Him. To minify the human factor in this divine-human process is to discredit the process itself. The age-long historic movement whereby God has unveiled Himself as the Lord and Redeemer of men is articulated throughout with the corresponding human experience to which and through which God has thus spoken. The higher aspect of this interlocking process depends upon the integrity of the lower. The logical result of discrediting or depreciating human reason is agnosticism, which is a state of mind wherein the power of evidence is lost because of a fixed belief in the infirmity of the human mind as the organ of divine knowledge. The false and artificial antithesis which has often been established between reason and revelation spells ruin to the task of the apologist. Reason becomes a blind faculty which tells us nothing about God. Revelation becomes a sphere of extra-rational beliefs indistinguishable from superstition. Faith becomes an asylum for the feeble-minded. Christianity becomes a mode of interpreting the unknown, the truth of which it is impossible to establish on any recognizable rational grounds.

On the other hand, it is essential that the Christian apologist should understand the normal work-

ings of the human reason and the clearly defined boundary within which it works. In the region of religion, as elsewhere, reason is conditioned by *objective facts,* and cannot construct the world without these facts. Reason, apart from facts as disclosed in experience, cannot construct an atom or an amoeba, much less a solar system, a universe or the being of God. When Hegel says that there are no mysteries in the absolute which reason cannot penetrate, he makes a statement which would be false and absurd if he were speaking of so trivial an object as a tea biscuit. Such arrogant and measureless claims for reason are absurd and suicidal.

The rational task of the apologist for Christianity is just the natural task of the advocate and exponent of any great generalization of science, to vindicate it, on the basis of evidence, as *the most reasonable hypothesis to explain undoubted facts.* Here are the facts: The world, human nature and human history, religion, the Hebrews, the New Testament, Jesus, the Christian church, Christian experience. How are these facts to be explained? If the universe is intelligible, then these facts are capable of a rational explanation. If Christianity is true, it is this sought for rational explanation. Christian apologetics is the explication of the fact that the Chris-

tian religion explains the world, man, and human history more comprehensively and more satisfactorily than any other explanation which can be devised. This is our task and the whole of it. To be sure, it is a great undertaking, but is quite intelligible and quite within the bounds of reason. But, let it never be forgotten, that for Christians and for disbelievers in Christianity alike agnosticism destroys the foundations upon which we stand. Discussion of Christianity or any other subject which touches upon fundamental realities upon the terms of agnosticism is an interchange of views as to the world of reality on the part of lunatics or imbeciles. How else could one possibly interpret these words from the pen of Herbert Spencer? "Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created by an external agency. Which of these suppositions is most credible it is not needful here to inquire. The deeper question, into which this finally merges, is, whether any one of them is even conceivable in the true sense of the word" (First Principles, p. 36).

The Christian apologist must untiringly wage war upon such a belittling conception of human reason. He affirms revelation, inspiration, au-

thority, but on the basis of an implied affirmation that human reason can receive, interpret, and establish truth which is from above. The faith that men may know God and recognize and interpret truth he must never betray. Religious affirmation, in all ages, has borne the brunt of attack on the part of skepticism. Christian apologists have had to meet not only doubts as to the truth of Christianity, but doubts as to the possibility of any valid knowledge whatever which passes beyond the range of empirical observation. The epistemological burden of the Christian apologist has been so great that twice, at least, within a single recent century, the courage of the advocates of Christian faith has broken down and they have ingloriously thrown their shields away, making a pitiful and ineffectual attempt to advocate Christianity on the premises of a philosophic skepticism. We do not so read our charter nor so interpret our task. We stand for the rights of reason and the integrity and validity of our intellectual processes. We assert with all confidence, making due allowance for the fact that reason is conditioned by objective and concrete experience, and that man is a being who learns through trial, failure, and trying again, falling but to rise, that human reason when brought into contact with the facts can know the truth.

II. The Christian apologist must cultivate the habit of looking at both sides of controverted questions, including the most fundamental and sacred truths of the Christian faith.

A man may be an able and effective preacher of the Gospel, who neither knows nor cares much about unbelief. Such a preacher, provided he has a genuine prophetic insight into the truth, a knowledge of the human heart, and an intense sincerity and earnestness, may have a message even for unbelievers all the more searching that it does not and cannot deal with the intellectual problems of unbelief. But the task of the apologist is quite different from this. His work is to meet organized and articulate unbelief which is buttressed by argument and supported by alleged facts presented in the name of reason, and which, on historical, scientific or philosophical grounds, assails the truth of Christianity. To meet such assaults with the naïve assumption that nothing in the way of effective objections can be urged against Christianity, or, still worse, with the dogmatic judgment that all unbelief is impiety to be met with anathema, is to surrender a great battle without a blow.

The Christian apologist must know what men have thought and said against Christianity and must allow himself to feel the whole force of these

objections. He must do far more than meet specific objections. He must develop the intuitive sense of an intellectual climate in which such objections flourish. He must argue the case against his own convictions with all the severity, and more, of the most relentless opponent. He must remember that his chance really to win in this great controversy, unlike that of the lawyer or the debater on the hustings, depends not upon his intellectual finesse or his cleverness of cut and thrust, but absolutely upon his *having the better case.* Unless he believes with all his soul that more can be said for Christianity than can possibly be urged with fairness against it, no man has heard the authentic call to be a defender of the faith. The apologist, therefore, is compelled to the attitude of one who holds himself ready to discuss with every comer the grounds of his most fundamental and sacred convictions. In order to do this he must have met, in the solitude of his own inner thought, in that arena of dialogue and debate where the voices of Assent and Denial answer each to each within his own soul, the unbeliever with whom he is openly to discuss the grounds of belief. He must know thoroughly and sympathetically the mind of the unbeliever and the psychology of unbelief. He must know not only how to meet an objection, but how that objection

arose. He must reach behind the argument to the mind which formulates the argument and graduate the mental trend to which the argument appeals. His task is to remove the difficulties which certain types of mind, or certain groups of men, feel with respect to the principles and doctrines of the Christian religion.

The one necessary element of training for this task is that the apologist shall establish the rational ground of his own convictions. He must understand the psychology of his own belief. He must have subjected his attitude toward belief, pro and con, to the severest possible rational test. He must thrust mercilessly through question to the assurance which lies beyond doubt. He must spare no labor in the task of deepening his religious experience and grounding his beliefs on the basal facts of human life and history.

III. The Christian apologist must obtain and present the results of genuine and thorough research.

He must maintain the convincing attitude of the searcher for truth. The primary postulate of his undertaking, as we have said already and cannot say too often, is that the facts are on the side of Christianity. This being so, the apologist's task resolves itself into the prosaic and laborious undertaking of digging up facts. Patient delving

for hidden treasure is the only method of effective service in this field. The great apologetic achievements of the past have, invariably, been due to the work of scholars who have dug beneath the feet of attackers upon Christianity and, on the basis of deeper and more thorough scholarship, have met and refuted assaults made upon it.

Mention may here be made of Origen's reply to Celsus. The original work of Celsus, the earliest and the keenest of the pagan controversialists who attacked Christianity, has been lost, primarily because Origen refuted him so completely that even the opponents of Christianity did not care to keep alive their champion's work. But Origen dealt so comprehensively and minutely with the work of Celsus that we are able to reconstruct it practically in its entirety. We are, therefore, able to see that the refutation is achieved not by brilliancy of argument nor superficial cleverness in debate, but by the solidity of the statement built up, fortified, and buttressed by facts. Origen has the better case. Celsus is infinitely clever but superficial—the facts are against him. Truth wins the debate—not Origen—which in the interests of mankind is the only victory worth having.

Another illustration of the same truth is to be found in the case of Supernatural Religion. Some

time ago there appeared anonymously in England an elaborate attack upon Christianity, entitled Supernatural Religion. The treatise was detailed and extensive and the various phases of the attack were supported by an appearance of learning which gave the work an extensive vogue, and promised for it, at first, a widespread and lasting influence. The work came under the eye of Bishop Lightfoot, who at once detected the fact that the citations, which were numerous and apparently cogent, were inaccurate. The writer who had amassed a great body of references was not an accurate scholar, nor, to say the least of it, did he make a fair and proper use of his materials. The scholarly bishop proceeded, in the finest spirit of courteous debate but with merciless effectiveness, to expose the monumental inaccuracies of this unknown assailant of Christianity. One who follows the course of the discussion will be convinced that Lightfoot broke the force of a powerful and dangerous attack upon Christianity simply through the force of superior scholarship. He knew more than his opponent and won his monumental victory, not by virtue of a superior cleverness, but because the facts were on his side, and he knew the facts.

Another striking illustration of the point we are endeavoring to enforce is to be found in the treat-

ment of himself by Professor J. George Romanes. When Romanes was a young man he published (under the pseudonym of Physicus) an essay entitled: A Candid Examination of Theism. In his discussion he examined the arguments usually advanced on behalf of the theistic view of the world and reluctantly but definitely abandoned them all and, with them, belief in a personal God. When Professor Romanes died, in 1894, he was a communicant of the church and left behind him, in the form of incomplete notes, a review of his own former work which, of course, involved a discussion of the whole religious question. The importance of this discussion for our present purpose lies in the fact that Romanes' change of view was due to his going over the same ground as in the former treatise, *with the plough-share set deeper.* Repeatedly he uses the formula: "I did not sufficiently consider," or "I failed to notice," etc. In other words, he corrected himself by deeper thought and fuller knowledge in the interests of faith.

One more striking instance of the value for Christian faith of this delving for facts is to be found in the case of Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay. In 1892 Professor Ramsay delivered his Mansfield Lectures: The Church in the Roman Empire before 170 A.D., in which he gave to the world

the first results of his archæological investigation into the origins of Christianity. Incidentally it signalized the beginning of Professor Ramsay's break with the prevailing radical school of New Testament criticism. This schism grew more and more pronounced as Professor Ramsay's researches advanced until it became quite clear that criticism could no longer afford to ignore his studies and that it must either refute his arguments for the early date and general historical trustworthiness of the New Testiment writers, particularly Luke, or admit their force. The results of this new movement, in one aspect of it, at any rate, appear in the famous series of New Testament studies published by Professor Adolf Harnack, beginning with Luke the Physician, published in 1907 (*Lukas der Arzt,* 1906). While in this work scant reference is made to Ramsay (see preface to the English translation), nevertheless the gauge thrown down by Ramsay *fourteen years before* is taken up by the Berlin professor—not as a dissentient, but as a fellow-challenger to current scholarship. Here is what Harnack says:

"The genuine Epistles of St. Paul, the writings of St. Luke, and the history of Eusebius are the pillars of primitive Christian history. This fact

has not yet been sufficiently recognized in the case of the Lukan writings; partly because critics are convinced that these writings are not to be assigned to St. Luke. And yet, even if they were right in their supposition, the importance of The Acts of the Apostles at least still remains fundamental. *However I hope to have shown in the following pages that critics have gone astray in this question, and that the traditional view holds good.*" "The Lukan writings then recover their own excelling value [*einen ganz eigenartigen Werth*] as historical authorities; for they are written by a Greek who was a fellow worker of St. Paul, and accompanied with Mark, Silas, Philip, and James the brother of the Lord" (Preface, dated Berlin, May 17, 1906, and translated by J. R. Wilkinson. Italics mine).

In general, the entire critical situation with respect to the New Testament changed between the publication of Ramsay's Mansfield Lectures and Harnack's *Lukas der Arzt.* How was this revolution brought about? Two things are to be noted.

First, Professor Ramsay was a genuine investigator, committed to nothing at all in the way of results but only to the consistent application of a scientific method. His challenge to cur-

rent criticism was made on that basis; and on that basis alone. Incidentally we wish to emphasize, in this immediate connection, that really powerful attacks upon the historical bases of Christianity can be met only by the rigid use of a scientific method which has no regard for results or partisan advantage. No true investigator can guarantee that his results shall be orthodox—he can only promise to be diligent and accurate in the use of a correct method. Orthodoxy must take care of itself. If it is true it need have no fear. In the long run truth, which is mighty, shall prevail. Here is Professor Ramsay's challenge as issued with his first great work —a challenge which became more insistent and commanding as he went on with his investigations:

"The books of the New Testament are treated here simply as authorities for history; and their credit is estimated on the same principles as that of other historical documents. If I reach conclusions very different from those of the School of Criticism, whose originators and chief exponents are German, it is not that I differ from their methods. I fully accept their principle, that the sense of these documents can be ascertained only by resolute criticism; but I think that

they have often carried out their principle badly and that their criticism often offends against critical method" (The Church in the Roman Empire before A.D. 170, p. VIII. The entire paragraph should be carefully read).

Second, the facts were on the side of the traditional view. As Professor Harnack says: "The traditional view holds." The scholarly diligence and candor of Professor Ramsay, dealing with the facts and controlled by them as his studies uncovered them, brought this noted scholar from a somewhat slavish adherence to current critical views to the defense of a view of early Christianity and its sources which is more in accord with the historic tradition and faith of the church. This is the only kind of intellectual defense of Christianity which we need or can possibly use. It is based upon facts and consists in the exposition of those facts. We must remember that any defender of the faith is necessarily a critic and is compelled to use the method of criticism. Criticism is not an occult diabolism for the destruction of truth—but simply a perfectly ordinary and, in itself, innocuous instrument for the ascertainment and expression of truth. The misuse of a method condemns not the method but those who misuse it. Professor Ramsay's invalu-

able contributions to the truth were the outcome of investigations carried out primarily not to prove anything nor to disprove anything, but simply to ascertain the facts. All Christian history indicates that Christianity has everything to gain and nothing to lose by investigations of this character.

The loss which has resulted to the cause of Christianity through neglect of opportunities on the part of recent leaders of Christian thought to do an underground work of this sort is incalculable. In three instances at least the results of this neglect are apparent. Until very lately the field of Old Testament investigation has been left almost entirely to the more radical schools of criticism, with the result that these writers and teachers have gained control of the instruments of dissemination to such an extent that it is somewhat difficult for more conservative views even to get a hearing. Evidence is now beginning to come in that this surrender of the critical field is not due to lack of facts, which can reasonably be urged on behalf of the Bible, but to a lack of Ramsay's scholarly work in the gathering and preservation of these facts. The case has been allowed to go by default.

Again Christian thinkers and leaders have failed to occupy, with sufficient energy and effec-

tiveness, the important field of religious psychology. To such an extent the pioneer work in this department received a powerful anti-Christian and even anti-religious impress. Professor Leuba's recent book shows that a larger percentage of psychologists are anti-Christian or un-Christian than of any other class of intellectual leaders—and that in spite of the fact that these teachers are dealing directly with religious thought and experience. This result is the more inexcusable in view of the wealth of material which is at our disposal. Christian teachers are just beginning at this late day to appreciate what the profound and scientific study of Christian experience can do on behalf of our faith.

Once again we cannot but feel that recent leaders of Christian thought have failed to keep abreast of the needs of the day in the matter of Christian origins, and particularly the pagan surroundings of nascent Christianity. There are workers in this field, but many more are needed, for the wealth of material still unused is great. In short, one of the most crying needs of the hour is a vast increase of scholarly activity on the part of those who believe in the truth and finality of the Christian religion. Why is it that so few who really believe thus in Christianity are willing to give themselves with unstinted devotion to

the work of amassing such a treasure of Christian scholarship as shall present with some adequate degree of fulness the Christian case to the scholarly world? We have much to do. The work must be organized. The field must be subdivided. Adequate means of distribution must be provided. A definite program for a great and worthy propaganda must be prepared and carried out. The cross of a new crusade of Christian scholarship must be lifted and carried forward. But we must remember that the basis of this ambitious undertaking, and the one condition of its success, is the recognition of the fact that the Christian apologist is the Christian scholar—a discoverer and interpreter of facts. We have had too many rhetoricians and stump speakers in this undertaking. We need a new generation of consecrated, tireless Christian scholars.

IV. The Christian apologist of to-day must be a genuinely catholic Christian.

We are of course using the word catholic in its legitimate etymological sense. There is a place and a work in the world for the provincial type of sectarian or partisan Christian—but neither his place nor his work is in the field of apologetics. The first task of the apologist is the difficult one of self-emancipation from views of truth which are exclusively individual or nar-

rowly partisan. It is necessary to remember that the apologist faces an unbroken solidarity of negation. However much those who disbelieve may differ among themselves, they are one in their opposition to Christianity. And this opposition to Christianity is directed against the system *in limine* and as a whole. In such discussions the *essence* of Christianity is at issue and that alone. The unbelieving world has no interest in the *minutiae* of interpretation within the system of historic Christianity as it presents itself to the world without. Christianity and anti-Christian world views face each other at the center. It is imperative that the advocates and interpreters of Christianity present a united front and sink minor differences in devotion to those essential principles which we hold in common, and which, for that very reason, are of vital importance to the world. Voltaire once said that Christians were fiercely debating whether Christ had one will or two, while the Saracens held possession of the Holy Sepulcher.

All debate on minor points of interpretation or emphasis are fundamentally frivolous in the view of the world's great need and its searching elementary questions. Why should Christians debate the inscrutable relations between the divine will and human freedom, when men are asking

whether God is or not? Why should we divide as to the time or manner or program of the last things in the world's history, when men are asking whether Christ is coming at all or not, nay, whether He rose from the dead—even more, whether He ever came or not?

The apologist has no interest in questions which divide Christians from each other, but only in those deeper and more vital issues which divide all Christians from the non-Christian world. A former missionary in Japan used to tell this incident in its bearing upon his life and thought. He was sailing one glorious starlight night on a river in Japan, in company with certain intelligent and thoughtful Japanese. They had been talking about the cosmic system—the greatness, the exactness, the splendor of it all. Suddenly one of the Japanese gentlemen turned to the missionary with this query: "You have come here to tell us that the Maker of all this [with a sweeping gesture] was born of a woman, at a given moment in the world's history, in a given spot of the earth's surface! How dare you preach such a doctrine?" The missionary said that in that very moment all interest in any question that could reasonably divide Christians was burned out of his soul forever.

Any man who has come into authentic com-

munication with the mind of the unbeliever necessarily recognizes the vital necessity of concentrating the defense of Christianity upon vital and essential points. It is Christianity itself which is at stake. It is Christianity, therefore, in the broad, essential, historic sense which we are to defend.

The very carrying out of such a task, which visualizes an unbelieving world reaching out groping hands after God, will broaden the mind to the compass of a world-wide, comprehensive Christianity and emancipate it from narrow and provincial views of Christianity. The defender of the faith will need and desire to have the essential system at his back and all genuine believers at his side.

We have thus endeavored to state, in simplest outline, the task of the advocate and defender of Christianity in the present era. The call goes forth for men of the highest type for this most exalted task—sincere, scholarly, industrious, broad-minded, constructive, patient, penetrating, able in amassing facts, equally able in presenting them. Who is sufficient for these things? We should be discouraged were it not for the fact that God always raises up men for His tasks, and fits them for the work they have to do. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And

there are diversities of ministrations, and the same Lord. And there are diversities of workings, but the same God, who worketh all things in all."

CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE BIBLE

IT may confidently be asserted that the study of the Bible and Biblical religion will enter upon a new and striking phase of development when adequate attention is paid to the mental processes of the Biblical teachers and writers. The study of religious psychology in general is already producing a large and increasing body of suggestive and permanently valuable facts and interpretations. A comparatively new science, it is already passing beyond the initial stage of rash theories and hasty generalizations to something like a sane maturity.[1] The attempt to force an arrest of constructive thought within the mental sphere alone, which is, of course, the proper range of descriptive psychology, and to account for religion on purely subjective grounds, is a passing phase which is even now beyond the bloom. The objective reference is becoming increasingly necessary in order to save the primary postulate of all

[1] Steven, Psychology of the Christian Soul, ch. I.

science, the rationality of human experience as grounded in the cosmic order. A single generation of students has witnessed a great change in this respect, say, from the earlier to the later writings of Herbert Spencer or from Spencer to William James. The latter's findings, rigidly confined within the sphere of descriptive psychology, may not be satisfactory from the point of view of the positive theologian but are immeasurably in advance of earlier deliverances.[2]

This science, however, needs for its own sake to complete its survey and crown its work by a thorough-going, candid, first-hand study of the psychological foundations of the Bible. All that is attempted here is a sketchy and tentative essay toward a better understanding of what must be undertaken in such a study. It involves a review of certain prolegomena to the detailed investigation which many masters in many fields must carry forward.

To accomplish with any degree of satisfaction even so modest an undertaking as is here proposed requires, by way of preliminary, a brief survey of certain fundamental facts in the psychology of religion.

The common basis and proximate root of all religion and, we may add, of all religions is in

[2] Varieties of Religious Experience. Lecture XX.

the religious instinct of mankind. This instinctive religiousness which is the maker of religions is a primary, normal, and universal constitutive element of human nature. It may be repressed, perverted or overlaid with secondary and acquired instincts which are in conflict with it, but it is always there. Like all instincts the religious, at bottom, is an organic and involuntary response to environment. In this sense it is given to no man to determine whether or not he will be religious. He is religious, because he is so constituted. His religious reaction is just as natural and normally just as inevitable as his response to sunlight or to pleasant sound. If one asks why man's natural environment arouses the religious impulse within him, the only answer possible, in general and non-committal terms, is that nature is so constituted that it arouses religious feeling and man is so constituted that he is so aroused.

But a lead forward is given us in the fact that all human instincts are bound up with personality, involve emotion, are apprehended and interpreted by reason, and are ultimately controlled, or at least directed, by will. Therefore religion which *originates* in instinct *eventuates* in thoughts and actions. Thought and action together bring about experiences, and experiences are consolidated into institutions and systems of thought. These in

turn play upon instinct, reawaken emotion, and find expression in a new series of thoughts and actions. The whole man, therefore, is involved in religion. If we begin with the idea or action or institution we are led back through emotion to the primary instinct. If, on the contrary, we begin with the instinct it leads forward inevitably to the emotion, the idea, the action, the system, and the institution. In order to destroy religion, therefore, it would be necessary not only to destroy its formal and institutional development but to remake the man by the eradication of his constitutional religiousness. Seeberg's dictum: "Keine Religion ohne Religiosität" [3] holds true. It is also true, since "Die Religiosität ist die Kraft und das Leben der Religion," that, given religiousness, religion is inevitable.

Upon analysis the religious instinct in actual operation is seen to be at once complex and comprehensive, not psychologically distinct in the sense that a single or specific faculty is involved in it. It is only when we define it in terms of its object that its specific character is disclosed and made definable. As a mode of feeling it involves the sense of dependence, of awe and reverence, of union with a vaster life, of responsibility to authority both moral and social. As a mode of

[3] Grundwarheiten, p. 10.

thinking its necessary intellectual implicate is the idea of God, meaning an extra-cosmic living being, who is the object of the religious instinct and the cause, psychologically speaking, of that complex spontaneous reaction which we term religious. The late Dr. Behrends once said: "There would be no religious feeling except for the thrust and push of the self-revealing God." We may bring this statement within the limits of psychology by saying what is the undoubted fact, that there would be no religious feeling except for *that which is conceived* of as the self-revealing God.

Here, and here alone, the religious instinct finds completion and satisfaction. Complex as an activity which involves man's whole being necessarily must be, the religious activity in its objective reference is always simple and direct. Its object consciously or unconsciously pursued is always extra-cosmic living being. No being or thing is ever the object of worship or the cause of religious emotion which is not conceived of as personal and extra-cosmic. To interpret and to justify this simple, straight-going objective reference is religion's intellectual task.

It is quite evident from this brief survey that the final differential of religion is to be sought in the region of ideas. The instinctive factor which is behind and beneath the entire religious

life of mankind, for the very reason that it is universal, is relatively constant and for purposes of comparative study negligible. Hence, the unconscious fallacy involved in much contemporary use of the comparative method. Religious ideas are interpreted in terms of the instinctive elements which are present in all systems alike and are, therefore, relatively valueless to explain the differences which separate the various systems from each other. Instinct is always static. It operates mechanically and uniformly unless subjected to the manipulation of conscious purpose. Its results are uniform, not various. Instinct explains nothing because it explains everything. The same may be said of the many attempts with which we are familiar, to interpret religion in terms of emotion. Emotions do not grade or even define themselves. A religion (if such could be found) which is purely instinctive or emotional would be a religion unconscious of itself and incapable of improvement. Paul's exhortation to the Ephesians (5:18), to distinguish between being drunken and being filled with the Spirit, was by no means merely rhetorical. There have been times and occasions when this elementary distinction was not made. When an ancient banqueter was overcome with wine and fell under the table his brow was crowned with a chaplet, indicating

that he was peculiarly "under the influence of the god." It is only by virtue of intellectual discernment and the application of ideas that one is able to tell the difference between the exhilaration of wine and true spiritual enthusiasm. The ancient Greek or Roman was not sufficiently enlightened to make the distinction. Alcohol has been deified in practically every ethnic system. So far as feeling alone is concerned there is little to choose between the frantic excitement of the Hindu dervish and the exaltation of the Christian saint.

As has often been pointed out, mystic and emotional states are cognate and unmoral and can be graded only on the basis of their positive content of ideas. The only specific differences in emotions apart from their intellectual contents is in the measure of intensity which they exhibit and the comparative freedom of expression which they are allowed. Instincts are powerful or feeble, emotions are strong or weak. All other differentiation among them is through the ideas with which they are associated. In this connection it is important to note that no religion is altogether devoid of intellectual content for the very simple reason that no human emotion is ever altogether devoid of the intellectual element. Every human feeling, even on the level of mere physical pleasure or pain, involves the element of intel-

lection. Every feeling is present in self-consciousness and is a part of it. Hence, in every religious system, however elementary, there is an element of thought. At the lowest point where the instinctive impulse which we call religious differentiates itself from the psychic complex which forms the impersonal basis of our conscious life, the idea is already present and at work. The religious instinct enters at once into the realm of mind and associates itself with ideas. Only thus can it manifest itself as religious.

Here, too, the work of discrimination must be conducted. That religion is rightly regarded as lowest which remains nearest to the merely instinctive level and has the fewest or weakest ideal and intellectual elements in it. At the summit of classification is to be placed that religion which yields the richest treasure of thought. This advance is not purely intellectual but also moral, as the ascending movement of regulative as well as interpretative ideas involves a progressive refinement and exaltation of emotions which become sentiments,[4] animating and inspiring rational conduct. Tiele maintains that religious progress proceeds *pari passu* with the development of the human self-consciousness. Religion must keep

[4] For this distinction see Galloway, Principles of Religious Development, pp. 111, 112.

pace with the widening mind which is becoming conscious of higher needs and always demands for them higher satisfaction. On all accounts it is clear that the grade and standing of religions must be determined in the sphere of ideas.

But, at this point, a very important fact emerges. The human mind is thrust forward by inner impulses of which it can give no rational account. Even logic, which is the mind's account of itself, is a discovery, not an invention. The mind which is most highly cultivated and most aware of its own operations most clearly recognizes that feelings and impulses which modify or even control thinking in its self-conscious forms rise from unfathomed and unfathomable depths within. A feeling sways us which we can neither control nor describe. A thought arises within us, we know not how. A conviction seizes us, we know not why. We argue from premises we did not lay down, and we reach conclusions which we did not foresee or desire. Many of our most cherished convictions were in part made for us through our constitutional predisposition to see and accept the grounds upon which they rest. We cannot control absolutely either the forms of our experience or the impressions which that experience makes upon our minds. We can hardly believe in truth at all except as we believe in some-

thing closely akin to inspiration in connection with this process which controls thought before thought, consciously directed, begins. Principal Fairbairn has uttered a very striking and suggestive remark when he speaks of religion as "the greatest of all man's unconscious creations."[5] When we speak, therefore, of the psychology of the Biblical writers we have in mind not only their explicit teachings, consciously set forth to persuade others, enforced by argument and appeal, but the more or less unconscious prepossessions which lie behind the thoughts which are expressed in the spoken word.

These anticipatory mental processes, which are vague, ill-defined, but potent, universally govern our thinking and precondition our teaching. A prophet or wise man may tell us what he believes and why he believes it. He cannot tell why the facts or principles, which he urges on behalf of his views, convince him. He usually does not know. For to make the discovery which would lead to knowledge on this point involves a depth of introspection of which few men are capable. A man is persuaded to a mental conviction which he holds with a thoroughly self-conscious grip by mental processes of which he can give little or no account. These lie in a region deeper than

[5] Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Preface.

the plummet of ordinary self-consciousness can reach. The conviction the aforesaid thinker is prepared to expound in words and to defend with arguments. Of the prepossession which entered into his process of persuasion he is ordinarily unconscious, and consequently he makes no attempt either to explain or to justify it. Principles which are thus taken for granted usually may be classed as *governing prepossessions*. We seek, first, for such ideas or principles in the minds of the Biblical writers, for here we shall come closest to the original source and flow of their thought and be able to know it for what it really is.

We may begin with their emotional intensity. The Bible is marked throughout by a certain intense and flaming enthusiasm. The varieties of thought and expression contained in the sacred library are psychologically unified through the operation of this characteristic and pervasive medium of sacred emotion. The fire is often lambent, sometimes pent within the bones of the writers, but its warmth is always perceptible. In so saying we have not particularly in mind those portions of the Bible which might seem most directly to answer this description—the lyric outpourings of the Psalmists or "rapt Isaiah's wild seraphic fire"—but such unlikely documents as political annals, royal memoirs, canonical law codes,

and meditations of the wise on problems of destiny and duty. We are not at all prepared to say that the religious instinct was stronger in the Hebrews than in other races. We do not believe this to be true. But it is clear that by some means the religious instinct in the case of the Biblical writers has been powerfully awakened and released in such freedom and fulness of expression as to *submerge the secular consciousness.* In the minds of these writers "holy unto Jehovah" was to be—indeed, already was—inscribed upon the bells of the horses. All life was suffused with holy light and endowed with sacramental meaning.

Wellhausen has issued a dictum to the effect that the closer one gets to the actual reality of history the more profane it becomes. He holds, therefore, that the Old Testament (and the principle must apply also to the New) as it has come to us is at an indefinite distance from its original sources, distinctly, repeatedly, and *unhistorically* rewritten under the influence of religious enthusiasm and in the interest of what he terms "pedantic supranaturalism." The critical value of this principle may, we think, reasonably be doubted—its suggestivness is undeniable. The whole Scripture is bathed in this glow of religious feeling. What effect this quality may have upon historicity we need not stop to inquire. Its significance from

the viewpoint of religion and its value as a spiritual force are quite beyond estimation. It makes the Bible *in all its parts* a unique instrument of religious inspiration because it is impossible really to come into contact with it without feeling the influence of this pervasive and dominant quality.

Professor Davidson laments the fact that in the book of the Judges we have gathered together such crude materials, the lives and adventures of warriors and border chieftains and local heroes of very limited spiritual capacity, and surmises that if the careers of other and more representatively religious persons had been available we should have had much more satisfactory views of the age and a much greater book. We are not so sure. The religious insight which can spiritualize a career like Samson's, and in general reap such rich harvests from such scanty sources, is perhaps worth more to us in the long run than the lives of saints. At any rate it exhibits the intense religiousness of the Bible writers who, whatever they may have found in their national annals, left nothing untouched by their intense and sacred enthusiasm.

We need not deny or ignore the counterbalancing fact that the emotional warmth of the Bible writers was drawn in part from the nobility and elevation of their ideas, for so it must have been.

None the less it remains true that intense feeling lay back of their ideas. It was secretly energizing in the minds which did the thinking. It conditioned their approach to truth, their entrance upon its possession, their use of it after they had gained possession of it. It was a matter of mental predisposition, of racial and individual temperament, woven into the fiber and bred into the bone of successive generations. This intense emotional response to great ideas was conditioned upon a constitutional responsiveness, latent in the very blood and soul of a great race as embodied and realized in its elect leaders. No wise student would presume to give an exhaustive account of the many influences which from the earliest days converged to form the minds of Israel's teachers. The essential point is that these minds were formed *long before they began to think,* for they longed, aspired, and felt before they were able to see clearly what afterward they saw and uttered. They were made not only *by* ideas but *for* them, and when the ideas came they were received into minds and hearts molded for their expression. When the Psalmist says: "I have believed, therefore have I spoken," he tells us only a part of his experience. He never could have believed had he not had the *will* to believe, and he never would have cared to believe or speak had he not been

aflame with love of the thing which he had discovered. The prophet and the apostle felt that they were called of God and formed for their work from birth and before. We cannot doubt it. Back of the mind is the race and the history which made it. Back of the discovery of truth is the search for truth. Back of the search for truth is the longing for truth. Back of the conscious longing for truth are the deeps of personality reaching down to the secret springs from which our elementary and irresistible impulses flow. Out of this secret reservoir of life came the enthusiasm which so seized the Biblical writers and so marked their work. It is this enthusiasm, so completely lacking in self-consciousness as to produce the noblest art without the thought of art, which has made the Bible the world's literary masterpiece. The making of it goes back of our knowledge of the most remote past.

We may now fitly turn to more definitely doctrinal conceptions. The fundamental theistic idea of the Bible is the essential disparateness of God and matter. This conception is not a definite or formal teaching. It is an *imbedded* idea, a governing prepossession, which underlies and conditions the actual, consciously elaborated teaching.

The foundation of this teaching is laid in the idea of creation. Our discussion of this point

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is altogether apart from any questions which center about the age, origin or authority of the creation narratives of Genesis. Logically (and only thus are we interested in it) the doctrine of creation underlies and conditions all other Biblical doctrines. It is original with the Old Testament in the sense that here for the first time, as regards contemporary documents, the idea of an absolute beginning of the universe in an act of personal will is expressed and consistently developed and applied. It is an idea which lies beyond the range of either science or philosophy and is very difficult either to hold or to state.

In the Biblical statement certain difficulties inherent in languages are overcome and many pitfalls well known to students of science and philosophy are avoided by the happy expedient of stating essential truths in the language of phenomena. In this way discoveries in natural history are neither anticipated nor antagonized. The Biblical statements "run around the outermost rim of all possible discoveries." It is this truth which the Biblical writers have made the key of their doctrinal scheme. This we call *teaching,* truth which is aware of itself, consciously held and consistently enforced. But we are not now concerned with this doctrine save to point out that it is not merely a starting point—it is a point of arrival

and long is the way that leads to it. This teaching is preconditioned by the conception already stated, which is nowhere argued but everywhere taken for granted, that God is in essence distinct from phenomena. The doctrine rests upon a pure assumption that the entire cosmos is a concatenated series of effects, the cause of which is to be sought outside the series and by the use of different categories. This is a very laborious and technical way of stating a conception which in the Bible is nowhere formally stated, but, rather, so completely assimilated as not to have been consciously present in the writers' minds as they wrote. The idea of creation is a stupendous conception, and the attainment of it by the Hebrews, at so early a date that no trace of any other is discoverable in their documents as these have come down to us, is one of the many marvels of their history. It is taken for granted by historical evolutionists that the Israelites must have passed through a period of nature worship, but if they did it was so early that, of the mental struggles or debates through which their emancipation from this thraldom must have been achieved, not a trace remains.

We repeat that the doctrine of creation is a majestic and thrilling conception. Professor James' depreciation of it in comparison with the Hindu

conception of emanation was due to a confusion of the true Biblical doctrine with the deistic conception of an external and mechanical fabricator. To the Biblical thinkers the universe is the working as well as the work of God. The point here, however, is not the creation doctrine in general but the peculiar fact, already alluded to, of its foundational support. When one penetrates deeply into the arcana of the doctrine of cosmic creation he finds himself in the presence of a vast structure of contributing and supporting ideas, superficially hidden from view and yet entering structurally into that which is seen. Central among these is the distinction between God as Spirit and the world as material. This is not to be mistaken for any primitive ghost notion, for the ghost of spiritism is material of finer structure than the ordinary matter, but material none the less. As a matter of fact the distinction between body and soul of current usage is not a Biblical conception nor is the distinction between God and the material universe based upon that contrast. The Biblical idea is something more than a recognition of the divine as spiritual or invisible. In animism and polytheism of the pronounced naturistic type there is a recognition of the divine as being the inner and spiritual essence of material objects. Says Professor Hopkins: "Many

have been the vain attempts to go behind the believers of Vedic hymnology and reduce Indra, Agni, and Soma to terms of a purely naturalistic religion. It cannot be done. Indra is neither sun, lightning, nor storm; Agni is neither hearth-fire nor celestial fire; Soma is neither planet nor moon. *Each is the transient manifestation of a spirituality lying behind and extending beyond this manifestation.*"[6]

It is true that there is no such thing as a pure naturism in which a natural object *as such* is worshiped. There is, however, a relative naturism which to all intents and purposes is the same thing, namely, a conception of the divine power and the physical manifestation *as one and inseparable.* The Biblical idea is that God and phenomena are essentially distinct and bound together only by the *will* of God. All material processes are looked upon as the expression of His transcendence and freedom. He is essentially of a different order of being. In His innermost essence God is altogether apart from phenomena. This qualifying thought is not definitely promulgated—it is *imbedded* in the doctrine of creation which is everywhere taught. It is, for example, made the basis of the crusade against idolatry in Isaiah 40 and elsewhere. Moreover, this idea, nowhere ex-

[6] Religions of India, p. 91. Italics mine.

plicitly stated but everywhere implied, is itself conditioned by a prepossession which is manifestly unconscious. It has often been noted that, according to our way of looking at it, the cosmos is strangely dwarfed in the Old Testament cosmology and in the Bible as a whole. The modern mind has been greatly scandalized by the astronomy of the Bible which has been said to consist of a single verse. Whatever may be said on this subject in general (for there is great difference of opinion), it seems to be sufficiently clear that we are given a geocentric and restricted view of the stellar universe.

In so saying we must not forget the momentous religious consequences of this comparative depreciation of nature on the part of the Hebrew writers. It was due to a correlative exaltation of personality as the key to God and nature. The melancholy results of making *nature* the key to God and man are written large in the history of religion. In Babylonia, in Egypt, and, above all, in India, where nature has been allowed to dwarf man, religion has wandered in the mazes of a self-contradictory polytheism or been swallowed up in the abyss of pantheism. Among the Hebrews alone this bondage to disappointment and futility was avoided. And it was avoided through this prepossession for personality, and through

this alone. Some writers hold that this interest in personality was itself in turn due to a preponderating ethical interest which led on to the interest in personality where alone ethics is grounded. This is quite likely to be true, but since the ethical interest was equally unconscious this supposition merely pushes the mystery a step farther back. The fact remains that when the Babylonian and the Egyptian, with genuflections and prostrations, were worshiping the heavenly bodies, the Hebrew thinkers were able to dismiss the stellar magnitudes with the curt and amazing sentence—from the viewpoint of religion the most majestic conceivable: "He made the stars also."[7] This comparative depreciation of the physical universe, this resolute clinging to personalism in the interpretation of the world, this use of *will* as the key to cosmogony, this recognition of God as distinct from His phenomenal operations—this whole fruitful tendency of thought belongs to the category of unconscious prepossessions. It is thinking before thought begins.

Another ruling idea of the Biblical writers which is to be classified, like the one just discussed, as an unconscious prepossession is the conception of the natural order as inviolate. In numberless ways the Bible writers express the thought

[7] The clause reads literally: "The stars also." See Gen. 1:16.

that the operations of nature are in a very real sense ordinances. In what the Bible says about parents and offspring, the succession of seasons, the connection of seed time and harvest, the movements of the heavenly bodies, there is very evidently expressed a deep sense of order, regularity, and law. The Biblical writers, universally, have passed out of fairyland, where anything may happen at any time and in any order, into an everyday land of regulated occurrences under the law of God.

We have designated the Biblical conception of the natural order an unconscious prepossession for two principal reasons. The first is that the Biblical writers are most emphatic in regard to the regularity of nature, when they are most deeply absorbed in other thoughts—another *thought* perhaps we ought to say. For example, Isaiah 40:26 (compare verse 12) is a characteristically complete and beautiful expression of the thought of God while the idea of order is purely secondary and ancillary. The same may be said of Psalm 19. In the former passage the focus of attention is the thought of the incomparable majesty of God as seen in His control and direction of nature. In the latter the central idea is the divine revelation through nature in its regular processes. In both utterances the mind of the writer is con-

cerned primarily and consciously with God, not nature, and with the latter merely as the expression and disclosure of God. They describe nature as they *see* it, not as they think of it—they are *thinking* of God. The second reason is far more important. The Biblical writers unconsciously look upon the regularity of natural operations as furnishing a disclosure of God. The ability to discover God in the prosaic monotony of natural processes depends absolutely upon the *imbedded idea,* to which no formal expression is anywhere given, the latent *consciousness* that God can thus be revealed. This is a very advanced idea indeed, and yet the Biblical writers have so completely assimilated it that they proceed silently upon the assumption of its truth. They are guided by it and yet are unconscious of it.

It is usually asserted by scientific historians of religion that the discovery of the supernatural is made through unexpected and striking deviations from the observed natural order. Exceptional events awaken the sense of a power within and above nature. The difficulty with this explanation, in so far as we attempt to apply it to true religious progress, is that exceptional events, wonders, and portents in general have no educational value except to minds deeply indoctrinated with the idea of a divine significance in the regular

order of natural events. Unrelated portents, to a mind superstitiously responsive to the exceptional and blind to the divine order, teach nothing of permanent value. The appetite for marvels grows by what it feeds on, often without any true vision of the divine. (See Psalm 78:19, 20; John 6:30.) When the portent fades the superstitious thrill to which it gives rise dies away. The Hebrews were taught by what they considered miracles (we deal with the subjective aspects only), but it was because there was deeply ingrained into the mental constitution of their leaders and teachers a sense of the divine order, the pledged regularity of nature's ordinances. Their intense personalism introduced no element of caprice into their view of the world. The regular order was, to the Biblical writers, so fixed, enduring, unalterable, that any deviation from it involved the immediate presence and action of the Almighty. Hence the rarity of miracles in the Bible. As a wonder book it is really not of the first class. Its miracles come at intervals, occur in cycles, are centered about great personalities and critical eras. More than this, they are educative, progressive, cumulative in effect. The Bible is frankly supranaturalistic—it is with equal frankness naturalistic (Mark 4:26-29). Of mere wanton wonder-mongering there is none within its

covers. And (as we hold) unconsciously the teaching of the Bible is directed and controlled by the thought that God is revealed in the world which in its beautiful regularity and order is the expression of the divine mind.

Still another great regulative idea of the Bible writers is the activity of God in history. There are at least four specifications here which deserve more than passing notice. God is looked upon as bearing a constant and vitally intimate relationship to the universe at large and to all the living beings in it. The idea of origination passed at once, and by a perfectly smooth transition, into the idea of an immanental connection of God with the world which is sustained and carried forward by its Creator along the line of His creative purpose. Creation is a continuous process. It is, of course, quite true that the general notion of a divine participation in human affairs is no exclusive idea of the Hebrews. The kings of Assyria and Babylonia as well as the rulers of Egypt constantly affirm the presence on earth of the gods and their leadership and activity in the royal undertakings. The Greek and Roman mythology is full of instances—which indeed form its substance—of manifestations among men of the gods and of alleged instances of actions on their part directed toward quite mundane ends. But, what

we have in mind is something quite different. And we are strongly impressed with the fact that this fundamental difference in method and outlook lies deeper than the ordinary range of self-consciousness on the part of a teacher of men. The ethnic gods are represented as participating in human affairs in one or both of two ways. Either they appear *in propria persona* in human form and perform physical acts in which their divine powers are exhibited, or, they are present in the persons of rulers who incarnate or, strictly speaking, *embody* them as in the royal birth-fictions of Egypt.

In the Bible the participation of God in human life, including such exceptional events as the very occasional theophanies of the Old Testament and the incarnate life of Christ, which is a unique event, is represented as occurring *historically and under the conditions of history*.[8] That is, His activity among men is conditioned by the fact that it *is* human history and that the divine government, while supreme and paramount, is moral and spiritual, divinely self-limited with respect to the deputed sovereignty of the human will. The Biblical writers do not say that. It is nowhere expressly stated that God limits or conditions Himself in human history. They do not say it because they are not conscious of it, but they so

[8] See Sweet, Study of English Bible, pp. 133ff.

represent it. The career of Jesus, for example, which the Biblical writers affirm to be an incarnation, is so essentially historical that we can trace in detail the authentic records of the human life of the Son of Man. The Gospels record "the toils, the energy, the love and wrath, the defeat and triumph of the brief career which changed the world." He entered the world through the lowly gateway of human birth; He passed through all the vicissitudes of human experience; He submitted to death and escaped from its power only through a unique, awe-inspiring exhibition of divine power on His behalf. Men *were allowed* to "kill the Prince of life, whom God raised from the dead" (Acts 3:15). With this historical character of the incarnate life fully agree the representations we have in such passages as Isaiah 42:14-17 to which Principal Smith refers as the "passion of God." With this passage in which God is represented not as "regnant" but as "militant and agonizing," crying out in the anguish of a despised and thwarted but undying love, compare the whole representation of the divine dealings with Israel from the beginning to the end of the record, and the meaning of the expressions used above will be made plain. That God is in history, the Hebrew writers consciously hold and explicitly teach. But the mode in which they

apprehend the divine presence among men and the way in which they interpret it seemingly go far deeper, even into the unconscious molding and prepossession which govern the mind in its action.

The Bible has a very striking doctrine of racial unity. In the course of the development the idea that the human race in all its branches, including Israel and the "nations," is one in origin, blood, and essential constitution undoubtedly comes to explicit expression. When Paul says (Acts 17:26) that God "made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth," and when the author of the Apocalypse echoes the same idea when he speaks of the redeemed as being "of every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation," these teachers were undoubtedly voicing a clear and conscious conviction which had been taught them and learned by them. These expressions, therefore, represent the final outcome of a long historical unfolding. But, as to the origin of the idea we are by no means so clear. In fact, it is a very complex question. Taking the Old Testament documents as they stand and making no attempt to sift them critically, we find that while the fact of one original and essential human stock is everywhere taken for granted, and implicated in terminology, narrative, and doctrine, it is nowhere explicitly and formally stated. The

human race back of the human races is a primary Old Testament datum. The unity of the human race is "implied in the accounts of the Creation, the Deluge, and the Tower of Babel, and in the genealogies of Genesis."[9] The idea of racial unity is deeply involved in the Biblical teaching about sin and redemption in both Testaments. But everywhere, except in Paul's speech and in the words of the Apocalypse, it is presented by implication only. Here is a most amazing situation. The Biblical writers have hit upon a great idea which has become interwoven with their thinking so intimately that they do not, until the latest generation, seem to think of it in the way of fixed or voluntary attention at all. They take it for granted. Moreover, we are quite safe in asserting that the conception of racial unity is not only a great idea, it is also a great truth—the first and greatest of all truths with respect to man himself. How did these early writers get the idea which they so implicitly accept? The hypothesis of revelation which would be a great relief to us at this moment is forbidden by the limits of our subject. We are also forbidden to find in the stories, genealogies, and doctrines of Scripture anything like anthropological science. All we can

[9] W. F. Adeney, Hastings Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. III, p. 226. See Davidson, Old Testament Theology, p. 217.

count upon here, if we ask for common consent, are myths, family and tribal traditions, doctrinal interpretations, more or less developed. The strange fact is that on a basis so insecure and unscientific the Biblical writers have reached so important a truth, *apparently without striving or conscious effort.* And the earliest Biblical writers have attained truth not only with respect to the main idea of racial unity but also in many details of inter-racial connection. In the tenth chapter of Genesis, for example, we find material not to be despised by the most advanced investigator.[10] The idea controls their doctrinal construction and is historically in advance of all but the most modern scientific thought.

This is the more remarkable when we connect the intensely particularistic race consciousness of the Hebrews with the powerful general tendency of the human races each to find a separate origin for itself in a mythical divine or semi-divine ancestor. The Hebrews based their unique relationship to God not upon creation, in which all nations were included, but upon the redemptive covenant in which they were separated from the nations (Mal. 2:10, especially last words). But the race at large was looked upon as not outside the control of God in Providence or the plan of God

[10] Hastings Dictionary of the Bible, extra volume, p. 79.

in Redemption. We are not attempting here to solve problems in the psychology of the Biblical writers; it is privilege enough to point some of them out. But, surely, it is a remarkable and significant fact that when the Biblical writers began to compose their annals and to formulate their convictions they were under the dominion of a sense of racial unity so strong that their belief is not open to question and does not even call for formal expression. This, too, must be counted among their unconscious prepossessions.

And this suggests immediately another striking Scriptural idea, namely, the natural capacity of man to know God. Every word in this statement has been very carefully chosen and demands thoughtful attention. It has nothing to do with questions of revelation or inspiration, except as it involves the capacity of man *as such* to know God as God makes Himself known. The possibility of exceptional enlightenment, such as is involved in revelation or inspiration, implies as its basis a *natural* capacity to receive the knowledge of God. The presence of a natural capacity, the operation of a concreated faculty of apprehension through which God may be known, is everywhere implied in what the Bible teaches about God and spiritual knowledge. Its entire doctrine of God is addressed to men everywhere in the confidence

that they can understand and receive it. The notion which has recently become current that Christianity was an esoteric doctrine promulgated only to the initiated sounds very modern and scientific but is undoubted nonsense. Against it is the whole drive of the consistent Biblical view that man is *responsible* for his lack of spiritual knowledge because he can know God if he will. Imagine Paul framing an indictment against heathenism on the ground that it has wilfully closed its eyes in the face of a world-wide *natural* revelation of God (Rom. 1:18-21), and at the same time acting as high priest of a cult to participation in which the initiated alone could be admitted. The point, however, as regards the present discussion, is that this idea of an innate human capacity to know God rarely if ever comes to overt expression. The words of Elihu (Job 32:8) might be alleged in contradiction to this, but the context seems to show that the fact of inspiration is emphasized rather than the capacity which is rather implied. The same may be said with reference to another implied exception found in Proverbs 20:27.

As Professor Davidson aptly puts it: "The existence of God is not a doctrine of Scripture in the sense that Scripture directly teaches it. *It is assumed there as a fact, and as an element in the thought of all men; as connate with man.* If

there be men who deny it, or do not know it, it is because by a long course of wilful wickedness they have banished the knowledge from their minds, and their state is not so much miserable as criminal."[1] The point herein emphasized is, of course, the fact urged above, that the Biblical writers take for granted the inherent capacity of the human race to know God as He has made Himself known. It would be a very simple matter to refer this presupposition to the naïvete of primitive thought which unthinkingly accepts knowledge of God along with its other traditional lore. But it would be extremely unsafe to attribute merely traditional notions, which involve unthinking conformity to current usage, to the Biblical writers on any subject. Here it would be especially dangerous because of the emphasis laid by them generally upon the conditions and principles of spiritual knowledge, their clear-cut recognition of the nature and cause of spiritual ignorance, and above all their emphatic insistence upon the superior position of Israel with reference to the knowledge of God. They are far beyond the undisturbed innocence of a primitive belief in the universal knowledge of God. We have again a distinctive psychological factor in the structure of the Bible, a constitutional mental trait, or possi-

[1] Old Testament Theology, p. 73. Italics mine.

bly it might be more correct to say, a truth so thoroughly assimilated as to have become indistinguishable from an unconscious prepossession. At any rate, the idea is *there,* and as an unconscious and effective prepossession which supplies motive power both to the warnings and appeals of the Biblical writers.

We have but one more instance to review in this connection, but it is a particularly interesting one. The unique religious history of Israel was due, humanly speaking, to that unique succession of religious teachers, the prophets. Whatever may be said as to the origin and development of the prophetic order, that this order made Israel and Israel's history in a spiritual sense is beyond question. But if we ask: What made the prophetic order? the answer is by no means unanimous. The broader import of this question we are forbidden to canvass, but one important psychological fact, which secondarily at least conditioned the rise and progress of an order like the prophets, comes within the scope of our inquiry. We refer to the tacit and unconscious acceptance of the right of an individual to speak on behalf of God and with an authority to which the people as a whole were bound to listen. This does not mean that the prophets were popular heroes and always listened to with delight. The contrary we know

to be true. But there was a recognized place among the Hebrews for individualism in thought and speech. A universally acknowledged prophet was never the victim of persecution. The prophetic martyrs died under accusation of using forged credentials. With every qualification allowed, the large place in Hebrew and Christian religious circles allowed to individual leaders is sufficiently striking. It assuredly involved most momentous consequences. The remark attributed to Moses in response to Joshua's complaint against Eldad and Medad (Num. 11:26-30) expresses the ruling conception of the prophetic office. Moses says: "Art thou jealous for my sake? would that all Jehovah's people were prophets, that Jehovah would put his Spirit upon them!" This noble utterance involves the idea that ordination to prophetic dignity belongs to Jehovah alone according to the *secret* counsel of His own will, not according to a prescribed order or canonical mechanism. The prophet is singularly set apart by the immediate touch of a divine grace. It also involves a most thoroughgoing democracy of sentiment inasmuch as it plainly implies that any member of the community might become the recipient of this grace and the organ of God's Spirit and word. If all Jehovah's people might be prophets, then any one of them might be a

prophet. The sovereign touch of divine ordination and that alone would make the commonest man in the ranks of Israel the mouthpiece of God and the recognized peer of the great lawgiver himself. These are the explicit ideas conveyed by the reply to Joshua.

There is another idea involved in the utterance which is not at all explicit or, so far as we can judge, consciously in the mind of the speaker. It is, according to our familiar phrase, an unconscious and controlling prepossession. It is that an individual may be selected and ordained to speak for God. Nominally this is true in any community where a wise-man is consulted in matters of policy, but in practice the wise-man almost invariably voices the will of the community. *Vox populi, vox dei* is the motto of strong communities everywhere. When a man can openly express the wish that all the people of Jehovah might be prophets, he has traveled far from the solidarity which marks the ordinary ancient community. He has a view of things different from the ordinary religious society, even in modern times, for even here individualism is apt to be subordinated to the will of the majority. Israel's history was punctuated by the appearance of great decisive individuals. Modern criticism has too often been blind to this fact and has weakened itself by a

tendency to reduce great individuals to committees, syndicates, and associated ciphers which together are supposed to make great sums. This process does not fit the facts. When it is carried to the limit and beyond, it still remains true that Israel's religious history stands as the record of great names, great men, great crises, great "building eras in religion." Look at a few contrasts. In the long history of religion in Assyria and Babylonia not one single name of an individual needs to be mentioned as having contributed in a conspicuous way to religious advance and uplift. In Persia, or ancient Iran, one name stands out; in Egypt, one; in Arabia, one; in India, two. In Israel—how many? Time fails us to record, as it failed the author of Hebrews when he undertook to call the roll of the heroes of faith. This can only mean that there was in Israel a wider play for individual religious initiative, for great and dominating personalities, than elsewhere.

It is impossible to refuse some credit to the community as a whole for this free spirit and loyalty to the living word of Jehovah. The Old Testament is neither the pamphlets of a triumphant faction nor altogether the dying bequests of gibbeted martyrs. It voices also the hopes and convictions of multitudes of faithful men and women among the people. The New Testament

also is the work of chosen individuals—the Master Himself supreme among them—but it has behind it a united Christian church. The noble catholicity of the canonical Scriptures, in both covenants, goes to the credit of the Jewish-Christian communities at large. It would be very difficult, even to-day, indeed, to form a committee *with power to act* in the selection and rejection of books who would be as broad-minded in allowing freedom to individuality in teaching as the men who gave us our Bible. We have hinted at the momentous consequences to religion of this individualism which made room for the prophets. It allowed the individual an authoritative voice above the local community. In many cases the group sentiment was dominated and controlled by the voice and judgment of an individual. The single individual or the spiritual minority was allowed a voice against the national leaders. The prophet rebuked priest and king and in familiar recorded instances was heard and obeyed. The individual was given a voice above national institutions. Prophets were allowed to bring messages which profoundly modified the popular attitude toward ritual and sacrifice. The individual was given a voice against the nation at large. Jeremiah's career in the espousal of a course which seemed as absolutely unpatriotic as it was unpopu-

lar was troubled enough, but in any other community than Israel it would have been impossible. It was of the genius of Israel that a man like Paul should separate himself from the community and endeavor to lead the whole nation in a new way. Through the working out of this principle Israel's religion was given freedom and movement in a growing organism of truth, continuity as each great leader took up the message of his predecessor, and progress as each carried the work forward to a new stage of fulfilment and realization. Jesus spoke in the true prophetic spirit when He said: "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil" (Matt. 5:17). The spiritual history of Israel is the history of the prophet and his work. The prophetic office and work was made possible, psychologically speaking, by an instinct for individualism, an unreasoned and unconscious catholicity of mind, surprisingly strong in communities marked by such racial and temperamental solidarity as the Jewish and Christian bodies which gave us the Bible.

Here we must make an end. We have not been studying Biblical Psychology but the psychology of the Biblical writers, and that only in the most general and synoptic way. A vast field lies before us here, almost unexplored. It is sin-

cerely hoped that these suggestions may interest some others in the same line of thought. It is a matter not merely of curious antiquarian interest, but great and hitherto unsuspected issues are involved in studies which show the minds of these writers in action. Have we not, already, a suggestion in the fact that the Bible writers were governed in their conscious thinking by unconscious prepossessions, in the fact that they were produced by a historical movement which they did not inaugurate or control, though they did contribute to it, a closer tie between historical Providence and inspiration than we have yet suspected? Is not inspiration a vaster and more far-reaching fact than we have yet suspected? And, lastly, since so great an intellectual product as the Bible could scarcely have been the outcome of an unintelligent process, are we not compelled to look for the vaster mind behind the minds of the prophets and teachers who made the Bible? At any rate, one who knew them passing well said of them: "No prophecy ever came by the will of man: but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit" (2 Pet. 1:21). We have pretty thoroughly demonstrated by our instances the first half of this sentence—are we not carried a long way toward a firm conviction of the truthfulness of the latter part also?

CHAPTER III

THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION

IT is a well-known principle of military science, we are told, that battles are often lost or won before they are fought. Victories are organized or defeats made inevitable, before armies take the field, in the war councils of cabinets and generals. Moreover, we have heard it said that military advantage consists largely in the ability to force the fighting and to determine when, where, and under what conditions battles shall be fought. In our apologetic discussions, wherein we have endeavored to maintain Christianity against opposition and attack, we have too often allowed the opposition, figuratively speaking, to force the fighting and to determine under what conditions the discussion as to the truthfulness of Christianity shall be conducted. They have prescribed the presuppositions which shall govern the debate, and have dictated the nature, extent, and form of proof demanded.

It is more or less of an open secret among re-

ligious educators, though not realized by the Christian public as it should be, that the battle for Christian faith is sometimes lost before it is fairly begun. No one who has had any intimate contact with students in the way of religious education can possibly be unaware that the eclipse of faith is the outcome of a process set in motion long before any specific religious problems come into view. The astronomer is able, on the basis of the known laws of motion, to predict that on a given date the moon will pass between the earth and the sun and darken the latter's face. In like manner the student of religious psychology is able to predict, from the known effects of certain teachings in the classrooms of psychology and philosophy, that when the student turns to religious thought that portion of his mental sky which ought to be most brilliantly illuminated will be mechanically obscured. Much time and pains must be expended in straightening out the perverse epistemology into which these young minds have been betrayed. They must be freed from the theory of knowledge and the conception of verification in which all unconsciously they have been indoctrinated.

An adequate Christian apologetic cannot begin with any formal presentation of its arguments, else it will be subjected to the futility of present-

ing arguments of undoubted weight and force to minds mechanically and hermetically sealed against them. We must begin with a thorough, adequate, convincing presentation of the nature of thought, the range and limitations of knowledge, the constitution and application of reason. We must include within the range of our apologetic method a presentation of the process of verification. This has often been recognized before. More than twenty-five years ago an able teacher of theology wrote as follows: "In attempting to answer the questions which his rational study of Christianity suggests, the student is forced back on questions which reach to the profoundest depths of human thought. Among these are questions as to the reality, the processes, and the possible sphere of human knowledge; the principles and laws of thought * * *."[1] Unfortunately this necessity of raising the previous question, as to the nature of knowledge, has not widely commended itself to our religious writers. Our apologetic writings have been saturated with the notion which really guarantees the position of empirical agnosticism, that "the fundamental difficulties of knowledge do not begin till the frontier is crossed which divides physics from metaphysics, the natural from the supernatural, the

[1] Harris, Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 2.

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world of 'phenomena' from the world of 'noumena,' positive 'experience' from religious dreams."[2]

Let this contention once be granted and the religious position is practically surrendered beforehand. We have been trying to make war on the enemy's terms. The whole agnostic position depends upon a theory of knowledge which breaks the force of evidence and allows no place for religion save the vague, bleak, uncharted regions of the unknown. This point is so vital that it is worth while to delay our direct consideration of the process of verification long enough to examine two striking historical instances in illustration of the truth for which we are now contending, namely, that Christian apologetics cannot ignore the problem of knowledge, and must force the fighting by challenging the epistemological positions which afford shelter and support to agnosticism.

Our first illustration is the case of John Stuart Mill. This English philosopher, who entered the arena of discussion and debate fully equipped as to method, system, and dialectic at the age of twenty, was the exponent on its theoretical side of the inductive scientific method. It has often been pointed out, and demands no emphasis here,

[2] Balfour, Theism and Humanism, p. 142.

that the mind of Mill was artificially constructed —formed according to the ideas of his father by a peculiar system of education. It is not always so clearly recognized, however, that Mill's philosophical conclusions almost to the last iota were implicit in his theory of knowledge. Petersen says: "It was not the education which gave him his spiritual character, but the platform on which he was placed, and from which his education prevented him ever to free himself." That platform, that "standpoint," "was that of his father, that of Jeremy Bentham, that of the French encyclopedists—the baldest materialism" (Schaff-Hertzog, ed. 1883).

This is of course strictly correct. Our contention is that materialism was the *result* of Mill's thinking, not its starting point or precondition, and not only its result but its foredoomed and inevitable result in view of the premises. Given Mill's epistemological theory, no logical mind could possibly avoid materialism.

The scarcely veiled confession of the autobiography, that there was something in religion beyond his ability to understand, is pathetic evidence that he was by a false method of education robbed of an essential part of his inheritance as a man. Mill (in spite of his Three Essays on Religion) was never really allowed to think on religion be-

cause he was never allowed by his invincible theory of knowledge to make it a part of his experience. Mill was an empirical philosopher, with one entire hemisphere of experience automatically closed to him. Shut up with the range of sense perception to the extent of denying the ontological reality even of the perceiving mind, is it any wonder that he found himself unable to understand the rational possibility of religion?[3] Among many illustrations which might be adduced to indicate the prescriptive hold upon his mind of this theory of knowledge perhaps the most suggestive is furnished by Mill's attitude toward mathematics. In the autobiography (pp. 225 ff.) occurs this passage, which may be duplicated in the Logic, in explanation of his antagonism to mathematics: "The chief strength of this false (intuitional) philosophy in morals, politics, and religion lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and the cognate branches of physical science. To expel it from these is to drive it from its stronghold." Hence the denial of *a priori,* or self-evident, truths and the assertion that all general principles are deposits of observation. Hence also the suggestion of a hypothetical world in which two and two make five. It would scarcely be possible,

[3] See Mill on Hamilton, Vol. I, p. 253.

in the light of this instance, to overestimate the power of a theory of knowledge to dictate the results of our thinking.

Our second illustration is the intellectual career of one who might easily have been a disciple and follower of Mill, but who actually became one of the most trenchant and destructive critics of his principles and methods. We refer, of course, to the Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, ex-Premier of Great Britain. In less than a dozen pages of his Gifford Lectures, on Theism and Humanism (pp. 140-151), Mr. Balfour gives us one of the most fascinating intellectual biographies recorded in the history of philosophy. We have already quoted a sentence from this section of his discussion which touches upon the vital issue. The whole discussion is peculiarly worth while because it exhibits concretely the proper method of dealing with the contentions of agnosticism and the proper point at which the issue should be joined.

Mr. Balfour states that he found it impossible upon entering Cambridge as an undergraduate to accept the teachings of the prevalent school because of his radical antagonism to its leading principle.[4] He says: "For my own part, I feel now, as I felt in the early days of which I am speak-

[4] Op. cit., p. 143.

ing, that the problem of knowledge cannot properly be sundered in this fashion. Its difficulties begin with the convictions of common sense, not with remote, or subtle or other worldly speculations; and if we could solve the problem in respect of the beliefs which, roughly speaking, everybody shares, we might see our way more clearly in respect of beliefs on which many people are profoundly divided."

He refers with wonder to the dogmatic assurance of the empirical school as represented by Mill and Leslie Stephen (the author of An Agnostic's Apology), who refer with perfect confidence to experience (meaning thereby physical or phenomenal experience) as the one and sufficient ground of assurance. Mr. Stephen quotes with approval Locke's aphorism about believing in proportion to the evidence one has.[5] According to the view of this entire school, experience as defined above is the court of final resort. On this basis we may avoid controversy, be philosophic and religious agnostics, and at the same time be scientists dwelling at peace in a structure of ordered, satisfying, and indisputable knowledge.

Mr. Balfour retorts with finality: "The field of experience is no well-defined region under

[5] Cf. Orr, Christian View of God and the World, p. 80, note 1.

whose clear skies useful knowledge flourishes unchallenged, while the mist-enshrouded territories of its metaphysical neighbors are devastated by unending disputations. On the contrary it is the very battlefield of philosophy, the cockpit of metaphysics, strewn with abandoned arguments, where every strategic position has been taken and retaken, to which every school lays formal claim, which every contending system pretends to hold in effective occupation. * * * All men nowadays speak well of experience. They begin to differ only when they attempt to say what experience is, to define its character, to explain its credentials, and expound its message. But, unhappily, when this stage is reached their differences are endless" (p. 148). Mr. Balfour's escape from the maze of agnosticism was through the recognition of the *petitio principii* which closed the discussion even before it began.

We offer no apology, therefore, for a brief and rather crudely elementary study of the process of verification, with some slight reference to the specific application of it to the Christian system.

There are four principles which it is necessary for us to remember in all study of the process of verification:

First. There is no essential difference between belief and knowledge. "I suppose," "I think," "I

believe," "I know"—in these four phrases are expressed with some degree of accuracy the stages of intellectual certitude involved in our progressive attainment of truth. The lines of demarcation between these various levels are a little wavering and uncertain; there are foothills both coming and going, but on the whole they express gradations of assurance which are sufficiently marked and distinct for all practical purposes.

It will be seen at once that the entire structure of this discussion is erected around the words, "I believe." It will also be clear upon reflection that the four familiar phrases used above center in the words "I believe." The element of belief is common to them all, and they express degrees of confidence or stages in belief.

When I say "I suppose," my words imply an assumption of truth for argument's sake (see dictionaries) or, more commonly, in ordinary speech, a low degree of probability in favor of a conclusion reached in view of the general situation.

When I say "I think," I mean to express a degree of confidence in a certain conclusion, based upon thoughtful consideration of it to the extent of affirming a preponderance of evidence in its favor. When, however, I say "I believe," I express a state of mental rest in the conviction that a given thing is true.

Finally, in the phrase, "I know," I express the

highest degree of certainty attainable to me. I imply complete and satisfactory certification.

The first thing that strikes one in viewing these affirmations is, that in the words "I know" I can actually express nothing more than is conveyed by the words "I believe," for the reason that constitutionally I can affirm nothing more than the subjective persuasion of truth. We can distinguish belief from knowledge only when our beliefs are held with reservation—for we know only by and through believing. We can maintain the validity of objective knowledge by an act of faith in the intelligibility of experience and the trustworthiness of the faculties by which we organize experience into knowledge. In the very nature of the case, this antecedent possibility of attaining truth must be assumed and granted. It cannot be proved, for we have no instrument for proving other than that whose trustworthiness is already in question. Mind cannot verify itself, inasmuch as it is itself the verifier. If the assumption that mind may be trusted be refused, the whole discussion of knowledge becomes futile as well as unmanageably complex. We are quite content, for the purpose of discussion, to assume the reality of knowledge in the sense in which it is ordinarily accepted as the basis of thought and action.

In making this assumption, which is quite sensi-

ble, inasmuch as we cannot hope to do without it, it is necessary only to point out, as we are now doing, that our entire structure of knowledge rests upon a foundation of assumption and is simply a strong form of belief. Knowledge which rests upon belief is no stronger than the belief upon which it rests.

An unrealized or suppressed premise of all logical processes is the trustworthiness of reason. The critical scrutiny of our knowledge and knowing processes always turns upon the assumption of our competence to criticise. Another premise of the same sort is the coherence and intelligibility of experience. These are assumptions which cannot be proved because they are the very instruments of proof. They can be justified and confirmed only as they are put to the test of experiment and are verified in the actual business of living and thinking. Knowledge, therefore, consists of beliefs sufficiently tested to bear the weight put upon them in practice. In moving through conjectures to beliefs, and onward through beliefs to certainties, we advance without crossing any absolute boundaries of difference in kind. Knowledge is certified belief. In all the process of our thinking and knowing, and throughout all our successive stages of verification, nothing can ever be quite so sure as the instruments of our assun

ance, the unproved assumptions with which we start out. These are: That our experience is coherent and intelligible, and that we have in mind an instrument which, when brought into contact with the reality through experience, can attain to truth. In the final analysis, therefore, truth is self-witnessing. As Professor Ladd has put it: "No certification of knowledge is possible that is not somehow found actually existent within the process of cognition itself."[6]

Second. Mind is co-extensive with experience; that is, there is no non-mental experience. In the final analysis all experience is mental experience. Mind is the central, supreme, and determinative reality. The self as perceiving and organizing agent is the only immediate object of knowledge. What we call (and rightly call) "objective reality" is given to us only in the form of mental experience and in the terms of mind. We know nothing of an objective world, which includes our own sensations, save as mental phenomena, objectified with reference to their cause by a native and irresistible impulse. This objectifying process is justifiable as an operation of mind only on the basis of faith in the trustworthiness of our mental operations.

One side of our mental experience we call na-

[6] Philosophy of Knowledge, p. 105.

ture, and interpret in terms of cause, substance, space, and time. Our experience, in which is included that broadened and generalized type of experience which we gain through reflection and communication with other minds, is an absolute and indivisible unity of thought, within which the only recognizable duality is that of subject and object. On their inner side all these facts which we term objective are mental. The conclusion is that on their outer side they are also in some sense mental. The practical outcome of this experimental fact is that the entire world of our experience lies within the mind and in the form of ideas, and that those facts of which we are apt to speak strictly in terms of the idea (our moral and spiritual ideals, for example) are not less objective and concrete than those other ideas of which we speak in physical terms. They are operations of the same faculties; they are parts of the same experience; they are referable to like causes; they are verifiable on exactly the same basis. We shall not allow ourselves to be cut off from the verification of that part of our experience which belongs to the spiritual realm, on the ground that a higher certainty belongs to another aspect of experience which is itself constituted in mind and in mind alone. To say that our physical experience only is objective, in the sense of extra-mental, is to

say what is not true. To say that our ideals are self-imposed and capable of subjective verification only is not to discredit them. All verification is subjective. Our categories of interpretation, the constitutive laws of mind through which we know all reality, are subjective and self-imposed.

Third. Reason is limited by experience. Taking now into consideration that which is ordinarily meant by the term "reason" (that is, the ratiocinative faculty, as it is termed—the faculty by which we reach conclusions in the persuasion of truth), we at once perceive that it operates in experience and upon the material supplied by experience, and never apart. Reason gives us no knowledge save of its own processes, though it is the medium and condition of all possible knowledge. It is what the Germans call a purely formal faculty. Reason can tell us nothing concerning the objective world save as that world is described in experience.

Logic, which is the science of reason, does no more, as has often been pointed out, than to assure us that we can think without self-contradiction; much less can it, out of its own resources and apart from experience, give us one fact concerning the external world. Rationality in its entirety is the possession of every rational being, but the possession of rationality is quite compatible with erroneous views as to the nature and constitution

of objective reality. All experience is within the mind, but mind may misinterpret its own experience. The universe is larger than our experience, and experience is vastly larger than our rational interpretation of it. At any rate the mind cannot construe reality apart from contact with it in experience. Our conclusions as to objective reality are never final, even though on the basis of experience they are necessary. They are in constant process of revision as experience accumulates and knowledge grows. The function of reason, therefore, is to determine the significance of experience as it is translated into modes of consciousness.

Fourth. Belief is the outcome of a strictly rational process. The words "I believe" register the conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. We believe with the reason; we have no other faculty by which we can believe. We may believe on insufficient grounds, or on what seem to others insufficient grounds; but we cannot believe on no grounds at all. This involves no denial that there is such a thing as the "will to believe." But the will to believe does not imply forcing one's self to believe contrary to evidence, but simply that the will may throw its weight in favor of a given conclusion which might otherwise remain uncertain. A man believes because he

must. In the presence of facts truly presented and rightly understood, the operation of reason is absolutely and infallibly automatic. In the absence of a correct knowledge of the facts, wrong conclusions (because of the trustworthiness of reason) are unavoidable. We are all well aware, of course, that prejudice warps our judgment, and that feeling controls to a very great extent the operations of reason. In the former instance prejudice may induce a man to refuse reason the opportunity to come into contact with the facts, but it cannot control the reasoning process itself. I may refuse to consider facts which are presented to me, but if once I do consider them my conclusions are reached by virtue of the compelling force in the facts themselves. In the latter instance feeling controls reason only by effecting a change in the valuation of facts. We reach conclusions, not merely by recognizing bare, unadorned facts, but partly by estimating their value. Feeling may impose an artificial value upon facts, and by this false coloring mislead reason. We may, under certain circumstances, fabricate experience or imagine facts, and thus reduce our reasoning powers to a minimum or mislead them altogether; but this does not change the fact that belief is the outcome of a rational process.

Fifth. Belief may reasonably extend beyond

the range of experimental verification. All the great generalizations of science are in the nature of extended beliefs that transcend the very possibility of detailed verification. The application of the inductive method in detail to the entire universe is, of course, out of the question. We can, of necessity, observe but a very limited portion of the facts. Yet on the basis of their convictions as to the unity of nature, the universality of law (itself of course a postulate), and the intelligibility of the entire world process, scientists do not hesitate to make generalizations which include within their embrace an immense number of unknown and perhaps unknowable facts of the universe. It ought not to be forgotten that such generalizations, however reasonable and convincing, involve the truly stupendous assumption that in the comparatively narrow range of experience possible to us, even when we extend and refine it through careful experimentation and the use of instruments of precision, we have a disclosure of the essential nature of things, an authentic glimpse of reality which enables us to think securely in realms indefinitely beyond the range of our senses or of these instruments of precision. And this leads to the remark that the world of scientific exactness is abstract rather than real, an ideal construction and creation of the mind rather than one of actual

physical realization. We have no instruments of absolute precision; we can, therefore, take no absolutely accurate measurements. We have no correctly given fixed points from which measurements can be made. We have to idealize the world in order to bring it completely under subjection to the scientific method. From the point of view of abstract dynamics, fixed points and immutable foundations are needed, but there are no such except within the mind—"the earth is the scene of incessant convulsions, and the fixed stars are like a swarm of flies." The writer of these words goes on to say: "The costliness of the devices to eliminate terrestrial oscillations in certain attempts at experimental precision, and the elaborate calculations to unravel the 'proper motions' of the less distant stars, are plain evidence of the truth of this seemingly extravagant statement."[7]

It is no reflection upon the work of the scientist to say that it is conceived and executed in the workshop of the mind, and that its perfection and finish are due to tools finer than those of sense. The significance of the world lies in its relationship to mind. Its meaning consists of its fundamental ideality. The ponderable realities of out-

[7] Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. 1, p. 78. See whole chapter.

ward experience are essentially thought-forms, else we should not be able to know the world at all. In this outward experience we lay hold upon ontological reality simply because it is a part of the life of the mind wherein we reach directly and know at first hand essential being. It is quite legitimate for the scientist, on the basis of a profound conviction as to the structural unity of nature, to generalize from incomplete data—to judge the whole from a very small part. But it ought not to be forgotten that it is not a strictly logical process. The spectroscope proves the presence of familiar metals and gases in distant stars, provided it be assumed that the same effects always indicate the same causes, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the presence of a new cause will of necessity produce a new effect. We believe firmly in the testimony of the spectroscope, for without such beliefs (which are incapable of proof unless the assumed premise be granted) science would be impossible.

It is quite evident, therefore, that into the most severe and exact science, bound to the inductive method and reaching its conclusions step by step through the most painstaking experimentation, a large element of faith—unproved trust—is infused at the very beginning of the process. Faith has been well called the "torch of science," without

which investigation is impossible. Even natural law is "a hypothesis, a postulate, an epistemological precondition of the possibility of scientific experience, but not itself a fact of experience." As the author of these words also says: "Such a statement involves no disparagement of science." We believe in natural law, once it is properly understood and defined, just as we believe in nature itself, because we trust the operations of mind.

We are now prepared to summarize the possibility of verification as preliminary to the specific application of it. The process of acquiring knowledge, or the progressive establishment or verification of our beliefs, consists of two operations which are distinct and yet necessarily move forward together. The first is the training of the mind as an instrument of intellectual precision. The second is the progressive enlargement of experience. Mental training is an essential element in the gaining of knowledge. The laws of reason are universal and inexorable; the operations of the mind are spontaneous and in natural harmony with reason. None the less man has to learn the use of his own mind. The obvious difference between the untrained mind, with its loose and inexact ways of thinking, and the trained mind, so swift and sure in action, is evidence enough of the necessity of this process. The very

first of the objective realities which man encounters in his movement outward upon the world are the laws and operations of his own mind. These he must learn in order to know the world itself. To be sure, he learns to know them by using them, but back of all mental operations, and furnishing the motive power to thought, are the impulses of self-expression and self-preservation, which are the primary and elementary impulses of life. Man thinks and learns because he lives, and wishes to live abundantly. His mind is the instrument of his life, and in living he learns to use his mind. The process of his enlightenment is, so far, the progressive development of his mental powers and the application of them to experience. But this is not all. In addition, the voluntary enlargement and enrichment of experience are necessary. Because he wills to know, man becomes the investigator and experimenter. He seeks to enlarge the area of his experience, and endeavors with infinite toil to penetrate beneath the surface of it. He breaks into the experience of other men, and enlarges both his intelligence (by combining it with that of others) and his experience (through the same combination), until there comes to be a racial mind and a racial experience, or, to be more exact, a collective mind

which expresses the deepest experience and most careful thinking of the race.

When we review the field of verification in the light of the foregoing principles we are able to designate, with somewhat greater precision than at the beginning, the degrees of certainty to which we are able to attain.

A. At the foundation of all certainty, securely imbedded in the nature of reason itself, are the postulates of reason, which are principles laid down in advance of all thinking as the prerequisites of the thought process itself. These are incapable of proof, and independent of it. They rest upon a basis of self-witness more secure than any issue of the reasoning process can possibly be, inasmuch as they condition that process itself.

B. Next to these postulates come necessary or universal truths. These are ideas also wrought out of the nature of reason itself, the contrary of which cannot be thought without self-contradiction. These necessary ideas form the apparatus of demonstration. We demonstrate by the application of necessary ideas to concrete items of experience. Demonstration is possible only where our knowledge is exhaustive. The process is dependent upon the universality of the premises upon which it proceeds. No inductive process

which does not, extensively and intensively, involve complete knowledge can give more than relative certainty. For the most part our demonstrations are limited by our ability to make premises by definition. No matter how certain our logical processes may be, if the premises are uncertain the outcome is infected with this primary uncertainty.

C. Next to necessary truths comes that body of common experience which remains relatively constant, whatever our views may be of its ultimate nature. What we call the external world, the phenomenal side of experience, is relatively a stable object of thought, and is, as an element of experience, constant and reliable. The subject matter of the descriptive sciences is found here. Science, apart from its theory, is a careful definition and orderly statement of our phenomenal experience, a large part of which is at once common to the race at large and to the relatively small body of scientific observers. Science collects, arranges into groups, classifies according to general principles, and describes for purposes of identification certain facts which belong to the world of experience in which all men live. The common and universal quality of this experience is one element of our security in the process of building up scientific beliefs.

D. Next in order come probabilities—beliefs based upon a greater or less preponderance of evidence in their favor. Among these conclusions resting upon probability, which Butler claims to be the guide of life, are scientific hypotheses—theoretical constructions framed to explain related groups of facts. Speculations as to origins, the attempt to discover genetic connections in the process of development, theories of matter and energy all belong to the class of tentative beliefs, probable in proportion to the number of facts which they explain, but not final nor absolute in the face of incomplete knowledge of the data involved.

E. Individualized experience, which is peculiar to the subject of it and can reach others only by verbal communication, is dependent upon historical testimony. Individualized experience which involves common factors, accessible to all may pass into immediate verification by the process of experiment along the lines of the original experience. A man, even in his most unique and individual experiences, may be simply a pioneer along the pathway of experience in which others may follow after him. Historical testimony, therefore, is of two kinds: That which is open to repeated experiment and therefore continuously and universally verifiable, and

that which is private and self-enclosed to the individual who first knows it. This becomes credible only on the basis of confidence in the testimony of the witness.

We may now briefly suggest the concrete application of these general principles to the verification of Christianity. The Christian religion is, in essence, a mode of approach to God historically conditioned by the person of Jesus Christ as disclosed in the New Testament and as now living and working in the lives of men. It is, therefore, in the final analysis, an interpretation of human life in and through the historic and living Christ. "What made the [Christian] religion was the significance His person had for thought, the way in which it lived for faith, the mode in which it interpreted to reason God and the universe, man, and history. * * * It is by virtue of this idea that we have the Christian religion, and that it has lived and reigned from the moment of its birth until now."[8]

The verification of Christianity belongs primarily to the sphere of psychology and history. In other words, the appeal is to the facts of human nature and human experience. In verifying the vital principle of Christianity, which affirms the continued presence and living influ-

[8] Fairbairn, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. 478.

ence of Christ, the immediate appeal is also to consciousness in its specifically Christian form. If there is competent evidence to show that the key to the essential meaning of human nature and human life is to be found in Christ, our positive and constructive proof is complete. In other words, if it can be shown, historically, that men consciously need and are consciously experiencing access to God in Christ, then, on the basis of an intelligent conception of the meaning of human nature, Christianity is vindicated. But this positive and constructive proof has certain historic implications which react in the most decisive way upon our general conception of the constitution of man and the nature and possibilities of human experience. It is quite evident that the differential quality of Christian experience lies in the continuity which it assumes between the past and the present, conceived of as centering in the experience of reconciliation with God through Christ. This interpretation identifies the Christ of history and of experience. "It is a distinctive mark of the Christian religion that it blends together inseparably the historical and spiritual." The writer just quoted also says: "Clearly such a faith [the basis of Christian experience] which is a spiritual act has its roots in history and that in two ways. First, our concep-

tion of what Christ is as the indwelling life of the church, and of the individual soul, derives its content from His earthly character and work. Secondly, He Himself possesses His present power to deliver and renew us because He was once a sharer in the moral struggle of our race, and came forth from it victorious."[9]

The vindication of this inward and spiritual element in the Christian life is inseparably connected with the verification of the historical. It is true that the fact of Christian experience, the central principle of which is a conscious relationship to the living Christ, bears heavily in favor of its historical implications; but that experience is so manifestly based upon historical considerations that separate attention must be given to these. It is evident that the connection between the historical and the spiritual elements in Christianity is established in a series of unprecedented physical events. The mysteries of the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Ascension are essentially transitional and connective events, bringing together and uniting the historical and the spiritual elements in the Christian religion. These alleged events bring Christianity under observation by the scientific mind, and dictate in a measure our mode of procedure in vindication of its rationality.

[9] Forrest, The Christ of History and Experience, pp. 3f.

We are not now attempting a proof, merely indicating the sphere within which the proof must be conducted. In the first place, we must remind ourselves that Christianity claims to be a rational system. It makes much of belief, and emphasizes strongly the necessity of faith as an organ of spiritual vision. As we have seen, however, faith (that is, trust beyond the range of experiment) is an element in all reasoning processes. Christianity admits the unprecedented nature of the events which it alleges in the career of Christ, but maintains that the belief in these events is entirely reasonable because they are supported by many infallible proofs. It assumes the ability of the mind to know the truth concerning God, indeed to know God Himself. It assumes the inviolability of natural law to the extent of affirming that any breach in the continuity of natural processes involves the immediate agency of the Supreme Cause. It maintains the essential unity of the natural and the supernatural by affirming that the unique person and career of Jesus reveal the inner and spiritual meaning of the world process itself. "In him all things stand together." As far as physical science and theory are concerned, Christianity (including its miraculous elements) is entirely compatible with any interpretation of nature which is in harmony with known facts of consciousness and personality. It is en-

tirely congenial to any one of a thousand conceivable theories as to the ultimate constitution of matter, the nature of energy, and the phases of cosmic change through which the universe has passed. As long as these theories keep within the sphere of physical facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from these, Christianity has no quarrel with them.

One concession which science is compelled to make in its own interests Christianity demands. The centrality and primacy of man in his own world of experience, and the essential harmony between the human mind and the experience which centers in that mind, must be allowed. Without this primary confidence science is impossible. Having made, as we have said, this concession in its own interest, science cannot take it back by erecting the physical order, considered not in its actual and concrete reality as given in experience, but abstractly and imaginatively as something apart from mind, into a false primacy which reduces mind to shadow and unreality. The fundamental fallacy of materialism in all its forms lies in our utter inability to know or even to conceive of a world lying apart from mind. The creative preeminence of mind is the first principle of science, which can never be revoked by science except at the cost of self-destruction. The ultimate trust-

worthiness of self-consciousness as disciplined in the school of experience is the first corollary of the principle on which all scientific investigation proceeds. This principle once granted, Christianity has a free hand to organize the testimony of experience in favor of its view of the world, and in so doing is the legitimate heir of all that science has done to give fulness and richness of meaning to those organizing ideas of unity, order, and law which are the formative elements of any harmonious and intelligent conception of the meaning of experience. The simple and undeniable fact that belief in Christianity does not compel one to any specific type of scientific theory, but is equally compatible with any one of many which is in harmony with the principles to which science is irrevocably committed, makes possible the spiritual interpretation of all physical facts, and the hearty participation of Christian thinkers in building up that structure of knowledge upon which science is engaged.

The verification of the exceptional historical elements which enter into the Christian Gospel lies in a region outside the range of science. Physical science has no apparatus with which to recognize or identify a miracle. For science, a miracle is merely an unclassifiable physical event. By definition, it is an event without an immediate

physical antecedent. For science, this is an event beyond the range of its methods of explanation. Such an event can be catalogued with other events: "Not yet classified or explained." It differs from other members of its class only in the fact that it can never be explained by any formula which science has at its disposal.

On the other hand, science has no apparatus with which to controvert either the possibility or the actuality of miracles. The only actual principle which science can apply to universal experience is the law accepted as a postulate that the same cause will always produce the same effects. All its predictions regarding the future, as well as all its speculative reconstructions of the unknown past, rest upon the proviso, *ceteris paribus*. It has nothing to say concerning the results which may have followed in the past, or may follow in the future, the operation of new causes, except to affirm that they must necessarily be different. Unless science is prepared, however, to commit itself to the "eternal regress" in the phenomenal succession, it must somewhere in that succession come upon a physical fact that has no physical antecedents. Origination is miracle. Unless, too, one is prepared to look upon the world both as cause and effect in which the succession of events is bound together by a mechanical necessity (an altogether gratuitous and ambiguous supposi-

tion), he must admit that every event has antecedents which are not physical. Every physical event partakes to some extent of the character of a miracle, and the totality of connected events in the series which makes up the world process is one gigantic miracle.

The nescience in which all science ends, in the attempt to frame ultimate physical explanations of the world, simply shows the limits of the method. The encircling and impassable wall of the unknown by which all the physical sciences are surrounded exhibits the fact that no further progress is possible in that direction. The frontier of all investigation by physical methods runs on the hither side of final explanations. Science cannot be commandeered on either side in the battle of world-views. The attitude of incredulity, in so far as it represents hostility to stubborn and unclassifiable facts, is essentially unscientific. The first step in scientific education is to divest one's self of antecedent prejudices so as to yield complete obedience to the actual world order as presented to us in experience. As we have already seen, reason can give us no objective fact. No amount of abstract reasoning could give us beforehand the number of quills in a bird's wing or the length in miles of the orbit of Neptune. Such items of information can be gained only by observation or by inference from other known facts.

The objective experience out of which science is built up has very little regard for antecedent probabilities. Our very sense of what is possible is continually under assault by the facts of the natural order. One who looks upon any cycle of experience as completed and closed, and consequently as a criterion of probability, is likely to be forced into an attitude of blind antagonism to indisputable facts. Many of these facts are (at least when first seen, and often permanently) on the face of them inherently incredible.

The exceptional historical events of Christianity are no more inherently incredible than any other exceptional events which defy classification according to the methods and tests of physical science. Professor Huxley has said: "The mysteries of the church are child's play compared with the mysteries of nature."[10] Why then such obdurate skepticism concerning Christian history? In Professor Huxley's case, simply because he would not admit that spiritual view of things in connection with which the wonders of Christianity become harmonious and consonant elements of one great system. The agnostic, he says, rejects theology "simply because in his judgment there would be no evidence sufficient to warrant the theological proposition even if they related to the commonest and most every-day propositions."

[10] See Gore's Incarnation, etc., p. 266.

This means that the evidence for the miracles of Christianity would not be sufficient to prove them if they were not exceptional events at all. It also means that evidence enough to prove these events, if they were not miraculous, would be enough to prove them as mircles. The upshot of the whole matter is that the difficulty of miracles is not the improbability of these events as such, but the implication of spiritual causality immediately behind them. It amounts to the refusal to consider the evidence at all, on the ground that no evidence to prove the real point at issue can be found.

This instance is cited simply to support the contention that the exceptional nature of the historical contents of the Christian Gospel does not outlaw it from the realm of rational explanation, provided one admits other evidences than those of the senses, and other tests than those of physical science. Science, acting within its own legitimate sphere, can interpose no *a priori* bar (as Professor Huxley admits) to belief in the historicity of the Gospel narrative. Science, as such, is agnostic in regard to miracles, not because they are any more inherently incredible than other physical events, but because the only possible explanation of them carries one immediately into a world of reality not accessible by the scientific laboratory method. The fact that this supersensible world of reality (which is behind miracles, not only, but

all events alike) is not accessible by the method of physical science is no proof of its non-existence unless it be affirmed that our only instruments of knowledge are those used in the investigation of physical data. This we take to be an altogether false, irrational, and misleading conception of knowledge, which in the ultimate outcome is quite as fatal to science as to religion.

The special manifestation of this world of the unseen on the platform of visible history in a series of exceptional events, such as are alleged by Christianity as proofs that such a movement from the unseen to the seen has taken place, is by no means inherently incredible and is susceptible of the strongest rational vindication. At the center of a converging network of inter-related evidences which indicate the divine origin of the Christian religion stands the unique, unassailable figure of the Christ who is Himself at once the supreme affirmation and the inexpugnable proof of Christianity. To refuse, to evidences like these, the right to be heard at the bar of reason is to refuse to the sun the right to prove that day has dawned upon the earth.

"And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of an only begotten from a father) full of grace and truth."

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT

IN the preceding chapter we were chiefly concerned with the process of verification as such. We made very slight use of the theoretical principles developed in the course of the investigation, for the reason that our main purpose was to clear the ground of preliminary difficulties and *a priori* objections. We did this somewhat laboriously in order that we might clearly discern, in outline at least, the proper field within which we are to make application of the general laws of verification, to arrive at so much of rational conviction as, in the premises, we have a right to expect. We now propose to enter and occupy a portion of the field thus defined. Our first task is to measure Christianity *in limine* as a psychological fact—that is, as a product of the human consciousness. Wherever our task may ultimately lead, here it certainly begins. Whatever else it may be, however much more it may be, Christianity is indubitably a product of the human consciousness. We

wish to study it as such, and, at the outset, as such alone. Having once laid hold upon the mental phenomena, we may reasonably attempt to fathom its significance, test its reality, fit it into our general scheme of thought and life. But to the mental facts first.

We naturally turn here to our extant records of Christian origins. In so doing we make no demands upon the historicity of any narrative. Call the New Testament, in its entirety, legend, myth or dogma, it yet is the literary expression of the thought of its writers, and as such we wish to examine it. What did the New Testament writers think concerning Jesus, and what light does their witness throw upon the human consciousness in its relationship to God?

The first fact which strikes us upon opening the New Testament is that, though still in the flesh, we are in an ideal world—a world of God. This world of truth, of law, of righteousness, having its center in God, is looked upon as actualized in the person of Jesus Christ, an historic and human personality. The first word of the New Testament is a word of fulfilment: The "kingdom of God *is at hand.*" And this Kingdom is at hand in the person of Jesus; the historic *human* process has arrived at completion in the arrival of Him in whom that process is fulfilled. What-

ever the New Testament writers believe as to those elements in the person of Jesus which transcend the human category, they assuredly believe in the reality and sincerity of His human life. Whatever they believe concerning the Divine Being He was, they also believe (and with full assurance) in the human being which He became.

Their convictions concerning the Incarnate One, His mysterious past, His glorious future, His enthroned and illimitable power, His invisible and immortal kingship, rest upon the immovable conviction of His genuine incarnation. His advent is a birth, His life a development, His obscure and toilsome youth and manhood a preparation, His ministry a task, His victory an achievement. He was and remained to them the perfect man. To the end of the Apostolic Age He was the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. 2:5). His story, therefore, becomes a doctrine of man, an interpretation of human life, an utterance of the religious consciousness of surpassing interest and worth. Jesus, therefore, is the ideal man who is the fulfilment and realization of the historic process conceived of as the progressive utterance of God's thought of man having its natural realization in the man of God's thought.

One by one these great ideas emerge as we read the story. Jesus is the perfect man who ful-

fils the purpose for which the world was made and the human race was brought into being, because He was the sinless man. God's world of order and beauty, which at the beginning He made in order to express in it His own nature, to make it the image of His own infinite perfection, comes to bloom and fruitage in the career of Jesus because in Him was no moral defect. He fulfilled the world because he fulfilled the law of the world. He brought to light the meaning of the world and disclosed its secret by being in harmony with its intent and purpose. The sinless man is the actualization of the divine and ideal world.

Jesus was the sinless man because He was the obedient man. His sinlessness was no mere cosmic product, no mere mechanical perfection, but the issue of freedom, the outcome of the loyal acceptance of obligation. It was as the personal will of God that Jesus saw and accepted the law of life. The Gospels are filled with the reiterated expressions of Jesus' devotion to the Father's will. These expressions, repeated at every turn, culminate in the utterance of the intercessory prayer: "I glorified thee on the earth, having accomplished the work which thou hast given me to do" (John 17:4). This sentence is noteworthy in more ways than one, but this much at least and

primarily it involves, that Jesus was given a work, that He consciously accepted it as a task, and that He loyally carried it through to the end. The whole story, as the Gospels tell it and as the more developed doctrinal portions of the New Testament recall and apply it, involves the truth that all that Jesus was, as exhibited in what He said and did, flowed forth from the central fountain of devotion to God and was the unfaltering expression of His loyalty as human son.

Moreover, according to the same testimony, Jesus was the obedient man because He was the holy man. His consciousness from beginning to end was that of unity and harmony with God. He was in conscious and unbroken fellowship with God from childhood to maturity and through every phase of His career. He lived in the beatific vision and worked in the power of it. To Him, the skies were open and God was ever present. He was never alone—until the mysterious and awful hour of His doom His vision of God was never clouded and He walked in the light of Heaven. And, strangely enough, in view of His assertions of unity with God, the center of that consciousness of fellowship rested upon a basis of trust. His work was the work of God in Him. What He did, He did by divine permission and gift. He was begotten of God, which

means that the very human nature He wore was inwrought through divine creative energy. He was called of God and ordained by the baptism of the Spirit to His mission. His was the Spirit-led, Spirit-filled, Spirit-fed life. Jesus was the ideal, the sinless, the obedient, holy man, because He was the trustful man. The Father's acknowledgment: "Thou art my Son," was accompanied by the filial acknowledgment: "The Son can do nothing of himself." Jesus was what He was by virtue of His unbroken filial consciousness, issuing from His unbroken filial dependence. Out of His trustful Sonship, cherished amid all vicissitudes of life, issued, as the river comes from the overflowing spring, His blameless life of service and power.

The story of Jesus, therefore, from this point of view is the consummate literary expression of the conception which is the essential moral core of all religion, that the true life of man is in God. The ideal (who is the only real) man is the man whose life is established in fellowship with God. The perfection of character and life in Jesus was the natural result of this complete and holy union with the Father. What He attained is the divine purpose and intent of God for all mankind. To this end He created the world and to this same end has patiently worked through all the ages of human history.

But this is only the beginning of the wonderful cycle of ideas which center in Jesus. We have in the career of Jesus Himself, whose life is the realization of the ideal human life in God, an exhibition of the fact that humanity needed to be reconciled to God. The conflicts and the victory of the Son of Man show how deep the breach between the ideal world and the actual. It was only through the blood of His cross that peace could be made. Jesus was the perfect man but not without cost. The ideal manhood did not flow forth from the deep fountain of Christ's devotion to God in a smooth and unopposed current, along placid ways "where it is always afternoon." What is the meaning of the note of stress in the career of Jesus—of conflict, of trial—which issues in a hard-won victory? That this element appears in the life of Jesus and is looked upon by the New Testament writers as a central element in its meaning there can be no possible question. His public career is ushered in by a crisis of temptation, and the entire meaning of this life is repeatedly made to turn upon the victory thus achieved.[1] In Hebrews there is a most touching reference to the fact that whatever Jesus achieved

[1] The fact that John omits the narratives of the temptation and the agony in the garden only serves to bring out more clearly the unique emphasis he places upon our Lord's mental struggles in the last phase of His ministry. (See John 12: 23-28.)

was through suffering and trial. Jesus, "because of the suffering of death," was "crowned with glory and honor." This is an echo of Paul's "wherefore" in Philippians 2:9. Without controversy the New Testament is full of this idea.

Whatever this may mean, in its widest application, it must first be regarded from the point of view of Jesus Himself. Undoubtedly, the ultimate issue of His life is something which He accomplished for others; but the vicarious accomplishment must have been the extension and overflow of what was primarily an individual and personal achievement. The salvation of men was the purpose of Jesus' life, but He actually had to live in order to fulfil that purpose. He was tempted, tried, and tested. He struggled and conquered. He qualified through a personally achieved victory for the headship of the redeemed race. What is the meaning of all this? Is the meaning difficult to read? Jesus lived in humanity. He shared the nature which in us is the seat and occasion of sin. He was absolutely sinless in that nature, but only at the cost of self-conquest over the weakness of the flesh. Can we doubt that the career of Jesus as the perfect man was not merely the realization, or fulfilment, but the reconstruction of the nature that He bore in becoming a brother to us? Deeply seated in that

nature was the immemorial and unbroken tradition of sin. In order to the attainment of the perfect human character He must make conquest of human nature. He must die in that nature to the sin latent in it in order that we might have a new life in Him. (See Rom. 6:10.)

The moral victory of Jesus was typically and vitally the resurgence of humanity. He accomplished the reunion of the human nature which He wore with God by sacrificing Himself in it for us and subduing every natural human impulse to the Father's will—in sacrifice *even unto death.* In His death in this vital and personal way we were reconciled to God.

Nor is this all. Jesus came into our world, not merely to reveal the ideal world of divine thought and purpose, but also to win men to participate in it. He was not merely artist, poet, interpreter; He was prophet and deliverer. His idealism was militant, aggressive, missionary. Jesus was not philosopher, content to explain; He was also preacher, eager to win.

And it is necessary to get rightly the gist of His proclamation. It was emphatically and consistently a message of recall to God. The first utterance of Jesus was a deep-toned and authoritative echo of the message of John the Baptist: "Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at

hand" (Matt. 4:17). From that point on He proclaimed the "gospel of the kingdom" which is the "Gospel of reconciliation." The most striking (because the most unexpected, and for the most part unsuspected) evidence of the fact that the word of Jesus, from the beginning, was a Gospel of reconciliation, of recovery to God as the condition of blessedness and power, is to be found in the Sermon on the Mount. Contrary to the common idea of it, the Sermon on the Mount is not an *ethical manifesto,* a moral charter for the new Kingdom. It is theological throughout, intended and framed to bring men into a new relationship with God. It is the Kingdom of God which He preaches, and we must return to God in repentance before we can become members of the Kingdom. He begins with the series of remarks or aphorisms concerning blessedness, which we call the Beatitudes. What is the condition of blessedness in the Kingdom of God? We find the condition in the words which immediately follow the series, ending with this expression: "Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 5:16; cf. 5:48; 6:4, 6, 8, 15, 18, 26, 32; 7:21). How can we glorify our Father who is in Heaven?

Because the qualities and graces which the disciples show forth are His.

Therefore, the gist of the lesson is, not that there is blessedness in the mere possession of the qualities of meekness, purity of heart, etc., but in possessing and exhibiting the life of God. This is the keynote and undertone of the entire sermon. It is the relationship of men to the Heavenly Father which is the urgent and appealing note of this great message. To win men to God is to win them to blessedness, to true charity, to prayer, to sane and simple and dignified views of life, to faith, to gentleness and discrimination in judgment, to the choice of satisfying and permanent realities in their ambitions and activities. To win men to God is to win them to the good, the beautiful, and the true. This is the "secret of Jesus"—which indeed is no longer a secret, for He plainly told it. It was this purpose of universal recovery which animated and controlled all that He said and did. And the final implication of everything that He said was, that His own Sonship was the expression of humanity's true relationship to God. He not only constantly implies, but also explicitly states (as, for example, in the parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son) that God, who is eagerly

waiting to be gracious, still values men, though they are sundered from Him and are lost; and that the way back to Him is open. These words on the lips of Jesus are peculiarly winsome because so consonant with the whole tone and temper of His life. He was always the Reconciler; on the one hand, always trying to commend God to men, as tender, patient, placable; on the other, trying to win men to God as sons. What could be more startling, for example, to our rigid and somewhat narrow notions of propriety than to say that God "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust" (Matt. 5:45)? But what could be more natural for one whose mission was conciliatory? What could be more seemingly absurd than to tell men that they shall be perfect like God (Matt. 5:48), but what more natural if He really believed that in reunion with God men might share His nature and become like Him? It was the task of Jesus to remove all misapprehension as to the attitude of God toward His human children, and to win them to a new filial relationship to Him. Into this single channel Jesus poured all the treasures of His devotion. Into this message went all the intensity of His zeal, all the power of His holy living, all the winsome earnestness of His gracious character. His closeness to God, His

insight into the divine character, His wonder-working power, His discernment of human motives, His spiritual authority, His penetrating and persuasive speech—all were directed upon the task of winning men to God. "Never man spake like this man," for never had man such things to say.

But the mission of Jesus was not to be fulfilled either in His life or in His message. The tragic need of the world could only be met by a tragic deliverance. Whatever more it may mean, the death of Jesus certainly means that human sin and alienation from God had gone too far to be overcome by a supremely gracious example of holy living, or by a message of love and reconciliation, though voiced by One incomparable in His knowledge of truth and in His ability to express it. We have seen that at the very beginning the ministry of Jesus gives evidence of a conscious purpose on His part to restore the world to a new life in God. It is not very long before evidence is given that He is conscious of the sorrowful fact that His mission cannot be accomplished except at the cost of His life. He is to be, not merely the Reconciler, but also the Reconciliation. "The Son of man also came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Mark 10:45). The shadow of

the cross comes to rest upon His pathway very early, and that shadow deepens rapidly to the final tragic scene. The general New Testament interpretation of this event is another evidence of the profound and awakened religious consciousness behind these records. Here then is the theory, spread at large upon these wonderful pages.

The death of Jesus was the result of His rejection at the hands of those to whom His message of reconciliation was addressed. They rejected Him because they were blinded and hardened by sin, which made it impossible for them to respond to the message of God or to receive the Messenger. They refused to be reconciled. The death which Jesus accepted by anticipation, not as a *fate* which could not be avoided, but as a *work* to be undertaken and finished, was to achieve the reconciliation which His preaching of the Gospel had failed to accomplish, in two ways.

First, it was to reveal sin and to judge it. It was to reveal sin as it is in itself, and in its results toward God. In rejecting Jesus men were rejecting God. In putting Jesus to death they were placing a seal of finality upon that rejection. In the light of the cross they were to see their sin in all its blackness. They had poured out innocent blood. They had lifted up their hand against

the Lord's anointed, and brought to shame and disappointment their own sacred national hope. They were to stand self-convicted in the presence of the condemning act which their own hands had accomplished. They were fixed in conspicuous shame forever on the cross which they had caused to be raised.

But second, in the gracious purpose of God, the cross was to be the tragic instrument of deliverance by being made the instrument of repentance. God was pleased, in His reconciling grace, to bring men under *judicial condemnation* in order that they might be brought into a new life of holiness and hope. These intimations the disciples gathered from utterances from the lips of Jesus Himself, who anticipated His death and faced it with unfaltering resolution, but always refused to look upon it as a finality. "When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am he, and that I do nothing of myself, but as the Father taught me, I speak these things." As an instrument of judgment, condemnation, and deliverance the cross became transformed from an instrument of shame, punishment, and degradation into the holy symbol of penitence, faith, and undying hope. In the light of the cross and the Resurrection, followed by its sequent events, repeatedly predicted but not really apprehended,

the disciples gained an insight into much that had hitherto been concealed from them. These tragic and glorious events, rapidly succeeding each other, opened the way for higher, broader, deeper views of all that they had experienced in sharing the self-disclosure and ministry of Jesus. The very skies seemed to become transparent, and the secret councils of Heaven were opened to them. Almost at once their uncertain glimpses of Jesus as belonging to the eternal order, transient flashes of light which in passing leave the darkness deeper than before, moved forward to a thoroughly intelligible and established conviction of His heavenly origin and destiny which did not obscure but brought into fullest light and glory the meaning of His earthly life. In that discipleship, by daylight on the way from town to town, at night pillowed beneath the stars, they came to recognize that they had had fellowship with the Lord of Glory.

The life, which they had thus intimately known, belonged to the ages, and belonged now to them in an eternal fellowship, because it was before time began and was to endure when the stars had grown pale. The life they had known was not a mere bubble floating on the stream of time, soon to vanish away, but the living utterance of the very eternal significance of time itself. In that

life they now clearly realized what they had always dimly felt, the throbbing of infinite love and the steadfast movement of an eternal purpose. The very Son of God, the eternal, personal Word of Jehovah, had become flesh and tented among them, and they had beheld His glory. The life of Christ, therefore, both as revelation and as sacrifice, is taken to be the activity in time of God Himself. All that Jesus was in Himself, and all that He said and did, was predicated of God. As revelation, the Logos; as servant, the Son; as sacrifice, the Lamb of God. The total significance of Jesus may be expressed thus: The Revealer of the divine ideal in the perfect life establishes that ideal through reconciliation accomplished by sacrifice. As Harnack says: "The paradox of Christianity is that the Creator is also the Redeemer." The cosmic process is also redemptive. Creation and the sacrifice on the cross are steps in one consistent and progressive unveiling of God. The passion of God, which is the militant expression of His love, ideally made known in the prophets, becomes historical and actual in the life of Jesus. The preacher, the seeker, the winner of men is God Himself. The same Lord who is the Shepherd of Israel is also the Shepherd of those who do not belong to that fold. He goes forth to

seek, at whatever cost, those who are His own. "Other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring * * * and they shall become one flock, one shepherd." This is the voice, not merely of a brother man, but of God Himself, who became our brother in order to win us to God.

The place and importance of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in the historic unfolding of the thought of God, are not far to seek nor difficult to interpret. It is the fulfilment of the desire of nations the world over and the ages through. It is moreover the logical development of the Old Testament conception of God. The Old Testament is unfinished. It is magnificent expectation, but an expectation standing alone is necessarily a fragment. It demands historical fulfilment, a concrete embodiment, a true divine incarnation, in order to round it out to completeness. In their interpretation of God, not merely as eternal wisdom and power, but as militant and agonizing love, the prophets gave tremendous hostages to the future.

A theism of pure reason, which gives only the Supreme Cause, makes comparatively few moral demands upon history. A theism grounded in the conception of active and redeeming love makes an immense demand for moral results.

The philosophic thought of the Greeks consciously reached the limit of speculation when they had clearly apprehended the need of the human heart for a full historic revelation of God to men. They never reached the point of realization, but they did give most explicit utterance to the sense of need. The wisest of them all, in outlining his thought concerning the immortal life, urges upon his followers the necessity of embarking upon this speculative hope as upon a raft —the best they could do until one of the gods should come to earth and show the way. At the very time when the Greek philosophers were thus stating their sense of need, and longing for a special and fuller revelation, the Hebrew prophets were flinging wide open the gateway of the future, with the insistent proclamation that God would surely come. In so doing they (as we have said) mortgaged the future. After having so positively and affirmatively spoken, "history must come around to the side of faith" in order to save them from disappointment and discredit. A prophecy is a fragment until it is joined to its complement in historic fulfilment. A prophetic fragment, denied permanently its complementary fact, would be a sad and final commentary on the vanity of human wishes, for it would stamp with futility our noblest hopes.

The writers of the New Testament, one and all, declare that in the career of Jesus they are presenting the historical complement to the prophetic expectation. It is not necessary to support at any length this statement by citations or by arguments. This conviction is written on every page of the New Testament. It is the essential and factual basis of the entire Gospel proclamation. "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Even as it is written in Isaiah the prophet" (Mark 1:1, 2). "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy." (See Rev. 19:10.) What we need to point out here is, that the higher view of the Person of Christ involved in the doctrine of the Incarnation is a necessary part of the idea that He fulfils the Old Testament expectation.

All that could be said concerning the love of God through inspired men had been said and well said through the prophets. From that point of view the Old Testament is no fragment, but is nobly complete. When the prophet says: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love: therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee," he has given worthy voice and expression to the divine love, sufficient (as a voice and verbal expression) for all time. Jehovah's love for Israel and for all mankind finds suitable and noble utter-

ance again and again in the Old Testament. But love is the one thing in the world that cannot remain a matter of verbal expression, however noble and appropriate. Love in words is love in shadow and reflection. Love can be expressed only in action, and is measured and made concrete in sacrifice. Now we are far from saying that God's love to Israel is not manifested historically, for it is. But there is a significant difference in this respect between the Old Testament and the New. In the old history God is lovingly, transcendently, in sovereign and administrative power, directing movements for the good of His people and exercising His good will on their behalf. These utterances of love are therefore spiritual, not historical; mediated through the inspired consciousness of the prophets, not in actions. They are messages of pleading which disclose the heart as fully as tender and beseeching *words* of evident sincerity ever may. In the New Testament the divine love in Christ is disclosed through actions performed in person, through suffering which He Himself endures. In this fact, that the career of Jesus brings God among men to suffer with them as He seeks for them, the New Testament is the fulfilment of the Old. In this fact, also, the higher Christology is necessarily involved. Otherwise, the New Testament contains

nothing new, nothing essentially different from what has already been experienced under the old dispensation. The whole Bible is thus made into a fragment, for the expectation of God which it awakens is not fulfilled.

The New Testament is not a postscript to the Old Testament, but a fulfilment of it. It is not a letter nor a verbal message in any sense. The message is the Messenger. The conviction that in Jesus Christ the disciples met and dealt with God is the very nerve of the Gospel proclamation. This conviction it was (that Jesus was "Immanuel"—God with us) that gave unexampled power to the preaching of the early Christians. This conviction was, that in Christ they had been brought to God and established in a new relationship with Him, not in the sense that Christ had taught new truth after the manner of a prophet, but that in His own person and by His own redeeming work He had opened up a new and living way to God. This was but the normal response of actual experience to His own words: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." That this belief in the deeper truth of the Incarnation was the dynamic of the early Gospel can scarcely be denied. As Professor Denney has expressed it: "At bottom, the Gospel is not good advice,

but good news" (Expositors Bible, 2 Corinthians, p. 214).

Moreover it was this interpretation of Christ on a cosmic scale, as Lord and Creator as well as Redeemer, which has given Christianity its historic place and its permanent power.

It is not only, as Principal Fairbairn has pointed out with complete success, that the interpretation of Christ in terms of Deity and Incarnation made the Christian religion an interpretation of the world process, a philosophic exposition of the meaning of life; it is the only interpretation which makes possible a faith in the goodness of God, which is deeply enough based and sufficiently stable to stand in the midst of human sin and sorrow. It reveals God as one with us in those experiences which are hardest to understand or endure. In view of this teaching we can say:

> O Love divine, that stooped to share
> Our sharpest pang, our bitterest tear.

"Then we can look up to a God who is not impassible, as the speculations of men have falsely represented Him, but passible; and therefore full of infinite capacity of pure sorrow and saving sympathy. Then the dumb and sullen resentment

which rises in noble minds at the thought of a universe in which there is so much helpless pain and hopeless grief, created by an immovable Being who has never felt nor ever can feel either pain or grief—that sense of moral repulsion from the idea of an unsuffering and unsympathetic Creator, which is and always has been the deepest, darkest spring of doubt—fades away; and we behold a God who became human in order that He might bear, though innocent and undeserving, all our pains and our griefs" (Van Dyke, Gospel for an Age of Doubt, p. 163).

It now remains for us to review and summarize briefly the significance of this discussion. What is the significance of the New Testament testimony from the purely psychological point of view? Taken, not as fact, but as doctrine, what does the New Testament mean? As an expression of the religious consciousness of the Christian church its testimony is direct and unimpeachable. Taken as such and nothing more, it means that the Christian consciousness has created the figure of the redeeming Christ, endowed, without the aid of objective fact, with all the qualities which make His portrait so unique in human annals, so powerful in human life. It means that a group of men, by the aid of the imagination alone, working on elements gathered from the Old Testament and

floating contemporary ideas, fashioned out of their own inner consciousness the Messianic King, who is also the world's Saviour, the Lord of Glory, who is also the friend and helper of men; God in the flesh, a human character, revealing and embodying, not merely the thoughts and ideas of God, but God's own self. They supplied words fitting to His lips and works adequate to His hand, a spirit for His task and a task worthy of His spirit.

All this implies, first of all, an overwhelming sense of God as operating in contemporary or nearly contemporary history. This sense of the nearness of God was so intense that it overcame their natural conservatism and all their inherited prejudices with regard to physical representations of Deity, and blazed forth in an historical and personal narrative, having for its theme the appearance of God in human form among men. They interpreted the story of God in the fashion of One who suffered and died and was buried. They interpreted the holiness of God in terms of an altar on which the Holy One Himself was offered up. They interpreted the love of God in terms of a divine sacrifice and a self-giving in the form of a shameful death endured for others. All that we are now contending for is that the sense of God as an active participant in human af-

fairs was so overwhelmingly intense as absolutely to submerge their consciousness of actual reality and their sense of the distinction between vision and fact, so as to introduce an artificial and imaginary history in place of the actual. The subjective mind, beyond question, has great powers of self-illusion, but nothing parallel to this has ever been seen elsewhere. For this obsessed Christian imagination has incorporated into a narrative so extended, so detailed, so vividly lifelike, so inwrought with historical, geographical, and social matters of fact, as to defy the keenest intelligence to discover, except by *a priori* determination, the dividing line of fact and fancy. No purely historical criticism has ever shown this essential dividing line; that some of the narrative is fact is beyond doubt; that all of it may be is at least possible. As testimony to the consciousness of God on the part of a group of men it is impressive beyond words. On this basis, apart from all questions of historic fact, major or minor, the New Testament stands as the highest literary and imaginative expression of the religious consciousness. It is an epic of Divine Providence and human redemption of unexampled consistency, splendor, and power. Compared with it the Iliad, the Æneid, the book of Job, Prometheus

Bound, Paradise Lost, the Divina Commedia are as child's play.

But there is another aspect of the psychological fact which merits notice. It evinces a profound and acute consciousness of a need of deliverance from sin and restoration to God on the part of the human race. Two living and active principles confront each other in the New Testament, and the entire book is given up to the interaction between the two. These two principles are the holiness of God as realized in Jesus Christ and the principle of sin as operating in the world of human beings to whom Jesus was sent. In the absence of historical fact we are shut up to the supposition that the early Christians conceived of human sin as expressing its inner nature and bearing its bitter fruit in the rejection and murder of the Holy One. It is to be remembered that from the point of view of the writers themselves, the crucifixion of Jesus was not the martyrdom of a prophet, but the gibbeting of the very Son of God. "But ye denied the Holy and Righteous One, and asked for a murderer to be granted unto you, and killed the Prince of life" (Acts 3:14, 15). This is the frightful indictment which the New Testament writers frame against their age. This is their interpretation of the sinfulness of the world. This is their measure of the need of deliverance

and restoration to God. This hypothesis implies that these writers so conceived the malignancy and virulence of sin that they wrote it out in a tragedy, so vividly realized that they believed in it as fact, and projected themselves as eye-witnesses and actors into the imaginary scenes which they depict. Sin brought about, among the chosen people of God, the rejections, the unjust condemnation, the unholy murder of their Heavenly Lord and longed-for King.

Here the outstanding fact is that the consciousness of the universality and power of sin in the world was so intense that it overwhelmed their sense of objective reality, and embodied itself in an imaginary history which quite took the place of the ordinary events which were really happening. Again we are impressed with the magnitude of the achievement. In the constructive and dramatic unity which pervades it, in the intense and poignant reality which breathes in every utterance and clothes every act, in the heartbreaking realism of its ultimate outcome, this little book, as a tragedy, as a work of creative imagination, is without a rival in literature. It is the very consciousness of a sinful world, despairing of self-help, brought to supreme and final utterance.

There is one other phase of this psychological fact which remains. The New Testament is a

book of salvation, not potential in an incomplete process of effort and tragic failure, but in actual and victorious realization. The New Testament contains, not only the story of Christ, but that of Christians in Christ. It is the testimony of those who have consciously come into a permanent union with Christ, and through Christ have come into a new fellowship with God. "But now in Christ Jesus ye that once were far off are made nigh in the blood of Christ" (Eph. 2:13). "We also rejoice in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation" (Rom. 5:11). Here again we are impressed with the depth and intensity of the subjective persuasion. An entire generation of men are possessed, or rather *obsessed,* with the idea that they have come into a new life through the operation and divine use of the tragedy of the cross, and have imagined that they are now consciously in possession of a peace which lifted the burden away from sin-weighted consciences, and opened before them the joy of an endless life in God. All this is a conscious, present experience. It is worth while to point out that at this point the psychological fact begins to verge toward the historical and to approach the region of positive verification.

CHAPTER V

CHRISTIANITY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT—(Continued)

BUT before we are allowed to follow this alluring suggestion there is an aspect of Christianity, looked upon as a psychological fact, or group of facts, which demands more careful consideration than we have yet given it in its relationship to the Old Testament which lies behind it. These two libraries, widely separated as they are in time, in manner of composition, in intellectual climate, are yet the outcome of one movement, and are therefore organically related to each other, having a common psychological basis. Psychologically Christianity is greater in sweep than the New Testament—it compasses the Bible in both its parts. We are interested, for this phase of the discussion also, in the venerable body of documents comprising the Old Testament, not as the record of a supposed divine revelation, nor even as the narrative of actual historical events, but solely as literary documents embodying the historical consciousness of a great people. We may

perhaps safely assume common consent to the assertion that the Hebrew people existed and that in some way among them they produced the Old Testament. This assumption is entirely sufficient for the purpose we have now in mind. Apart from all questions of inspiration or historicity, the Old Testament is a wonderfully valuable and significant group of human documents. We wish to treat them as such and set forth the psychological testimony which they contain. Their value from this point of view is notable. The Hebrew people were endowed with a clear and profound religious consciousness. That consciousness finds literary expression in the Old Testament. While it is true that the Old Testament has many points of contact with other sacred writings, and that many of its organic principles are the common property of the universal religious consciousness, it is also strikingly true that it departs from other writings and stands in a class by itself as regards the clearness, the organic unity, and the systematic consistency with which its ideas are laid down and carried forward. It gives full, articulate, and consistent expression to ideas which, though found elsewhere, are elsewhere confused, more or less incoherent, and overlaid with error. In a very real and practical sense the Old Testament is a text-book in religious psychology, and it is all the

more significant and valuable in that it is evidently a part of a life and movement much broader than that of any one people. It is unique but also typical.

The first thing that strikes one who reads the Old Testament discerningly with a view to its ruling ideas is the ideality of its world-view. While this world-view is in form ancient and Oriental, and, in the beginning at least, primitive and pictorial, it is free from the intellectual and moral blemishes which are so marked in all contemporary documents. If the Hebrews believed that the earth was the center of the universe, that the sun, moon, and stars were created for the purpose of lighting the earth, that heaven was an opaque dome superimposed upon the earth, all the more marvelous is it that, accepting such a primitive view of things, they were able to transfuse into it so lofty and so essentially a modern conception of the world as the expression of cosmic law and eternal reason.

The Hebrew writers were not scientists. They spoke in the language of appearance and in terms that the ordinary man could understand. And yet it is no more than fair to say that their attitude and spirit were essentially scientific. In every fundamental aspect the world of the Hebrew was a world of solid fact and cosmic order in which

things happen in accordance with general principles. It was not a haphazard world or fairyland, in which anything might happen at any time and in any order, such as we find depicted in the Egyptian and Babylonian records. The monsters of the deep, the dragon, leviathan, lilith,[1] satyr, and the like appear in the Hebrew literature as mere poetical references, crystallizd mythology or mere choice literary embellishment in descriptions of a world made stable, orderly, and intelligible by the wisdom and might of the one true and living God.

The Hebrew was not a philosopher in the technical sense. His mind was practical rather than speculative. But it is intensely interesting to note how he finds his way over the precipices and perils of speculation, like a sure-footed mountaineer on his native crags. He is completely governed in all his thinking by certain organic ideas which save him from narrowness and from the pitfalls of pettiness and inconsistency into which the practical man is so often betrayed.

The Hebrew thinker emerges from the mystery of his prehistoric schooling the possessor of a world-view so noble, so spiritual, and so conservative of all the sacred interests of life and yet so

[1] See article, Night Monster, International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, p. 2143.

practically adaptable that it comes over into our modern world and makes for itself a place even there. The fact of the matter is that the Old Testament is constitutionally in harmony with progressive human thought because it so consistently deals with essential and unchangeable principles and relationships. It delineates a world created and controlled by God. It describes a visible world based upon eternal principles of truth and law, shot through with glories from within the unseen, touched with the light that never was on land or sea.

The Old Testament places man in this world of order and beauty as its crown and head. In his original creation and in his organic constitution he is akin to God. He belongs to God, for he is created in the divine image and is endowed with a deputed divine sovereignty over the earth and the creatures in it. He has the capacity to know God and to enter into fellowship with Him. This is by no means to be confused with the common ethnic notion that man is the offspring of the gods and thus, by a natural tie which degrades Deity but does not elevate man, made akin to Him. It is an ethical conception throughout. It completely guards the transcendence and majesty of God, first, by affirming that only as a spiritual being and in the highest exercise of his powers is he in the

divine image; and, second, by the accompanying assertion that in himself and apart from God he is nothing. "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownest him with glory and honor." "There is a spirit in man and the inbreathing of an Almighty One makes him to understand." "All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field. The grass withereth, the flower fadeth, because the breath of Jehovah bloweth upon it; surely the people is grass." But the striking thing after all is, that with such a lofty conception of God and with such an ideality controlling its view of the world as made by God, the Hebrew should place man so near to God and make him a citizen in that ideal world. Man is unique. The world and everything were made—man alone was inbreathed, a conscious, personal sharer in the life of God.

All that has thus far been said about man refers to the Old Testament conception of him, ideally speaking. Quite different is its account of man as he actually is. Ideally man is bound up in the same bundle of life with God, the representative and vice-gerent of God upon earth, His servant and His son. It is strange that with this conception of the fellowship of God and man, the

Old Testament should so uncompromisingly depict man's actual character and career in the world. It would have been so fatally easy to attempt an idealized character retouched with a hand so skilful as to obliterate every ugly line. Its conception of the ideal man as God framed him and intended him to be is expressed in the story of the creation and the garden. Its conception of the actual man, as his history shows him to be, is written on every page of the narrative in which human wilfulness, perversity, and degradation are told at length. The Biblical writers dipped their pens in candor and wrote down the damning record as it actually was. Naught was extenuated, even in the case of saints or heroes; naught was set down in malice.

Now between the ideal and the actual man, between the man of God's intent and the man who has drenched the earth with blood and covered history with shame, there lies, according to the Old Testament, a spiritual catastrophe. In the ideal and actual man we have the same man but dreadfully changed. This is, of course, the familiar story of the fall. Be it remembered that the critical question as to where or by whom the story was originated is not now at issue. Neither is the historicity of Adam or Eve or their experience up for discussion. We are dealing sim-

ply and solely with the conception, the idea, the psychological fact. The mind of Israel developed this conception of a fall away from or out of a primeval and organic union with God as the expression of its deepest consciousness of spiritual reality. One may call the Adam and Eve story a myth, if he chooses, but that does not finally dispose of it. The question remains: Is the fact which the myth attempts to explain true? Does the myth faithfully represent the fact? A myth is a doctrine in story form; is the doctrine true? Several features of it are to be carefully noted here.

The story, so far as we know, is original with Israel. No parallel to it has yet been found. The story represents also, and expresses in an intensely vivid and original way, the deep ethical earnestness of the Hebrew thinkers. It is often misinterpreted. It is not an attempt speculatively to account for the origin of moral or natural evil. Neither is it a theoretical explanation of the presence of death in the world. It is rather a concrete presentation, to the heart and conscience of man, of himself as he is in God's thought of him and as he has become through neglect of God and the misuse of freedom. The doctrine of the fall is a religious conception throughout. It accounts for moral wrongdoing as being the consequence

of religious misplacement. Out of fellowship with God man is morally fallen. By this interpretation religion and morality are inseparably united. By this simple and yet wonderful conception religion is moralized and morals personalized and both united in one harmonious conception of life. More than this, the idea of the fall guards in the most effective way the sacred interests of the moral life. Moral evil is either congenital or catastrophic. If it is congenital then it is not, strictly speaking, evil at all. It is a congruent and normal element in the life of the race, a phase of evolution, a stadium of advance along the ascending pathway of development. If this is all that the term moral evil really means then it is quite clear that altogether too much stress has been laid upon it. A truly urgent moral conception of life cannot survive the application of a morality like this. The truth that man *is* what he ought not to be, in any other or more earnest sense than the vague notion of immaturity, is incompatible with any other theory than that he has *become* what he ought not to be.

"This is the fact of the Fall, a fact, the truth of which it would seem wholly unnecessary to discuss, because what Christianity means by it is simply what it is impossible for any man to deny. Neither sin nor death is any part of the proper definition

and meaning, or of the true law, of manhood. They are the denial, contradiction, and destruction of it. Yet both sin and death are a universal and inevitable part of man's actual and natural condition. Whether or not a man Adam fell, unquestionably man has, because he is fallen. He is in a condition which is manifestly a fall, and a deep fall, from his proper law and end; and he can be raised up to and made to attain his perfection and distinction only through what is for him a Salvation" (Du Bose, Soteriology of the New Testament, p. 39).

Still further the idea of the fall furnishes the basis for the hope of redemption. According to this conception, man is not evil through depravation, so to speak, through the lesion of his moral tissue, but functionally, through the loss of harmony with his true spiritual environment which is God. Recovery to God means, therefore, moral renewal. Re-established spiritual relationship means re-established harmony of moral function. To make man righteous you must first make him holy. Since God is ever living and ever willing to give Himself, holiness, which is God working in the human spirit, is possible, and consequently righteousness for man is also possible. Reconciliation would necessarily be salvation.

This brings us to the third great idea of the

Old Testament, that God is actually engaged in an attempt to win man back to Himself. It is well worth our while to pause for a moment and contemplate the background of this suggestion. The universe at large is one vast interacting harmony with God as its living center. According to the Hebrew thinker, the will of God is the inner harmony, the connective principle, of all things. Man, according to the original intent of his creation and according to his natural constitution, should be a conscious, free, and willing participator in these cosmic harmonies. But instead of fulfilling his normal end as the crown of the natural world, man is the one exception. His life is the one element of discord in a world of law. He is the violator of his own acknowledged law. Now, in spite of this defection, God is represented in the Old Ttestament as still placing a value upon him, as seeking him in his wandering, and as attempting to re-establish him in the harmony of the divine law and love. Yes, we venture these two words together. No doubt a touch of austerity belonging to the general Semitic conception of God is not lacking in the Old Testament, but wondrously does that austerity melt into tenderness when we view as a whole the divine attitude to man as the epic of Israel unfolds. From the day of his creation, through all the stages of the his-

tory until the last prophet flings his voice out toward the coming of the Christ, God is represented as the Seeker after man. In this history He is the divine and gracious aggressor. Men are called into His service and into the service of other men, in a race-wide movement of blessing and deliverance. In prophecy the voice of God is heard not merely in command and warning, but in pleading. God is not only angry at sin, but grieved by it. And in spite of obduracy and persistent wilfulness He remains gracious and patient.

The entire prophetic movement as disclosed in its literature culminates in a doctrine of redemption which, in its formal aspect, is essentially one with the Gospel message of the New Testament. God is disclosed as the Seeker, the Healer, the Redeemer, the Father, of Israel. Jeremiah's prophetic lament over Ephraim (31-20) is practically the parable of the Prodigal Son. This passage just cited, which is notable both as literature and doctrine, is peculiarly pertinent here because it centers articulately in the conception of a divinely instituted reconciliation. This principle is not stated in formal or systematic terms, but it is stated in terms of life, of tender relationships, of grieving, yearning, and seeking love. Ephraim is a silly, wilful, wayward child. Jehovah is a father who yearns with tenderness unutterable and

irresistible even when his judgment dictates severity. To this noble-hearted prophet redemption is not a system or a scheme, but a vital process. He felt no more keenly perhaps than other prophets, but with tremendous emotional intensity, the seeking and reconciling love of God. Hosea's touching parable of the faithless wife, Isaiah's exquisite lyric of redemption when the "ransomed of Jehovah shall return, and come with singing unto Zion," both involve the same essential conception of Jehovah's activity and aggressiveness, of Jehovah as the Seeker and Saviour of man. And it is notable that while this attempt to deliver men from their lapsed condition centers in Israel, it continually sweeps beyond national boundaries and is seen to involve world-movements and even a racial process. The ordained servant of Jehovah is set forth to be a deliverer of the nations, who is to nurse into vigor feeble gropings after God wherever found in the world. (See Isa. 42:3, 4.) In this passage we find, as elsewhere in the Old Testament, the fundamental conception that recovery to God will involve moral restoration. The servant who is sent forth in the power of the Spirit of God is to bring justice among the nations by recalling them to the worship and service of Jehovah.

We pause for reiterated emphasis on the fact

already stressed, that according to the Old Testament moral degradation wherever found is the issue and result of religious lapse, and that the only way to lift men up morally is by re-establishing them in the fellowship of God. But these writers do not stop with this general idea, but go on to affirm what is a more daring conception, that God Himself is at work, urgently, tenderly, and persistently, to win men back to Himself. The recovery of the lapsed is primarily the divine task and is the primary divine task. The prophets and moralists of Israel, aflame with zeal for God and yearning over men with consuming passion to win them to God, felt that the zeal by which they were literally eaten up was but a faint and far-away reflection of the passion of Jehovah for the recovery of His own.[2]

This conception that men belong to God by a tie at once ideal and historic, that their moral and other disorders are due to the rending of this tie, and that God is seeking for reconciliation which is redemption for men, permeates the entire Old Testament and is logically involved in every Israelitish institution. Take, for example, the elaborate sacrificial system. We are not here concerned with any questions as to the origin or development of this system. In its entirety it rep-

[2] Cf. G. A. Smith, Isaiah, vol. ii, p. 141.

resents the Hebrew consciousness of relationship with God and embodies a method of carrying out that relationship in affairs of religious worship. Nothing could be more direct or unmistakable as evidence of ruling ideas. This institutional and ritualistic scheme was looked upon as divinely instituted and authorized. No matter now whether it actually was or not, the Hebrews *thought* it was. As divinely instituted, it represented the thought of God toward them. To perform these ceremonies in the spirit in which they were enjoined was to please God and to enter into a state implying peace and happiness. As divinely instituted these ritualistic exercises expressed a divine willingness to maintain, in spite of their sin, a direct and personal relationship with the people in a service every feature of which implied communion. Whatever may be said about the primitive sacrifice, whether it may be considered merely as a sacramental meal involving the unqualified notion of communion with the Deity or as sacrifice involving the idea of expiation, there can be no possible question as to the significance of the Hebrew sacrificial system as a whole. It is expiatory and redemptional. It is a system of reconciliation. Whether you take the structural form of the tabernacle and the location and character of its furniture, the literary structure of the book

of Leviticus or the mode of procedure in the conduct of any one of the more important sacrifices, all the facts point in the same direction. The sacrificial system presents really, though (to our minds) in less winsome guise, the same ideas which are to be found in history and prophecy, that access to Jehovah is obtainable only by an expiatory and confessional act which involves at once a confession of the divine holiness and of human sinfulness.

And in the background lies this organic idea that God though holy is gracious, forgiving, placable, and Himself actively the seeker of men. Forgiveness and restoration are looked upon as absolutely and invariably necessary. No man can approach unto God without the touch of blood upon him. No man, except the High Priest, once a year, could enter the Holy of Holies, and he could enter only after confessing his own sins and those of the people. We are all quite familiar with these facts, but we have not always correctly apprehended them or at least emphasized them. We should do the sacrificial system of the Hebrews but scant historical justice by making acknowledgment of the greatness and nobility of the ideas embodied and expressed in it. Nothing could be more spiritual than these related ideas, of divine holiness, sin, confession, forgiveness,

and restoration. These sacrifices, like any other symbolic and sacramental actions, might easily be misconstrued and misused. We ourselves are continually mistaking the sign for the thing signified. But the system itself expressed, in terms of universally accepted institutions of worship and sacrifice, the all-controlling spiritual ideas of the Hebrew teachers. What we often fail to see is that the ritual was the essential expression of the redemptive idea and was grounded in a deep consciousnes of the divine love.

We have paid no extended notice thus far to the Messianic expectation of the Old Testament. And yet this Messianic cycle in some respects is the most characteristic and distinctive deliverance of the Hebrew religious consciousness. It is by no means exclusively predictive. On the contrary, it is primarily an interpretation of life, only secondarily predictive. Every prophetic utterance lays hold upon the immediate situation in which it is spoken. Each separate prophetic oracle was a tract for its own times. But it also reaches out into the future because it enters so deeply into the present. Indeed, the distinctive feature of the Old Testament Messianic prophecy is that it deals with successive historical situations on the basis of principles so great and enduring that they are essentially timeless. As an interpretation of life,

Messianic prophecy is one with the Christian Gospel, and both are for all time. There are features of this Messianic type of thought which we venture to say would be considered utterly incredible were it not set down in black and white. At the bottom of it lies the familiar notion of Israel as the chosen people of God. Along with this idea is one much less familiar to the ordinary Bible student, the idea of a mediatorial function and responsibility for the people of God. In the great covenant passage it is said: "Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation" (Ex. 19:6). This same conception, that Israel is intended as a medium of revelation to the world, is found in other prophetic passages. (See Isa. 2:1-4, and others.) The whole personal and institutional life of Israel was keyed at this level of separation to God in an intimate and sacred covenant relationship, of dedication to God in a world-wide international mediation and priesthood.[3]

Evidently all these conceptions of national priesthood and mediation, of the Servant of Jehovah who is also Jehovah's Son, of a priesthood which is the expression in religious rite of Jehovah's service, of a kingship which is the political

[3] See Edersheim, Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, vol. i, p. 161.

realizaton of Jehovah's service, of an order of ordained teachers whose teaching is the expression of Jehovah's service, are framed in terms of the ideal. In the conception of the Kingdom of God the ideal world of reason, order, law, and righteousness is brought down from Heaven and established on earth. Israel, as the people of God, was the chosen instrument for the realization of this purpose. The ideal world of the divine purpose is presented to Israel as a summons to national dedication and achievement. Thus Israel is to become mediator between God and the nations, in a reconciling and redemptive economy of Providence. The world was to be won to God through the agency of Israel.

The Messianic significance of this interpretation, in the New Testament sense, is brought about in two ways. In the first place, Jehovah is looked upon as the Redeemer of Israel in the original nation-forming covenant relationship. We should recall all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the covenant at Sinai which indicate that it was a reconciling ordinance, a restoration to forfeited favor, distinctively a matter of grace. The exodus from Egypt was a great deliverance and a most high God was their Deliverer. (See Ps. 78:35.) The touching words of the Levitical prayer in Deuteronomy 21:8,

"Forgive, O Jehovah, thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed," expresses the religious consciousness of Israel. This conception, that the entire history from Abraham onward is redemptive and that Israel's fulfilment of her historic mission to the nations can be accomplished only as the work of one redeemed and in the power of an accomplished redemption, throws the prophetic mind toward the future when that redemption should be complete in Israel and among the nations.

But still more effective in bringing the expectation of a Messianic age of deliverance at the hands of a great personal deliverer to the prophetic mind was the historic disclosure of the magnitude and difficulty of the task involved in the redemption of Israel. There may have been a time when hopeful thinkers might suppose that Israel had been redeemed and restored to fellowship with God once for all in the deliverance from Egypt and in the establishment of the covenant, but the history gave the lie to the hope. By the time the prayer quoted above was incorporated into the regular ritual worship it was plain to all that the deliverance of Israel from sin and complete restoration to Jehovah was to be a costly and difficult task. This became increasingly clear to the prophets. Every element in the ideal con-

stitution of Israel was contradicted by the fact. The ideal Messianic King, except, so to speak, figuratively in David at his best, failed to appear but was shamed by a line of kings who were little more than puppets. The ideal mediatorial priesthood was dishonorably represented by a formal and venal succession of time-serving and formalistic ritualists. Even prophecy failed not so much in the persons of its representatives, who were really men of God, as in the refusal of the people at large to listen to their messages.

Under this severe discipline of disappointment the prophets were enabled to read more deeply into human nature and human life in the light of the divine purpose until the fuller significance of the redemptive process opened before them. In a series or group of varied, vivid, and really majestic representations the Old Testament writers unfold their visions of the future. In certain of the Psalms (notably 2 and 110) is given the delineation of the Lord's Anointed who is set by divine decree on the Holy Hill of Zion, internally Israel's perfect ruler, externally victor over all opposition and vice-gerent of God upon the earth. This conception has echoed throughout the literature, notably in Micah (5:2). It is remarkable that this universal kingship is looked upon as the issue of prolonged and bitter conflict. In the

first part of Isaiah appears the doctrine of the Remnant. According to this striking representation, while the historic Israel has been found unfaithful, yet there is an inner and spiritual core of Israelites consisting of those who are true to Jehovah, and by painful sifting this faithful remnant, even though very small, shall be saved in order to serve Jehovah's gracious purpose.

In the second part of Isaiah the remnant is narrowed down to one, in that matchless, serial epic of the Servant of Jehovah. When this perfect story is completely told the Servant of Jehovah stands out, not as the idealized Israel, but as the ideal Israelite who, despised and rejected of men, sprinkles many nations, after first healing the sins of Israel by having laid on Him the iniquity of all. He represents Israel and fulfils her historic mission to the world only as He is cut off from the land of the living—"for the transgression of my people to whom the stroke was due." Here Israel is the subject of redemption and is brought into harmony with God through the suffering of Him whom she despised and rejected.

Jeremiah draws for us the picture of the righteous branch of Israed, who is the true and ideal King, who is to save Judah and Israel. He is to "reign as king and deal wisely, and shall execute

justice and righteousness in the land." Jeremiah also predicts the day of the new covenant with Israel when the law of God shall be written on the hearts of the redeemed people, when sin shall be forgiven and iniquities shall be remembered no more.

Joel has a picture of a future day of spiritual illumination and outpouring upon all flesh, this, too, a wonderful deliverance at the hands of God. This prophecy of a day of outpouring of the Spirit frequently occurs in the utterances of the prophets.

Zechariah has an exquisite picture of the true King to come, approaching the walls of the Holy City, clothed not with the trappings of royalty, but in the garments of lowliness, bringing salvation as He rides on a mission of peace.

These illustrations might be greatly multiplied, but it is not necessary in order to gain a clear idea of their general import. One instance of great significance and beauty we may glance at as embodying the ruling ideas of these prophetic utterances. Nearly at the beginning of the book of Isaiah there are three oracles on Jerusalem—"the three Jerusalems," as Principal Smith calls them. In the first one (2:2-5) the prophet depicts the ideal Jerusalem, the center and rallying place of the world's religious life, whither the nations shall flow as a river seeks the sea. In the second (2:6

—4:1) he depicts the actual Jerusalem as one would see it who walks the streets and observes its life. This portrayal is as uncompromisingly denunciatory as the former is enthusiastic and laudatory. In the third (4:2-6) the man of God speaks of the redeemed and purified Jerusalem, "when the Lord shall have washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall have purged the blood of Jerusalem from the midst thereof, by the spirit of justice, and by the spirit of burning." Here we meet in the clearest possible exposition the three great ruling ideas of the Old Testament. The ideal Israel, the ideal Jerusalem, the ideal man, is *man* in harmony with God, head of God's creation, God's fellow in the working out of His holy will. There the actual man of sin, pride, failure, and wretchedness—the same man out of harmony with God. And as the center and soul and vitalizing principle of the entire conception, the God of grace, seeking man in order through reunion and restoration to save him unto the fulness of life.

We not only concede, but gladly and fervently proclaim, that the prophets were dealing with the needs and problems of their own days, but just because they saw so deeply into present-day life and interpreted human nature in terms of the actual and the possible, they reached out and

touched the future; rather they reached *down* and laid hold upon the timeless principle underneath history, which we have found to be the essence of the old-new, new-old Gospel, the principle of the divine reconciliation in the Christ who was and is and is to be.

CHAPTER VI

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

IN the immediately preceding portion of the discussion Christianity was considered as a purely mental phenomenon, a deliverance of the human consciousness. The documents in which this body of beliefs finds expression, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, were treated merely as literary remains. We advanced no claims whatever as to the authority, reliability or historicity of any portion either of the Old Testament or of the New, except as these express the beliefs of those responsible for their production and publication.

This method of procedure has the primary advantage of presenting for our consideration a body of *indisputable data.* Thus far, at any rate, we have not ventured upon debatable ground. The most strenuous and militant skeptic will scarcely deny that the system of thought which we have previously outlined is Christianity, in its formal and doctrinal aspect, and that this system finds

its explication and context in the Bible. No attempt was made, in this exposition of the psychological fact, to minimize the differences between the Hebrew and the Christian libraries bound together in the Bible. We made the moderate and very reasonable claim that "These two libraries, widely separated as they are in time, in manner of composition, in intellectual climate, are yet the outcome of one movement, and are therefore organically related to each other, *having a common psychological basis.*"

The psychological nexus between the Old and New Testaments is in the doctrine of redemption through a God-sent Redeemer, expressed in anticipation and prevision in the Old Testament and in realization and application in the New Testament. This common, pervasive, and constructive principle unifies the entire corpus of writings and makes the Bible, *the Book,* out of the books. This, then, is the psychological fact of Christianity which is presented to us for investigation and valuation.

It will be seen at once that the psychological fact of Christianity impinges upon the historical sphere in three aspects, and, therefore, imposes upon us the task of historical investigation at three vital points.

In the first place, the psychological fact is his-

torical. It is an historical fact that men have cherished the beliefs and have expressed themselves in the ideas which make up what we call Christianity. Christianity itself is an historical product. The Bible is the outcome of more than two thousand years of human history. The men who wrote the Bible are certainly historic products, as well as makers and recorders of history.

From this fact a very important conclusion follows. In some real and vital sense Christianity must gather up and express the significance of the historic process which lies behind it and has gone into the making of it. There must be some rational connection between the history and the Christianity which that history produces and in which it eventuates. Any psychological fact, any human belief, being essentially historical, brought into being by historic processes, is a guide to history. And it is a guide of greater or less importance in proportion to its intrinsic worth and the range of historic movement which it covers and illuminates. The more central it is, the more comprehensive it is, the more extended the movement of which it is the climax; the more illuminative it becomes. It is, therefore, just to say that ancient history is Christian, inasmuch as it produced Christianity. It is legitimate also to urge at this point the magnitude of Christianity as a product

of the human mind. Here, also, we are on ground which is not debated. No one of any importance in the world of thought has ventured to deny that the movement which culminated in Christianity is the most significant as it is the central historical movement of antiquity. This conclusion is entirely independent of controversy as to the relative value of various ancient cultures, for the historic medium by which all of these were conveyed to the modern world was the Christian religion.

Nor does anyone seriously attempt to deny the essential worth and significance of Christianity as related to the history of the past. Attacks upon the Christian faith are concerned with its permanent authority and finality as the "absolute religion," not with its supremacy as the greatest historic religion. Its primacy here is unassailable. The value of Christianity, therefore, with reference to antecedent and contemporary history is absolute and unqualified. The highest product of ancient history is Christianity; the highest meaning to be attributed to that history is in terms of Christianity. Christianity is inseparably united to its own past, which is the past of the world. Christianity, therefore, in a very real sense dictates the philosophy of history. Everything in that history which is necessary for the explanation of Christianity must be allowed. Any explanation

or interpretation of ancient history which makes of Christianity a mere interpolation in an alien and unrelated context is self-condemnatory. Christianity summons all the past to its side and assimilates the whole of history to its own nature and quality. In our study of Christianity the history of the past *in its entirety* is necessarily involved.

From this it follows that our view of history necessarily involves our valuation of Christianity. It is impossible to put a low value upon Christianity and maintain a high value for history in general. On the other hand, a high valuation upon history as a rational and progressive movement toward a real goal which involves a true standard of valuation compels to a high estimation of Christianity. This product of history is too central, too vital, too comprehensive not to involve in its consideration our very conception and estimate of history itself. The depreciation of Christianity is the degradation of history. It will be seen at once that, in a preliminary way at least, the verification of Christianity is no narrow or specific task, but involves our general view of human nature and human life. The psychological fact of Christianity is an historical product, our valuation of the fact involves our entire conception of the history of which it is the product.

In the second place, Christianity as a psychological fact touches upon history in that it involves an interpretation of history. The Bible is more than a record of events; it is a valuation of events. The doctrines of the Bible, from the cosmic theism with which it begins, to the theistic Christology, soteriology, and pneumatology with which it completes its teaching, are based upon history and derived from history. In the Bible, doctrine waits upon facts, and the facts are facts of experience and therefore historical. Be it understood, in this connection, that we are not attempting to foreclose the question of historicity as it relates to detail. We are dealing simply with the implications of the psychological fact as related to history. And the outstanding fact is that, whether justifiably or not, Christianity claims that its material basis is historical. To these writers, one and all, the experience of ancient Israel and recorded incidents in the life of Christ were actual, historical events. We can make Christianity ideal and dogmatic only at the cost of making its teachers deluded and fanatical dreamers. But, not merely were the events held to be actual, but the events were interpreted, valued, applied. This is of vital importance because it enters into the very constitution of the psychological fact. The Bible writers

believed that their beliefs were based upon history, upon actual events correctly understood and interpreted. Nor is it difficult to realize and state their viewpoint with reference to history. The whole movement of history, from the earliest known events down to contemporary happenings, was interpreted as indication and proof that God, the living and Holy God, had been and was still actively and aggressively seeking man in a redemptive process. This is the essential issue. Christianity stands or falls with this conception. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself"—in this is summed up the meaning of the entire history from the earliest days onward. This fact defines for us the task of verification.

Christianity depends for verification not upon the bald fact of detailed historicity in its record of events but rather upon cardinal events of a given valuation. By this is meant, that a denial of historicity for any number of events in the Biblical records cannot shatter the Biblical doctrine based upon them, provided *any* events are left of sufficient value to justify the interpretation put upon them in this doctrinal construction. This is really the vital and essential issue for Christian apologetics in all historical and critical investigations. We shall expound this principle *in*

extenso in regard to the New Testament. Here we wish to point out its application to the Old Testament record.

The use made of the Old Testament by the writers of the New Testament is, in outline, to prove that God has a redemptive interest in the human race. Perhaps it is more correct to say that they assume that God's interest in the human race is attested by the events recorded in the Old Testament and attempt to prove that the work of Christ is organically one with the divine process outlined in the book of the old covenant. In either case the interest which Christianity has in the Old Testament resides in the significance of the movement as a whole as indicating the activity of God as Redeemer of men. The theistic basis of Christianity is the Redeemer-Jehovah of the Old Testament. It is a matter of life and death to Christianity to justify and vindicate that view of history, which it bases upon the Old Testament and can base nowhere else, as a divine redemptive process. Christianity has a considerable stake in the detailed historicity of the Old Testament records because at their face value they furnish such overwhelming evidence in favor of its central theistic affirmation, namely, the redeeming activity of God. But the Christian apologist must never forget that Christianity can

get along with much less than this. The detailed proof of the historicity of the Old Testament narratives is desirable and undoubtedly, to a degree, feasible, but not absolutely essential. From the point of view of annals the Old Testament is extremely fragmentary, but its significance and value, religiously speaking, are not lessened thereby. It might be made much more fragmentary by adverse historical criticism, and yet its spiritual worth remain essentially unimpaired. It is not the number of facts at our disposal but the value of them which counts in this discussion.

From the viewpoint of Christianity the criticism which is really dangerous is not historical nor scientific, but *a priori* and dogmatic, foreclosing the vital question altogether apart from investigation by denying to any possible facts the spiritual meaning which the Bible derives from its historical records. If, according to Wellhausen's well-known dictum, history as such is essentially profane, then the question of historicity, as regards every event which has a spiritual significance, is settled beforehand in the negative. The history which is left us by the application of this drastic test is spiritually null and cannot be made anything else except by falsification.

We meet this criticism by bluntly rejecting the dictum upon which it proceeds and by affirming

the manifest historicity of events which are evidently not "profane" but filled with spiritual meaning. A general discussion of the historicity of the Old Testament is manifestly not germane to our present discussion, but to a few salient points we must briefly refer.

At the outset we may venture to define a little more precisely what we have referred to as the experience-fact back of the psychological fact, the history behind the beliefs which are expressed in the Old Testament. The Old Testament is a fact—how can we account for it? Its testimony to a unique body of conceptions is direct, immediate, and incontestable. How are we to account for the unique ideas of the Hebrews? If the Old Testament is the product of the unique characteristics of the Hebrew people, what in turn produced the Hebrew people and made them unique? That there is some vital and genetical connection, however obscure and hidden, between their history and their literature, on the broadest basis of historical analogy, cannot be questioned. Literature is always rooted in history. It is not an air plant, but is always the product of experience.

The interesting fact here is that the Hebrews attribute their peculiar and distinctive ideas to God Himself. They hold that God was their teacher, and they freely confess that they were

very slow to learn what God had to teach them. They point to a divinely conducted history as the explanation of their unique conceptions of God. They were conscious of having ideas of God different from those of other nations, but it never occurred to them or to their religious leaders that these ideas were to be attributed to their own genius or insight. We can easily imagine what Isaiah or Jeremiah would say of any theory as to the monotheistic genius of the Semites! The Hebrew thinkers of all classes, prophets, historians, priests, law-givers, poets, and sages, are a unit in ascribing their distinctive ideas to God Himself. Their education was through history; their history was a process of education. They knew God in experience; their experience gave them their knowledge of god. More than this they firmly believed that God could not otherwise be known. The Hebrew belief in revelation was not a theoretical conception, standing by itself, apart from the experience that gave it to them. It was, on the contrary, the inner significance of the continuous experience whereby they had come to know God.

The vital issue is this: On the face of it the Hebrew narrative justifies the conclusion that they had actually been in contact with God. The historicity of the Old Testament, as far as it con-

cerns us, involves the question whether or not the narrative will stand the test of critical examination sufficiently well to leave the conclusion borne out by the face value of the narrative unshaken. If the narrative endures this test and is seen to be essentially historical, then a manifestly supernatural factor is involved. If there is, as an unmistakable fact, a clearly recognizable supernatural factor behind the Old Testament itself, this goes a long way toward justifying the Old Testament view of the history which produced it. If God was behind the history, then the outcome of the history (in the deep-seated conviction that God was at work reconciling man to Himself) must be the expression of the essential and divine fact. If the history leads to the conception of reconciliation and the history is of God, then reconciliation clearly is of God.

From the point of view of scientific theory, the problem here is to account for the facts, chief of which is just Israel herself. We may remark in passing that the religious experience of Israel is the central problem for all theories framed to explain religious development in general. Many a theory works well until it is applied to Israel. Her experience often proves to be the surd of the theoretical and scientific equation. And then it ought not to be necessary to say that no theory

can be considered even tolerably successful which leaves at one side and unexplained such a striking and notable historical development. We take it that this is the vital issue for Christian apologetics in the much discussed critical hypothesis of our day. At any rate we are concerned in this discussion, not with questions of date or authorship, but with the question of essential historical verity, and with this, not with reference to minor details, but only as regards the significance of the history as a whole.

At bottom and apart from all details, any constructive critical hypothesis is an attempt to explain the religious history and achievement of Israel. If it is inadequate to this task, the scholarship engaged upon it cannot save it from ultimate discredit.

Let us first of all briefly outline the problem. What have we to explain?

1. The ultimate outcome of Israel's religious development in prophetic theism, which is the foundation of Christian theism with its rich and fruitful history. We have to account for Israel's arrival at a conception of God as spiritual, ethical, universal, active in the world and yet enthroned above it—the adequate, ultimate, and immediate, free, and personal Cause of all that is. It is to be remembered in this connection that not only did

Israel actually arrive at this noble conception of God but that she alone thus arrived. In Israel we have not only a successful development but a unique, solitary, and unparalleled development. No one of the great civilizations developed a monotheism. Neither Babylonia nor Egypt with their ages of brilliant history, with all their philosophic and literary gifts, arrived at a spiritual monotheism. Along with this basal theism is the conception, also preparatory for Christianity, of God as the Redeemer of men—a God who loves, forgives, and seeks in order to save.

2. We have to account for the emergence and emancipation of Israel from the tribal stage of religion, and her advance through the national to the universal grade of religious development. We must not fail to note that the more we emphasize the kinship of Israel with the Semites as a whole, and the cognateness of her origins with those of her tribal kinsmen, the more pressing becomes the necessity of explaining her ultimate deliverance from this condition.

3. We must explain the formation of Israel's national life and consciousness. We must know how the divisive tendencies among her tribes were overcome, how she escaped absorption at the hands of her powerful neighbors, and how a people without political genius ultimately succeeded

in developing a spiritual unity which has survived world-wide expatriation, so that, in spite of racial admixture and of frequent social submergence, the Jewish type has permanently affected the history of the world.

4. We must not only account for Israel's positive achievement in the development of a spiritual theism, but also for her negative achievement in resisting the manifold perils that haunted every step of her pathway. Knowing what we do of the religious history of mankind, and estimating the force of the malign influences arrayed against the march of improvement, we are amazed at the outcome of her history. Israel, as well as her neighbors, had to meet the intellectual difficulties presented by the darker aspects of nature, human nature, and human life. She had to meet the moral difficulties involved in the contagious vices of heathenism, in the plausibility of rival doctrines, in the defeats at the hands of enemies, and the dreadful temptations to unbelief involved in national overthrow and exile. The conquest of all these remains a marvel of history.

5. We must explain the origin of the prophetic order, its separation from all cognate orders of ancient heathenism, the difference between true and false prophets and the distinction between prophets and wizards of various kinds, its unique

moral as well as religious consciousness, the wealth of its teaching, its unique and unexampled power of moving in the realms of the higher thought. Whence came these men, and by what influences were their minds formed and their lives directed?

In the attempt to solve these historical problems we find overwhelming proof that the Biblical view of Hebrew history is the only one which offers any reasonable explanation of undoubted facts. With this as ancillary to the central issue of the New Testament we are quite content. This leads to the next stage of our investigation.

In the third place, Christianity as a psychological fact touches history in that it centers in the historic person, Jesus Christ. In turning to this delineation of Christ in the documents of primitive Christianity we wish to affirm again that we are not concerned, even here, with the minutiæ of historical criticism. We do not need to be. So far as the verification of Christianity is concerned there is really but one vital point at issue, and we do not intend that our attention shall be deflected from it for a moment by any cloud of controversial dust. This central and vital question may be stated in very few words: Is the Christian Gospel, which centers in the Person of Christ and the principle of salvation, based upon

historical facts, or is it wholly dogmatic and ideal? We say wholly dogmatic and ideal as opposed to historical, for it has become increasingly clear that it is adequately historical or entirely ideal. The Gospel as an interpretation of life breaks down if there is not in the narrative a residuum of matters of fact which are such as to justify the interpretation which the Gospel puts upon them; the Gospel goes completely and finally, vanishes into floating mists, with the significance which it demands from the facts.

This does not mean that in order to believe the Gospel we must accept the inerrancy of the narrative or the historicity of every event which it records. On the contrary, one event, one fact would be sufficient, provided it is great enough and broad enough and of sufficient solidity to bear the weight which the Gospel perforce is compelled to put upon it. Whatever may be taken away from the narrative in the way of subtraction in matters of fact, Jesus must remain and Jesus must be what the Gospel demands that He shall be, or there is no Gospel. One stubborn and immovable fact which testifies to the Jesus of the Gospel is enough to justify the Gospel. On the other hand, every fact in the record might be pronounced historical and yet help us no whit in the verification of the Gospel if those facts are overweighted by

the construction which the Gospel puts upon them. We are not for a moment forgetting the value of a cumulative argument or the significance of many minor facts pointing in the same direction and leading to the same conclusion. But no accumulation of minor facts can ever justify a conclusion which is not in some sense involved in every one of them. It is not a question of detail at all but of large and evident meanings. It is not the totting up lists but measuring the depth and range of an essential valuation which belongs to the facts as a whole. Indeed the facts are all one fact, namely, Jesus. If that fact stands, well and good, so does the Gospel. If that fact fails, so be it, there is no Christian Gospel. This is no matter of pecking at a rock with hammer and chisel and making little analytical piles of the débris. The rock is homogenenous, and when you are all through pecking and piling you have made no essential change in the substance of the rock. You have made it impossible as foundation or building, but by breaking it up you have not made it into something different.

Another way of stating the same thing as regards Christianity is this: The matters of facts concerning Jesus cohere in unassailable unity. They are all of the same sort and all have the same meaning and are all equally credible or in-

credible. From one point of view, namely, our historical knowledge of men in general and our legitimate inferences from that knowledge as to the powers and limitations of human nature, everything that is told concerning Jesus is impossible to believe except minor points which signify nothing. On the one hand is the whole record of the human race as the measure and standard of the credible; on the other, the uniqueness of Jesus. Let a man accept the issue and refuse to believe that any such man ever lived—He is a myth, an ideal creation. But even so, the trouble has just begun. The skeptic has already been compelled to throw over the whole narrative; he cannot retain part and reject part. But having rejected Jesus altogether in order to get rid of His uniqueness, the creator of Jesus remains, and he simply takes over (as residuary legatee) the undeniable uniqueness of the ideal Jesus. If no Jesus ever lived of whom it could be said: "Never man spake like this man," then the writers of the New Testament certainly wrote as no other men ever wrote. It is a certainty which no criticism can dissolve, that the sayings attributed to Jesus are in the New Testament and that somebody thought them. The contents of the mind can never be forged or fabricated. Our speech invariably and infallibly "bewrayeth" us. Here then is a solid,

historic fact, which stubbornly refuses to be moved. But this fact is *Jesus,* and the Jesus of the Gospel. It is simply absurd to reject Jesus as unhistorical on the ground of the incredible gifts and graces which are ascribed to Him, when the possession of one of the very highest of those gifts, in His Heavenly speech, as a plain matter of historical certainty, is present and belongs to some person who spoke these wonderful words. Everything the Gospel affirms concerning Jesus is logically involved in the certainty of the teaching ascribed to Him.

We may reach the same position in another way. We may attempt to divide between some sayings and others. We will accept what Jesus says about God and the Kingdom and morality —but we will not accept the wonderful and startling statements concerning Himself which are attributed to Him in the narrative. He never called Himself Messiah or Son of God in any absolute sense. He never said that He would come to judge the world or anything else that put Him outside of the category of humanity. What is the result? A complication of difficulties. For somebody, putting himself in the place of the Messiah, attributed those rejected sayings to Jesus. And they are not mere self-assertions— they are also inevitably self-revelations. As such

they bear the inimitable stamps of originality and power which mark the other sayings attributed to Jesus. They are actual unveilings of a unique spirit, who had a deep knowledge of God and men. We may deny that Jesus ever said: "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him" (Matt. 11:27), but are we prepared also to deny that He said: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (Matt. 11:28)? The self-assertion involved in this latter passage is as great as in the former. But can any one seriously maintain that this invitation could have been composed as an artistic detail in the imaginary delineation of the Messiah? The touch of authority and the ring of conscious power are accompanied by a sweetness and tenderness of appeal which is so characteristic of all that Jesus said and did.

In the next chapter of Matthew (12:8) these words are attributed to Jesus: "For the Son of man is lord of the Sabbath." This is of course a tremendous self-assertion because it implies an authoritative relationship to a divinely ordained institution. But we cannot reject it on that account, because this attitude toward the Sabbath was one chief ground of opposition to Jesus on

the part of the authorities and one main count in the official indictment drawn against Him. In other words, if we throw this out we throw out much more than this, among other items this unique and characteristic utterance: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath" (Mark 2:27). Literary experts claim the ability to distinguish sources which have been incorporated into composite documents. Shakespearean scholars, for example, do not hesitate to distinguish, in the plays, between the writing of the Master Elizabethan and the associated work of other and lesser men. Accepting this ability to recognize an author by certain hall-marks of originality, let any competent student go through the Gospels, with absolute critical freedom and unhampered by any theories of inspiration, with the idea of separating from the work of evangelists, editors, and redactors of various sorts those utterances which manifestly proceed from the same mind and are stamped with the same individual impress. The result will be this, that the line of sifting and critical discrimination will not run along the line of separation between the self-assertive utterances and those impersonal utterances which might come from the lips of any earnest preacher. The sayings which are gathered together under the caption of "original" will

contain every essential implication of unique and divine self-consciousness. This element cannot be expunged except at the cost of refusing the critical test and throwing all reports of the teaching away as alike legendary and untrustworthy. This summary action dismisses one set of difficulties and introduces another group equally troublesome.

The attempt has often been made to separate between the words and the works of Jesus in order to confine His uniqueness to the sphere of psychology and to avoid the acceptance of physical miracles. But, to say nothing of the fact that such a transcendence of national and even racial limitations as is implied in the mind of Jesus, constitutes a great difficulty, we have to face the problem of His freedom from the consciousness of sin, His "solidarity" with God, and all the positive and constructive evidences of His sinlessness. This is the most serious difficulty of all for the man who refuses assent to the New Testament view of Christ as a whole. More than this, the words and the works of Jesus are closely interwoven and mutually interplay in the most baffling way. There are inimitably original discourses which have no other historical interest than the miracles in connection with which they were spoken. The classic instance of this inter-

connection of words and works is found in the Galilean crisis following the feeding of the five thousand and the Capernaum sermon. (See John 6:66, and note the relationship of the Synoptic narratives to this crisis.) The rejection of the miracle of the feeding and all that is connected with it and depends upon it would obliterate one whole section and make completely blank one of the most important movements of the Gospel narrative.

There is still another difficulty in the way of a successful carrying out of this project. The works of Jesus are not isolated and colorless wonders; they are disclosures of Himself. Professor Stalker says: "The early Christians have not infrequently been credited with inventing the miracles, but the man would only betray his own intellectual and literary incapacity who ventured to say that they invented the parables" (Christology of Jesus, p. 40). But the miracles are parables—they are acted teachings—they are organic parts of His self-disclosure. The miracles are as unique and characteristic as the parables. Any one who could have invented a miracle like the raising of Jairus' daughter or the turning of water into wine at Cana, with just that inimitable touch of gentleness, selflessness, and power, must have been a spiritual and literary genius quite

capable of inventing a parable. The miracles of Jesus are of one substance with the teaching and cannot be separated therefrom.

There is another line of procedure which we may undertake. There are two contrasted groups of assertions concerning Jesus in the Gospels, those which imply His Deity and those which imply His true humanity. Let us go straight through the New Testament consistently rejecting every statement which implies this higher Christology in order that we may depict, on the basis of what remains, the "Prophet of Nazareth." Here, again, the result is most unsatisfactory. Mixed material, belonging to both categories, is inevitably left on both sides of our new line of cleavage. These statements are not inconsistent in the sense of being mutually exclusive, inasmuch as manifestly they rest upon and include each other. A glance at the discourse of Jesus in answer to the charge of blasphemy which is found in the fifth chapter of John (vs. 19-29) will illustrate what is here meant. This discourse was by way of reply to the charge of blasphemy made against Jesus by His opponents when He said, in defense of His action in healing on the Sabbath: "My father worketh even until now, and I work." In the defensive address which follows Jesus does not retract His claim of Sonship; on

the contrary, He reiterates it, but He guards Himself against the charge of blasphemy by asserting unequivocally His constant subordination to the Father. If we are to reject as lacking in genuineness this claim to equality with the Father, what shall we do with the assertion of His subordination?

As a matter of fact, the higher Christology of the New Testament rests upon, claims, and takes up into itself the entire body of material which implies the real and genuine human life of Christ. On the other hand, to take away from the narrative words, works, and functions which are involved in this higher Christology is to mutilate and destroy the human life itself. If Jesus was not the Son of God and did not come from Heaven to save men, if He did not assert His oneness with God and His power to save, if He did not heal diseases and otherwise manifest a supernatural life and power, if He did not die on the cross for men and rise again from the tomb to take captivity captive, what did He do or say? What, in plain unequivocal phrase, is the solid ground beneath our feet as believers in Jesus at all? This divisive process does not leave material for anything clear-cut or of permanent significance. It reduces the career of Jesus to the consistency of a rainbow which appears for a mo-

ment in faintly radiant lines against the dark clouds and then disappears. This theory knows nothing for certain concerning Jesus and can assert nothing with assurance. It cannot even admit, without hedging, His sinlessness, much less His authority as a teacher sent from God. (See Bruce, Humiliation of Christ, pp. 196, 197; Orr, The Bible Under Trial, p. 160.)

Another attempt to disintegrate the unity of the New Testament and to get behind the Gospel to that which is not Gospel is usually expressed in the contrasted terms, "kernel and husk." In most discussions under the above title or others like this is an attempt to discriminate between some more or less subliminal "essence of Christianity" and the interpretation of Christ which enters into the Gospel and is based upon a fair valuation of the New Testament witness.

Take, for example, Harnack's Essence of Christianity. According to this interpretation Jesus is the subject, not the object, of His religion. He is to be regarded simply the first and model Christian, and the essence of Christianity is the reaffirmation in subsequent Christians of His attitude toward God. "He is man who includes Himself with us over against God." "Not the Son, but the Father only, belongs to the Gospel as Jesus himself proclaimed it." (See

English Translation, p. 144.) He reveals the Christian life in that He first lived it. The essence of Christian faith is the belief in God as Father, the infinite worth of the human soul, the obligation of service. There is therefore no place in Christianity for a Christology—Jesus does not belong to the narrative.

We have several remarks to make on this theory.

(a) Whatever may be said for or against the general conception thus expressed, this much is beyond all question: It is not historic Christianity, and it has no historic basis. Upon whose authority is it asserted that Jesus did not include Himself in His message or make Himself essential to His Gospel? The idea that the disciples had received no doctrine of Christ's Person and that they had been taught to consider Him simply as *primus inter pares* with themselves in the art of holy living is preposterous. It is contradicted by every shred of evidence that we have. A Christianity without a Christology affords us the spectacle of the attempt of a modern ethico-philosophical system to obtain by stealth an ancient and historical name.

(b) This theory does not involve a Gospel, for it has no message for the sinner. Salvation from sin is not within the definition of the essence.

On this point we may well heed the words of Professor Cremer which, though spoken by an avowed opponent of Harnack, nevertheless will be recognized as a true characterization by those who have read the latter's book. Professor Cremer says: "In the controversy with Harnack the question is, whether the Christianity of the apostolic message is right, or whether it must be replaced by a Christianity of modern reflection and still more modern enthusiasm. The Christianity of the apostolic message applies to the lost sinner, to whom it offers salvation through the wondrous grace of God, who became our brother in Christ Jesus. Harnack's Christianity applies to the modern man who feels himself vexed, not by the moral but by the intellectual problem, because the moral problem, How is the sinner saved? does not exist for him" (Reply to Harnack, preface to English Translation). Can that be entitled to the name of Christianity which has no message for the sinner?

It is therefore clear that in order to defend the essence of Christianity we are compelled to take issue with those who attack the New Testament. The attempts which are made to distinguish between essence and form (kernel and husk) of apostolic Christianity are seen to do one or the other of two things: (1) They dissolve the his-

torical facts, the interpretation of which must enter into the essence of Christianity, and without which there are no facts to interpret and therefore no Christianity, or (2) they eliminate the application and deny the permanent worth of all those categories which alone maintain the supreme significance and final authority of our Lord's person. But these categories cannot be eliminated and their use disqualified except at the cost of reducing Him to the human dimension. This is both the purpose and result of such elimination. If there is no supernatural generation, no resurrection from the dead, no pre-existence, no Sonship, no Messiahship, no nature-miracles, it is because there is no one to whom such characteristics can properly be ascribed. We have no substitutes—the reality is lost with the surrender of the descriptive categories. It is no answer to say that we substitute absolute ethical value for these other obsolete functions, for absolute ethical value without historical relationships and metaphysical attributes is meaningless abstraction. Moreover, as we have seen, the absolute ethical value cannot stand alone but goes with the rest. It is impossible to get any of these modern interpreters to affirm categorically the sinlessness of Jesus.

We may illustrate the truth of this contention by one specific instance. In his article on the

Logos of John (Hasting's Dictionary, Christ and the Gospels, Vol. II) E. F. Scott holds that, in his Logos conception, John has united two disparate ideas, religious and metaphysical, and has thus attempted to interpret by an inadequate philosophy a truth of faith. Metaphysically the uniqueness of Jesus is accounted for on the ground that He is the divine Word incarnate. Religiously, however, "his worship is directed in the last resort not to the Logos whom he discovers in Jesus but to Jesus Himself." When you ask why the philosophy is inadequate to the religious truth which John attempts to express through it, the only reply that can be made is that he expresses the uniqueness of Jesus in the absolute terms of a definite metaphysic. Mr. Scott specifies five particulars in which John emphasizes the uniqueness of Jesus and criticises Him on the ground that in so exalting the divine Person he obscures elements in the divine life which constitute its glory, namely, its true human conditions. But, we answer, in verse 14 of the Prologue John not only asserts the true human life of the Logos but states the only principle in accordance with which worship addressed to Jesus, who lived under human conditions, could be justified as anything but abject and heathenish idolatry; that is, that the being worshiped was essentially God

though tabernacled in human flesh. Instead of being disparate truths, John's metphysical and religious conceptions belong together and are necessary to each other. Had he not insisted upon the metaphysical truth, his religious truth would deservedly have been held up to scorn and public contempt. He would have been held guilty, and rightly, of rendering to man that which belonged by right to God alone. This illustration simply shows that the attempts to put the knife between a truth of the New Testament and the form in which it is expressed is usually to thrust it into the vitals of the truth itself. The whole outcome of this line of thought is expressed in the terse and terrible sentence of Johannes Weiss: "Jesus is nothing more than a human being like the rest of us" (*Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments,* Vol. 1, p. 67).

We believe that it represents a deeper and truer insight to see in the Logos an essential and permanent truth. "John finds in the terms Logos and Son the ideas which turn God from mere abstract existence into a Being concrete, and living. He discovers in these the truths which breathe grandeur into his conception of Christ, and through Him confer dignity on nature and man, as well as reality on redemption. And therefore we can say: the history of Jesus read through

this prologue transfigures man and fills his actual history and possible destiny with the mind and life and majesty of God" (Fairbairn, Studies in Religion and Theology, p. 598).

Still another attempt to disintegrate the New Testament, and to eliminate the facts upon which the Gospel rests as the basis of its interpretation, is to separate the alleged strata of New Testament tradition. It is held that the Christ of the Gospel, Lord of Glory and Saviour of men, is a dogmatic and imaginary enlargement of the historic Jesus. This dogmatic figure is thrown upon the screen by an intense imaginative activity on the part of the church through the magnifying lens of faith. The only scientific justification of this hypothesis would be the clear exposition of the separate and distinct strata of tradition, exhibiting the stages of progressive enlargement whereby a simple human figure reached the magnitude and cosmic importance of the Christ of the creeds.

Here the history of New Testament criticism comes to our aid. We have seen in the past few years a significant change of front on the part of New Testament critics, even those of the more radical sort.

1. We have seen the gap closed between Mark and the other two Synoptic Gospels. It

was formerly urged that Mark's Gospel was the nearest, and much nearer than the others, to the "primitive Gospel," the supposed non-miraculous, non-Christological narrative of the Galilean prophet. Mark was considered primitive and by comparison historical both in time and method. Matthew, and Luke in particular, were thought to indicate a manipulation of the original matter in the direction of increased emphasis upon the supernatural. This contention is now definitely given up. Keim holds that Mark, if anything, goes farther than either Matthew or Luke in emphasizing the supernatural in the Person of Christ. (See Jesus of Nazara, English Translation, Vol. 1, p. 124.) While Professor Bacon has recently come forward as the advocate of a theory that Mark's Gospel is itself a secondary source and represents a Pauline manipulation of the Gospel material; others hold that it is a Johannine document. Bousset says: "Already the oldest Gospel is written from the standpoint of faith; already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous Son of God whose glory shone in this world. And it has been rightly emphasized that in this respect all first three Gospels are distinguished from the fourth only in degree" (*Was Wissen Wir von Jesus?* p. 54).

2. The gap has been closed between the Synoptics and the Gospel of John. It was maintained (and is even now by some) that in John's Gospel we have the culmination of the attempt to construct a life of Christ in the interest of a gnostic theory of Christ's Person. In John, therefore, we have the Jesus of the Galilean ministry all but completely hidden from us under the wrappings of dogma. But this gap has now practically disappeared. It is clearly seen, first that John has emphasized the true humanity of Christ quite as strongly as the other Gospel writers. Professor Burkitt does not overstate the case when he says: "In no early Christian document is the real humanity of Jesus so emphasized as in the Fourth Gospel. That Jesus was a real man is an obvious inference from the Synoptic narrative, but in the Fourth Gospel it is a dogma" (The Gospel History and Its Transmission, p. 233). Moreover, it is also seen that the Synoptic Gospels go just as far as John in affirming the supernatural character and quality of our Lord's Person (cf. Matt. 11:27). There is nothing stated in John that is not implied in Mark, Luke, and Matthew.

3. The gap has also been closed between the Gospels and the Epistles. It used to be affirmed that the apostolic teachers, Paul in particular, turned Christianity aside from the correct road

of development and, instead of interpreting the historical Christ in terms of the Gospel tradition, adopted the ideas and the terminology, partly of Messianic expectations and partly of Hellenistic philosophy, and produced a Christology and soteriology which do not rightfully belong to Christianity and which, in its very earliest development, involve a displacement of emphasis and a break with the true historical development. Now it has been shown by a number of workers (notably Professor Jacobus, in his weighty little volume, A Problem in New Testament Criticism, Professor James Denney, in Jesus and the Gospel, and others) that this discrepancy does not exist, that the teachings and actions of Jesus and the teachings of the apostles are related to each other as root and stem of the same organism of truth.

4. The interval has sensibly narrowed between the New Testament and the ecumenical creeds. Here it used to be said that there exists a chasm, world-wide, between the Jesus of history and the Christ of dogma. (See Fairbairn, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Sec. 1.) But if you would see just how much that difference amounts to read Principal Fairbairn's discussion, in which he makes clear that without the severe speculation which is embodied in the great

historic development of the church creeds the Christian religion would long ago have ceased to exist. At the same time we have the testimony of Professor N. Schmidt, at the opposite verge of the theological firmament from Fairbairn, that the dogmatic interpretation of Christ rests upon the New Testament teaching on the one hand and Christian experience on the other (Prophet of Nazareth, pp. 4-6).

The total result of this process has been so to exhibit the unity of the New Testament as to make the present and future issue the acceptance or rejection of its testimony as a whole. There are no stratifications in the New Testament. The whole deposit is seen to be homogeneous.

As Dr. Denney has forcibly stated the case: "He lived not as another good man, however distinguished his goodness might be, but as one who confronted men in the saving power and therefore in the truth and reality of God. Whether the words in Luke 24:52 are genuine or not, the fact remains that at no date can we find any trace of a church which did not worship Him" (Jesus and the Gospel, p. 64).

The unity and unanimity of the New Testament as to the Person and work of Jesus determine both the attack upon Christianity and the defense of it.

1. The most recent and most subtle of all attacks upon Christianity are made at the vital center upon the Christology as a whole. The result, as Dr. Denney sums it up, is that "Jesus remains out of our reach. The figure which we see in the Gospels is the Christ of the church's faith, not a historical person. That figure did not create the church, it was created by it. As we have them the Gospels are not the foundation of the Christian religion. They are its fruit. They show us the Christian consciousness, not the consciousness of Christ" (Jesus and the Gospel, p. 146).

2. The defense. The unity and unanimity of the New Testament as to the Person of Christ, the absence of all alien material from it, together with the time which is allowed by the historical situation for the unanimity to be reached, narrow the number of possible hypotheses to explain it to two.

(a) It was due either to an epidemic delusion ("epidemic of idolatry," "Christus-myth," "ideal construction" are some descriptive phrases used), a contagion of hallucination; or (b) it was due to a tremendous and revolutionary experience (issuing from contact with a great historical person) the nature of which is clearly expressed in the New Testament itself.

The first of these hypotheses is that of the so-called Christus-myth propaganda, which, dissatisfied with the illogical and contradictory position of modern liberalism, has gone on to the bitter end in the unqualified denial of historicity to the Gospels. By this hypothesis the historic Jesus disappears, and what appears to be such in the New Testament is an "ideal construction," an imaginary figure, formed of Messianic hopes and expectations, given a local habitation and a name by a group of ardent enthusiasts who dreamed in terms of history and wrote history of the substance that dreams are made of. This hypothesis has already been tested in these pages by the attempt, at the end of the preceding chapter, which was not satire but the outcome of an honest study, to think the thing through. The theory breaks down by its own weight. The task of fabricating an account of such particularity and of such and so many qualities of originality is beyond the range of possibility, not only for such men as the New Testament writers are reasonably reputed to have been, but for any body of men whatsoever. Moreover, the hypothesis fails even as one applies it. It is too cumbersome, too artificial, too self-condemnatory, too utterly preposterous. The student of the New Testament finds many concatenated indications that he is in a real

world of living people and actual events. There are far too many undesigned coincidences, unrealized interconnections, unresolved discrepancies (which are of the substance of history), unpremeditated traits of simplicity and candor, to make it credible that one is in a world of unreality, conceived of by men so rapt in their own subjective notions as to have been totally insulated from the real world of actual happenings. Nothing in the Gospels is one-half so hard to believe as this theory which makes the pyramid of Christian history rest on nothing, and resolves the supreme and mightiest Figure of all time into the fevered, psychopathic vision of men who were mad, and yet have made the wisdom of the wise as foolishness. And this leads to another consideration.

The positive and constructive evidence for the historicity of the Gospels and of the Gospel is found in the following considerations:

1. In the inimitable originality, power, and vividness of the portraiture of Jesus in the Gospels. It is well enough to say that the delineation of Jesus is the product of the faith of the church. We need not deny it. But it is pertinent to ask: What was it that created the faith of the church? It is especially to be remembered that the faith of the primitive group of Christians was the outcome of a mental revolution. They were con-

verts from denial, or from a fixed attitude of expectancy which required almost more modification to fit it to the reality than actual unbelief. Moreover, there is still another question which much be answered: How was the faith in Jesus as a supernatural being enabled to create so wonderfully lifelike and convincingly real a portrait? Have you ever carefully considered the literary argument for the authenticity of the New Testament conception of Christ, drawn from the well-nigh absolute impossibility of portraying the supernatural in definite relationship with the natural? It is well worth careful consideration. (A clear presentation of this forceful argument is to be found in Bishop Carpenter's Primary Convictions, p. 96ff. See also Fairbairn, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, pp. 357-378.)

2. The hypothesis of illusion is eliminated from consideration, in the second place, by the fact that these Christian writers were marked among their fellows by intellectual and ethical sanity. Their conviction about Christ persisted, was capable of clear, forceful, and persuasive intellectual statement, and bore fruit in actual achievement. We have in the New Testament the actual process by which their minds moved from point to point along the road of mental persuasion until they reached the ultimate convictions

in which they found rest. Nothing could more clearly indicate sanity, in the subjects of any experience, than the clear marks of such a process. Professor W. M. Ramsay (in a paper quoted in part in the appendix to Dr. Orr's Virgin Birth of Christ) has a striking passage on the evidence of the historical reality appearing in the Gospels. He says: "The compelling power of everything connected with the life of the Saviour was the greatest force in history. It was this force that produced the Gospels, driving the facts into the minds of men so that they could not but speak the things which they had seen and heard and impressing the image of Jesus on their imagination so deeply that it shines with almost undiminished brilliance through the Gospels, although they were written so many years after His death and are not unaffected by the time and circumstances in which they were composed. This compelling power is the reality that underlies the unfortunate and misleading name, 'verbal inspiration,' and the revolt from that term should not blind us to the great truth of which it is a misconception" (p. 247).

3. By the fact, that while no external restraint was put upon writing narratives concerning Christ and that a doctrine of Scripture separating the canonical from the non-canonical writings was a gradual growth, the portrait of Christ was handed

on in its primitive simplicity and clearness. We adduce in support of this statement the words of Professor E. P. Gould who says, on the position of the Gospels in the second century: "The conclusions are inevitable: first, that the second-century literature certainly uses extra-canonical sources of information about our Lord, and does it freely and without apology: secondly, that the four Gospels were the main stream to which the rest was tributary—the standard writings on the subject: thirdly, they were not Scripture in the sense which we attach to that word, they were not separated from other writings by any such line: fourthly, that the amount and importance of extra-canonical matter are after all small. Substantially, the Jesus of the second-century literature is the Jesus of the Gospels. This fact is as we have seen the most important and favorable result to be obtained, more important in every way than the attempted exclusion of extra-canonical sources. The unrestricted use of extra-canonical sources, without any important change of the record or of the historical figure, is an ideal result" (Gospel of Mark, pp. XLI and XLII).

4. By the fact that only the Christ of the Gospels and epistles, who is interpreted as a divine Being living a human life on earth and a

divine life in Heaven, incarnate Son of God, Messiah, Saviour, Judge, and Lord, is adequate to explain the belief which gave us the portrait and the continuing faith which has made, and with ever increasing power is still making, Christian history. The historical Jesus, and the only historical person discernible by the most searching scrutiny of the Christian documents, is the Christ of God, the Saviour. The Christian Gospel centers in Him, and His figure cannot be taken from us by any process less drastic than the total rejection of the New Testament as historical documents. Every evidence to show that it is either a mythical dream-figure, "an artistic and religious fiction," or the Christ, the Son of the living God to whom we must hold, only makes certain the outcome in the vindication of the Christian Gospel. That alone interprets and explains the facts. Here, too, history, in the future as in the past, must "come around to the side of faith."

CHAPTER VII

THE APPEAL TO CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

IN Christian experience, psychology and history, after long separate journeying, meet and are joined. Christian psychology is historical. The Christian life is a form of psychological experience which has become historical by bringing into the world and establishing among men a specific and recognizable type of human character. Christianity, as an organized and institutional force, consisting of bodies of men banded together by fraternal ties, as well as by an invisible and pervasive influence, is the definite historical result of a profound and far-reaching change produced in the thoughts and feelings of individual men by the historical person Jesus Christ.

Convincing testimony in abundance is available to prove that the historical movement, known as Christianity, was accompanied or followed by the appearance of a new type of character. A careful comparison between the noblest products of pre-Christian heathenism and representative men

of the Christian body will convince any candid and thoughtful person of this fact. It is also evident that this Christian type has never disappeared from the earth, even in the darkest times, and that it appears and reappears in all parts of the world wherever Christianity is proclaimed and accepted. It is a never-failing factor in Christian history. It is Christian character which gives weight and value to the testimony of Christian experience.

Men of the type of Paul of Tarsus and David Livingstone have a right to demand a hearing when they testify to the experience out of which their lives have issued. When a genuinely Christian man, whose gracious and noble character is an open book for all men to read, declares that his life, so helpful and so justly admired, is due to Christ, one who would refuse assent to the explanation is in a difficult and insecure position, for he can deny neither the reality which is to be explained nor the sincerity with which the explanation is offered. It is important to note that the testimony which is here sought is not theoretical, but practical—the true and sincere utterance of experience. We want no dogmatic interpretations of the Christian life thrown into the form of experimental testimony; we wish to hear the words of those who know, and who show

they know, the power of Christianity by exhibiting the spirit and living the life of Christianity. Fortunately, there is no dearth of testimony borne by those who are under no suspicion of being theologians, but are, assuredly, by every implication thoroughly Christian.

Beginning now at the central point, the question at once arises whether or not the New Testament gives us the normal type of Christian experience. Is the normal type of Christian life one which centers in the experience of salvation through the crisis of reconciliation to God in Christ, or is it something quite different? Historically the New Testament Christian, vividly conscious of salvation through Christ in reconciliation, is the normal type because the primitive and creative type. Christianity was inaugurated as a movement of salvation through Christ; its message in the name of Christ was: "Be ye reconciled to God;" and its converts were assuredly those who were conscious of being brought to a new fellowship with God in Christ. This type of belief, of preaching, of confessional life, created the church, and has dominated its life from the earliest days. Christianity won its victory on this basis. This fact is not decisive, for modification in a new age and under new conditions may be necessary, but it does create a certain presumption

in favor of the historic type, and also sets up a warning lest we so far depart from original Christianity as to forfeit the Christian name.

Moreover, the Christian life of the early leaders of the church is indication enough that they are entitled to speak from a deep, genuine, and life-giving experience. These first disciples of Christ and their successors were literally the salt of the earth, who saved the world from total wreck and became the builders of the new age that was to come. In the decay of religious faith, personal and social morality, and political authority, the Christian church, on the foundation afforded by the characters of those who had known and followed Jesus Christ, made recovery of those things which seemingly had been forever lost and re-established life on a more secure basis than ever before. History pays a tribute of praise to the holiness, the earnestness, and the wisdom of the apostolic church. Even so depreciatory a writer as Gibbon, in that famous fifteenth chapter of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, gives as one of the reasons for the success of Christianity the pure lives of the Christians. On all grounds deep respect should be paid to the New Testament testimony as to the nature of Christian experience.

Our purpose, however, is to go farther afield

and to interrogate more broadly the Christian consciousness in its general historic type. There have been five specific objections urged against the assumption that the New Testament type of Christian experience is the normal and controlling one.

1. It is urged that it involves the dogmatic assumption that God is angry and needs to be appeased—a conception that is held to be antiquated and discredited. Undoubtedly, apostolic teaching involves the supposition that the estrangement which is healed by the reconciliation accomplished by Christ is in some sense really mutual, and that in the death of Christ a barrier to the acceptance of men on the part of God was done away. "Reconciliation in the New Testament sense is not something which *we accomplish* when we lay aside our enmity to God; it is something *God accomplished* when, in the death of Christ, He put away everything that on His side meant estrangement, so that He might come and preach peace" (Denney, Expositor's Bible, 2 Corinthians, p. 212). This is the truth as the New Testament teaches it. But does not such a statement of the truth take away any imaginary offense there may be in it? How any one can conceive of a transaction between two parties as being altogether one-sided passes knowledge.

If there is alienation on one side there must be something in the way of a reciprocal result on the other. Alienation on the one side may not mean alienation in the sense of chilled affection or cold resentment on the other side—this could not be with God; but it does involve separation, hindrance, estrangement.

How anybody can believe that so deep and dreadful a thing as sin has no effect upon God, makes no change in His attitude, and constitutes no problem for His love and holiness, is also passing strange. Perhaps it is because we have no adequate sense of how dreadful a thing sin really is, that we can hold so light a view of its consequences either for us or for God. The wrath of God is no figment of theological imagination. It is a fact of life. It is working in the nature of things whereby sin and misery are bound together. It is a necessity of the situation. The reconciliation was accomplished in the heart of God before it was demonstrated historically. It was accomplished historically and objectively before it was accepted by a single person. It was a completed reconciliation, sealed with the blood of a consummate, voluntary sacrifice, offered to men and accepted by them through the infinite love and grace of God. The steadfast character of God, who "cannot deny himself," is guarded

by the Gospel at the only point where it could be endangered by such teaching in the assurance put at the very forefront of the message, that the entire process of reconciliation had its springs in the heart-love of God, and that He bore its costs Himself. "God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." If this was ever true, it must be true to-day. If it was never true, then the historic Gospel cannot be indicated as ever having been a true interpretation of life. It is not a question of the adaptation of an old system to new conditions, but of destruction, root and branch, of that which bears the name of Christianity.

2. It is further urged that this type of Christian life involves an overemphasis upon the death of Christ, if not an absolute misinterpretation of it. Here we come to a rooted objection to the idea of atonement, which is looked upon as crude, rabbinical, and obsolete. This is not a discussion of the atonement, and we can do no more than deal with great brevity with this objection which is urged against the apostolic type of Christian life. We raise this question: The death of Christ is a fact of history for the modern as well as for the ancient Christian; what significance is to be attached to this event, which is a cardinal

and critical one from any point of view? It is utterly impossible to approach the life of Christ or to study His career intelligently or to arrive at any firm persuasion as to His person or work without reaching some definite conclusion as to the meaning of His death. The death of Christ was never interpreted apart from His life in the world nor apart from His resurrection and ascension as parts of one supreme moral action. The death of Christ, therefore, involves the whole meaning of His life. At the very least estimation, if it is not mythical altogether, it was the central and most commanding act of His life. At the very least valuation, therefore, the cross is the expression of Jesus' conception of sin and His judgment upon it. The death of Christ, voluntary and self-less, reveals His secret, and the cross becomes the instrument of Christian discipline, the acceptance of which brings us into harmony with the will of God. On this very simple line of interpretation, not urging overmuch the death of Christ in relationship to forgiveness and acceptance with God, it yet enters most vitally into Christian experience and conditions our entire conception of our life in God. If we are to keep within the boundaries of the Christian life at all we must retain, to this extent at least, the historic attitude toward the death of Christ.

3. It is, furthermore, insisted upon by some that the New Testament type of Christian life, and the modern evangelical view which has been modeled upon it, insists too strongly upon the element of crisis and revolution in Christian experience, and is therefore out of harmony with the evolutionary thought of our day. May not the Christian life be a gradual growth, inaugurated without the consciousnes of any violent crisis, and carried forward in the same orderly way?

This question brings us into the most serious issue and the deepest problem of this entire discussion, and it is imperative that we should deal with it with the utmost earnestness and candor. We are concerned to know the limits of variation within which genuinely Christian experience may move, for this question involves another, whether or not normal Christian experience justifies the Gospel as an interpretation of life, and is in turn justified by life itself. In the first place, we are quite convinced that the Christian life, necessarily and in every instance, involves the resolution of the antinomy of the flesh and spirit through reconciliation with God in Christ. This involves the sharp contrast between the helpless bondage of the self to sin, and entrance into freedom through the Christian reconciliation. It involves still further that the entrance into this new life

involves an acknowledgment and confession of impotence and need. This we believe to be the essential content of every Christian experience, not merely because it is so clearly brought out in the New Testament, but also because it is implicated in many not unusual and conspicuous facts of human experience. That the flesh is enmity against God and that *union* with God means *reunion* seems to us too plain to remain long unseen by any thinking or observing man.

This essential content of Christian experience, namely, recovery from a life of alienation from God through reconciliation to a union with God, is shown most clearly in the case of those who have experienced a sharp transition from the one condition to the other. Of the psychological reality of sudden and permanent change of the soul, in many instances, there can be no possible question. Conversion, in the sense of complete and revolutionary changes in the inner life and in mental and moral dispositions, practically instantaneous, is no exclusively religious phenomenon. It is a not infrequent occurrence in human life. The sudden transition from antagonism or indifference, which is very much the same thing, through the mediating agency of Christ, is Christian conversion. The first Jewish disciples were conscious of this sharp transition through their

personal acquaintance with Christ, who awakened in them the sense of their alienation from God, and who brought them into a new relationship with Him. Paul came to the same clear-cut consciousness of deliverance through the contrast of his Pharisaic attitude of self-confidence and his Christian attitude of self-surrender—a change in which I "died unto the law, that I might live unto God." The Gentile converts experienced this transition in their passage from the delusions and vices of paganism into the life and joy of the Christian faith.

In every instance the very core of this experience is a change of attitude (which involves recovery from a lapse and the breaking down of antagonism to the will of God) and relationship to God—a reunion through the reconciling agency of Christ. Perhaps the most conspicuous instances of this element of contrast are to be found among those who have been rescued from lives of extreme degradation, of helpless slavery to evil habit. It is a well-known fact that instances of almost miraculous deliverance from evil are numerous. Among men of the sort described by Harold Begbie in Twice-born Men sin has worked itself out to its logical conclusion in all but utter and hopeless despair. They are marked by an almost total lack of definite the-

ology, but a most intense and agonizing sense of sin. Self-respect is gone and self-confidence is utterly broken. They are reduced to the condition of having no senses left but the sense of need, and with no voice but a cry. And in response to this cry they have been lifted up, seemingly in a moment, out of this hopeless degradation to self-respect, purity, and hope. For them, at any rate, hearing and learning the Gospel is the transition from death unto life. Harold Begbie, in summarizing the significance of the stories he tells, says:

"When I visit the happy homes, and experience the gentleness and refinement of such as those whose life stories appear in this book, and compare them with the squalor and misery of the great majority of homes surrounding them, I am astonished that the world should be incredulous about religion, and that legislation should be so foolish as to attempt to do laboriously by enactments, clumsy and slow, what might be done instantly and easily by religion if it had the full force of the community back of it" (Twice-born Men, pp. 279f.).

In cases such as these, where at an earlier stage of development one would have found the anti-religious bias most strong, the sense of need is intensified to such an unbearable degree by the

overpowering sense of failure and defeat that the shock of conversion, the violent antecedent struggle before submission, is reduced to almost nothing. One has not far to fall who is already beaten to his knees. And this suggests a most important truth: The contrast of the two natures, or the two selves (or as some prefer to say, the self and the nature), exists in every human person, but the antagonism is not equally intense in all individuals nor in the same person at different stages of development. We have just seen how a man, in the breakdown of self-confidence as the outcome of a lifetime of sin, passes with surprising ease through the crisis of conversion which utterly transforms character and cuts off the former life as with a knife. It is also quite reasonable that at the opposite extreme, when antagonisms are not fully developed, as in childhood, or when religious influences are very active and helpful, the transition through acceptance of the "reconciliation" may be almost unconscious. God does not bring hardened sinners into the world, nor does He leave men without gracious influences to pervade life and soften the heart. We are merely contending for the truth that, however gently or gradually, a real crisis occurs in these cases, and that a true reconciliation is accomplished.

One bank of a stream is just as separate from the other when the stream is a mere trickle as when the channel is miles in breadth. One passes from one bank to the other, even though he span the stream with a single step. This is true in the Christian life, and in the very heart of Christian experience is the constant proof and reminder of the fact that it consists in the reconciliation of antagonistic forces through the grace of God in Christ. The seat of this antagonism is in the self, and the self is never subdued except in the flow of the life of Christ. The entrance into Christian unity with God in Christ does not make the believer complete or self-sufficient. Holiness is always the condition of righteousness, and holiness is never our own intrinsic possession. It is a functioning of God in us. The Christian is made aware constantly, in the very secret of his victorious life, if not through failure, that his life is a constant experience of regenerative and reconciling grace At no time does he live except as Christ lives in him. The very holiest of men have been most profoundly conscious of sin. And they have known sin, not merely as the foil or contrast of their holiness, but as being buried, submerged, kept down, in their holiness itself, which is a tide of inflowing life from God, and is theirs only by a constant appropriation.

Thus reconciliation to God is the very center of the Christian life. Men will continue to be brought to God in as many ways as there are temperaments, but the coming itself, instantaneous or gradual, in gentle childhood or dour manhood, involves a reconciling of antagonistic forces and a restoration to God.

4. It is further objected that this New Testament evangelical type of Christian experience depends upon a conception of Christ as risen and enthroned and continuously present with the church, which is unhistorical, unscientific, and cannot be allowed.

It is quite true that the evangelical type of Christian experience depends absolutely upon the continuous presence and divine operations of Christ in the hearts and lives of men. The initial type of Christian character, consciously transformed, buoyant, hopeful, aggressive, and triumphant, grew out of the individual conviction that Jesus lived on high, having conquered death. When Jesus died on the cross the hearts of the disciples were broken, and their hopes were laid desolate. But after Olivet, followed by Pentecost, there were no more tears or laments, for they had Him whom they thought to be lost as an eternal inward possession. He was in them in a constant flow of enlightenment, comfort, and

power. Christ was in them the hope of glory. This was the power of the resurrection, the power of a reconstructed hope because of a fellowship renewed unto perpetuity. In this power the church was founded. In this same power the church has been carried on always. The constant reappearance of the original type of Christian, conscious of the power of Christ in salvation, is the tribute of history to the faith of the church in the perpetual presence and triumphant grace of Christ. Apart from this grace such characters could not be found; such deliverances as have marked the victorious work of the church in mission fields, at home and abroad, could never have been accomplished.

And it is this faith that they tell us is unhistorical, unscientific, and impossible, and must be given up. That which is historical cannot belong to a sphere above time and endure from age to age except ideally and historically in the record. We may go back with the aid of the historical documents, and by the use of an extensive critical apparatus reconstruct the circumstances of the first century, and see Jesus, that is, the historical Jesus, as He lived and moved among men. This we are quite willing and eager to do, but we are not willing to stop there. Moreover, we assert that this method is not the method of Christianity, nor

does it explain the facts of Christian experience. We appeal to the facts against the theories. That cannot be impossible which is actual. Just as behind the life of the Hebrew there was a unique experience of God which other nations did not have and, because they did not have it, did not produce the same results as the Hebrew history shows; just as behind the founding of the Christian church and the production of the documents there was the unmistakable evidence of a new and revolutionary experience on the part of the disciples of Christ, so the *continuous* production of reorganized Christian character rests upon the unbroken consciousness of the presence and power of the living Christ. The literature of Christianity is filled with expression of this consciousness. Its hymns, devotional books, sermons, biographies, missionary documents, are simply filled with the conscious presence and with the multiplying evidences of the working of the Christ who ever lives and loves. The thought of a dead Christ would destroy the church. The loss of faith in Christ as alive, enthroned, and at work with His church would cut the nerve of its endeavors and blast irretrievably all the fond hopes and earnest aspirations which, like shining convoys of angels, accompany its world-wide undertakings.

The attempt to account for this constant and cumulative testimony, beginning with the witnesses to the resurrection and continuing to the present, on the basis of some sort of historic illusion is nothing short of pathetic. It is so utterly inadequate—and because so manifestly inadequate, utterly unscientific.

5. One further objection is noticed. It is sometimes quite seriously urged that the New Testament type of Christian experience does not produce a desirable type of character, at least, for the world's practical business. The Christian believer is one who trusts, surrenders, gives up his will to another, and generally makes himself passive, negative, and useless. This objection may be plausibly urged from without and on theoretical grounds, but scarcely from within and on the basis of concrete examples among Christians. The Christian himself well knows that, while toward his Saviour Christ he is as dependent as a child upon a mother, toward the work and peril of the world he is a belted knight facing great tasks. The true Christian knows that he shall have need of all his faith, and is fearful only lest his nerve shrink and his courage fail before the battle is fought and his work done. The true Christian character is the light of the world and the salt of the earth because it has been touched by the

light-bringing and saving power of Christ Himself. But the church exists only by virtue of its relationship to the living Christ. He is "head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1:22, 23).

The ultimate origin of Christian experience is to be found in the innate religiousness of the human soul. The Gospel is an address promising fulfilment and satisfaction to the religious instinct. The religious impulse is the final and highest expression of the impulse to live and the longing for the fullest possible life, which begins with the merest instinctive outreach for food and light and air, sweeps upward through all the physical, mental, and social activities of man, until it fulfils itself in the outreach for God. Man is never normally solitary and unrelated. The unit of human life is not the individual, but the group. A human being is not fully human, not really a person, not altogether himself, until he becomes along with other persons the sharer of a common life with them. Behind the specific form of activity we call religious is the tremendous momentum of the elementary impulse toward self-fulfilment. Man is not sufficient for himself; men are not sufficient for each other; society is not self-realizing nor complete within itself. The

world of things is not an adequate environment. Man seeks for a footing in the unseen, and for an invisible and illimitable environment in which his consciously spiritual self shall rest in completeness and fulfilment. He is by nature a seeker for God, and eternity is in his heart.

But this impulse to seek and rest in God is met by a counter-current, just as all man's social impulses are met and thwarted by his insurgent egotism. This makes him war against the self-limitation and mastery in which alone his deeper self can find satisfaction. Man's approach to God is hindered by his sinfulness, which has overlaid his deeper instincts and perverted his true self. This is why the religious instinct has so often led him astray, and why his religious consciousness has been overclouded by gloom and chilled by dread and aversion. He is haunted by a fear of the Being for whom he longs. His religious aspiration becomes a cry of penitence, and expresses itself in the longing for redemption. This instinctive feeling for expiation is deeply imbedded in the literary memorials of the universal religious life. The noblest prayers in the liturgies of the world are freighted with this sense of sin and need. The Gospel as a system of divine reconciliation through a Heaven-sent Redeemer is thus addressed to a universal need

and comes as the answer to a well-nigh universal prayer. This is what Tertullian meant when he said that the human heart is by nature Christian. Christianity fits the deepest conscious need of the human heart.

George Steven, in very much the same connection says: "Neither in common things nor in Divine does the new life arise save on the foundation of what is already within" (Psychology of the Christian Soul, p. 183). He quotes in support of this statement the significant words of Warneck: "Even the most depraved heathen longs for contact with God, and therefore for authentic knowledge of Him—a knowledge which He alone can give. * * * The experience of missions proves that the heathen are ripe for a self-communication of God, and that they understand it at once" (The Living Forces of the Gospel, p. 198). The first effects of the proclamation of the Gospel in which the historical elements embodied in it play a leading part is to deepen and intensify the sense of sin. The story of Jesus, centering in the cross, reveals to a man as nothing else can the depth and awfulness of sin and the desperate nature of human need. The entire narration of Jesus' relationship to the world and to the men in it is a most pungent and stinging rebuke to the conscience. The way in

which He was treated in the world, the blindness of unbelief and malignancy of opposition which met His purity of life and motive, His universal sympathy, His tendencies to pain and sorrow—all search out the inner secrets of the heart and drag them relentlessly to light. The awakened man, to whom the Gospel has come with full power, never thinks to lay the responsibility of rejection and crucifixion of Christ upon anybody but himself. In the light of the cross selfishness and sin shrink up and wither away in utter self-loathing, and the fully awakened conscience writhes under a present, searching judgment. It is indeed what the prophet calls "a spirit of justice and a spirit of burning."

But the intent and operation of the Gospel are not to condemn, but to save. It condemns only to bring to the conscious and enlightened judgment of the man himself his own sinfulness, and especially to bring clearly to view the fact that man is dealing directly with God Himself. The voice of the Gospel is not the accent of law itself—merely condemnatory, hardening while it condemns—but infinitely winning. It is the voice of God wooing man away from his sin. While it searches out and awakens the deep-seated antagonism to God that slumbers in the heart that is not awakened to its own condition, it confronts

that antagonism with a love that will not be denied, which allies itself with that deeper instinct for God which has been superseded by sin.

Mr. A. J. Balfour says: "If there be a spiritual experience to which the history of religion bears witness, it is that of reconciliation with God. If there be an 'objective cause' to which the feeling is confidently referred, it is to be found in the central facts of the Christian story." The element in the Gospel which does most to win men is the thought borne on the very front of the Gospel message, that Christ is on our side, that He belongs to us by a supreme act of self-devotion, and all that He is in Himself He is willing to be for us. He is the friend of God, but also our friend. His holiness is a holiness for us, His victory a victory for us. He is ours! He is ready to form a life-and-death union with us! It will be a coalition of the Saviour with the sinner against the sin. It is not merely "the expulsive power of a new affection," it is the victorious incoming of a Friend who of Himself comes to our aid and throws His irresistible resources at our disposal. "It is the whole personality of Christ in its infinite riches that is given us, and it is fellowship with Him as He in actuality is, that saves us" (Steven, Psychology of the Christian Soul, p. 184).

That this deliverance from sin through Christ, in all its aspects, is a reality of Christian experience, there is an overwhelming body of testimony to prove. The change from antagonism to God and from slavery to sin to a condition of union with God and moral victory is real in too many instances to be denied as a reality in the world of experience. And we pause to protest that the indubitable expression of this experience is too clear and definite to be brushed away or discredited by any amount of hostile criticism. The living Christ, clothed in all the grace and concreteness of His earthly story, but radiating power from His seat above principalities and powers, is too well and intimately known and by too many reputable witnesses to be argued away. Through Christ the Christian comes into a new relationship to God's "Behold, I make all things new!"

But Christ is not to be looked upon merely as one who introduces into this heavenly relationship, and is then politely bowed away. It is only in Christ and so far as he is in Christ and as long as he is in Christ, that man is a new creature for whom all things have become new in Heaven and on earth. "Surely we forget ourselves" when we so lightly dismiss Christ as unnecessary, once we have set our feet in the right path, which He has pointed out. We forget the costliness of the

sacrifice which opened that way. We forget the steepness and thorniness of the path. Above all we forget our own human weakness. Are we able, without His hand to help, to follow Him the way He went,

> Toiling up new Calvaries, ever
> With the cross that turns not back?

He who thinks that he can, unaided, follow Christ knows neither himself nor Christ. Our reliance is in God? Yes, but God in Christ, revealed as our Redeemer, who stooped to our low estate and bound us to Him in an effable, sacramental brotherhood, sealed to us in the blood of the everlasting covenant.

But this is not exactly the thread of the argument. The direct movement is to show that Christian experience justifies the Gospel interpretation of Christ as incarnate Son and everlasting Saviour. That experience is utterly inexplicable; more than that, it must be pronounced illusory unless Christ be alive and enthroned in divine power of grace to bring men out of sin into a reconciled and gracious unity with God. To the reality of this truth Christian experience bears the strongest testimony possible; and from the point of view of this central fact of Christian experience, we get a new view of the whole body

of testimony which we have gathered to the essential principle of the Christian Gospel.

Paul, in one of the most remarkable passages in his Epistles, Colossians 1:9-23, draws a most majestic picture of the world as centering in Christ as its originator, organizing resident power, and final end. In this descriptive passage he makes Christ the image of the invisible God, the first-born of the creation, the antecedent cause, indwelling power, and living center of the whole created universe. It is a majestic picture of the ideal world, expressing the eternal reason and governed in the social bond of the eternal love—the Kingdom of the Son of His Love.

Into the midst of this majestic world process, with the creative Christ as its living center and head, Paul puts another process, with Christ also at its head. This world within the world is the church, and Christ—the same Christ, but in so different an aspect—is the head of the church because He is the first-born from the dead, to the end that in all things He might have the preeminence—head of the church that He might be head of the race and, head of the church and the new race by virtue of His death, because through Him it pleased God "to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through

the blood of his cross." And this act of reconciliation through the cross Paul puts on a level with the first great cosmic act when the universe was brought into being. In this act God participated by a "charismatic indwelling" (verse 19), whereby the reconciliation was made a divine transaction. The cosmic creation through Christ, the cosmic rift through sin, the cosmic reconstruction through Christ—and thus we were brought back again to God.

All this would have been impossible to believe or even to think except for one thing: Paul knew, as the whole confessing Christian body knew, the reconciliation accomplished in the cross of Christ. Man is the subject and victim of sin, and Paul, deeply sensitive to the world of spiritual fact and reality, had felt in his own person the fatal principle that had riven the mighty order and thrown it out of harmony with God. He felt the fatal antagonism that had separated God and man and had cried out in vain for deliverance. In the cross of Christ he (and they for whom he spoke out of the fulness of comprehension) had been reunited to God in Christ. For him and for them the rift had been closed, the world reconciled, the divine order potentially and assuredly restored. Here it is that Christian experience closes the

historic circuit, for in Christ the desire of nations had been fulfilled and the world restored to harmoney in God.

God flashed His power into the void,
  And thus His bidding ran:
Be thou through curve on curve employed
  Of greater Life, till man,
Last-born, with clear will unalloyed,
  Turn Life where Life began.
In clear-drawn round the line was steered
  Till man's power seized its sway;
Through will unruled and spirit seared,
  Was checked the circling play;
And Life fulfilled no perfect sphere,
  God-born, God-ended, way.
God's power flashed forth once more,—and lo!
  Whence Life had first begun
Life o'er the gap itself did throw
  To Life whose sweep was done;
God the cleft circle rounded so,—
  Man, God-grasped by God's Son.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN LIFE

ONCE on a time Hamlet, the sensitive and poetical prince of Denmark, indulged in a most enthusiastic panegyric on man: "What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!" In the very next breath, characteristically, he strikes from his pedestal this wonderful paragon which he has just depicted and sneers him into contempt and insignificance: "And yet to me, what is this quintessence of dust?"

Godlike, angelic, quintessence of dust! Herein is struck in artist and in portrait the characteristic and revealing human note of inconsistency. As we look out upon human life in the large, as seen actually in history and as reflected in literature, searching for some fact or principle which seems to involve the essential mystery and dispo-

sition of man, we come almost at once upon this amazing feature of inconsistency. It arrests our attention and challenges our courage as students and interpreters of life. Dare we face the problem? Human inconsistency, the greatness and the misery of man, is a commonplace and threadworn theme of historian, moralist, and poet, but the significance of it cannot be too often impressed upon our minds; our age, as most others, needs to study this question of the sphinx. We are profoundly convinced that the secret of human life and the key to its destiny are to be sought in this same curious, baffling, and infinitely depressing fact. Surely there never was a time in all history when there was so great a disposition and temptation in the interests of scientific or philosophical comprehensiveness, which covets a smooth and seamless world-scheme, to ignore or minimize so painful and illogical a fact. We must face it here, as the Christian Gospel is established squarely upon a definite interpretation of it.

To begin with, Hamlet's enthusiastic words are justified by the facts. There can be no possible question that man is the center and crown of his own world—which is the only world we know directly. It is quite evident that what we know as the world, conceived of as an independent and objective system of reality, is really man's

thought of the world. The beauty of the star or the flower is not in the thing itself nor even in the eye considered as a physical organ, but in the mind which through the eye perceives and interprets in terms of itself. What we call the world is really man himself in terms of an experience which is cosmic in its range and in its fulness. Kant says somewhere that man creates but does not originate the world. Some one also has said that the heavens declare the glory, not of God, but of the astronomer. We can see no possible reason why they should not do both. Certainly they do reveal in a very vital sense the greatness of the astronomer. The history of the world, as described by science, portrayed by art, and interpreted by philosophy, is simply an extended and co-ordinated biography of the human race. It is a very impressive record, and one may be pardoned for allowing a touch of warmth to creep into his discourse concerning it. And it is well-nigh impossible to overestimate or overemphasize the magnitude and glory of man's ideal world. Recall the greatness of the actual world, its complexity, order, and beauty, its far-reaching laws through which far-sundered worlds and various and most antagonistic forces, the immeasurably great and the inconceivably small, are bound together into one system and made to enfold a

single majestic epic of intelligently directed power —then remember that this world is man's world —in so far as we have been reading his interpretation of it. The greatness of the world is, in every dimension of it, a standard of measurement for the greatness of man. In a very real sense he is the creator of this exact and law-abiding world, for, as we have seen, he has no physical instrument by which he can attain the exactitude which his mind demands and attains.

In the mental sciences we find the same indescribable greatness and range of capacity. Man has searched out and set forth in order the laws of his own mental processes. He has also studied his own moral constitution and promulgated a system of moral ideals. He has studied the theory of social organization and development and has arrived at a system of economic and social ideals corresponding to his system of ethics. This same being has also transcended his own limits as finite, and conceived of God, the infinite, the eternal, the unchanging personal God. He has related himself, the world in which he lives, and his life and destiny as an immortal being to this eternal goodness. He has affirmed his kinship to God, has erected innumerable altars of worship, and has bound himself with his fellows into world-

wide and age-enduring brotherhoods of service and devotion.

Thus is man's ideal world. And it is not difficult to put the finger upon the organizing principle of this great world system of man's building. It is unity, harmony, order, law. And here again we get another view of the godlike magnitude of man's creative mind, especially if we take into consideration his history. At the beginning man must have been very much on the outside of his own possible organized experience. The magnitude and complexity of the world must have been very confusing at first, and to an intelligence less self-centered and competent it must have remained so. If one holds to the ascent of man from the animal mind through primitive and universal savagery, the greatness of his achievement is immeasurably increased. Steadfastly and unfalteringly man has set himself to the task of relating himself to his world and of reducing his experience to terms of his own instinct for beauty and order. Herein lies the wonder of it. The total trend of man's mental dealing with the world of his experience may be summarized as the attempt to reduce it to order. And the one guiding principle of the prolonged and costly human struggle to think and to know has been the

principle implicit in the mind itself of the essential unity of experience. This idea of unity, which is of course the primary postulate of the sciences and of philosophy, must have been latent, far below the level of organized and explicit consciousness, in the early stages of man's intellectual life—but it was there, antedating the arrival of self-conscious scientific thinking, and governing by anticipation man's whole mental development. From the lowest to the highest level of his thinking that sense of unity is present.

In animism the world is conceived of as alive and therefore unified in terms of life in which man himself shares. When the manifold of phenomenal experience has broken up and divided the sense of unity in polytheism, the departmental and divided deities are constructively unified on the hierarchical principle which binds their separate wills together in a divine commonwealth, oftentimes ruled by an abstract fate greater than gods or men. In pantheism the passion for unity has extinguished individual existence altogether, and of the many has made aspects or phases of the one all-embracing reality. Of this type are the materialistic and pantheistic monisms of philosophy, in which the manifoldness of the world is interpreted in terms of one reality or substance, however variously conceived. In the-

ism this instinct of unity and order is satisfied through one personal and intelligent will, expressing itself in the world and achieving satisfaction through the voluntary coöperation of finite wills and intelligence. The point is that the instinct of unity pervades all the operations of the human mind through all stages of its training and its development. The last word as well as the first word in man's ideal world is—order. Whether or not it is Heaven's first law, it is assuredly man's, ideally speaking.

We have thus brought in review, sketchily indeed, but sufficiently for our purpose, the greatness of man. We have interpreted his whole experience as if he were the sole architect of his fate and the one builder of his own fortunes. This is of course far from the truth as we conceive it. But the case is not at all changed if we introduce the idea of revelation, a supernatural unveiling of God; and the idea of inspiration, a supernatural quickening of man's spiritual powers in order to enable him to interpret revelation. We have thus brought into view a fourth dimension in the measurement of man's greatness. It is impossible to pay a higher tribute to human nature than to affirm of it a capacity of revelation and inspiration. The statement that "there is a spirit in man and the inspiration of an Almighty

One maketh him to understand" is the last word in appreciative psychology. Everything great is an element in the greatness of man. The greatness of God, the greatness of the world, the magnitudes of nature, and the majestic ordinances of reason are all of them constituent elements of the greatness of man, for they are as man conceives them.

Here ends this part of the lesson. And the rest is not like it. For we must go on with Hamlet to think of this godlike paragon of reason and discourse as the quintessence of dust, meaning thereby both insignificance and triviality. Indeed, we must go much further and affirm with Paul, who quotes words from the Psalm writers which sound strangely out of harmony with what we have seen of the greatness and majesty of man:

> Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness:
> Their feet are swift to shed blood;
> Destruction and misery are in their ways;
> And the way of peace have they not known:
> There is no fear of God before their eyes.

Can such things be said of the paragon of reason, infinite in faculty, in action like an angel? Whatever may become of our ideal world through the admission, we are none the less compelled to acknowledge that we have here no over-

drawn picture of man's actual world. His ideal world is one shot through and through with reason—his actual world of thought and action is to a lamentable degree dominated by unreason. Man's ideal world is illuminated by a light which never was on land or sea, in which his mind flashes forth its glorious visions—his actual life is more like blind and drunken stumbling from one ditch into another. With darkened intellect, defiled imagination, perverted instincts, and manifold irrational and destructive impulses man has filled the fair world in which he lives with misery and wreckage. There is nothing so true but he has denied it, nothing so good but he has refused it, nothing so sacred but he has perverted and defiled it, nothing so holy but he has lifted impious hands against it. There is no crime which he has not committed. There is no depth of inconceivable infamy into which he has not fallen. When we put side by side man's ideal world of reason, expressed in the true, the good, and the beautiful, and his actual world of falsehood, ugliness, and crime, we wonder what it really means —what is man? It may be said that this line of cleavage between an ideal and an actual world runs between man and man. Some are on one side of it and some on the other. The ideal world is the work of saints and sages—the actual world

is the blundering work of those who have missed the mark. Even if this were the whole truth it would leave the problem very much as it is. What explanation is there in the nature of things, why so many should be turned aside from what is manifestly the true destiny of all, inasmuch as the higher attainment is within the range of human nature as such? This ideal world is and must remain the measure of human capacity. Saints and sages are still men. But this statement is not the whole truth.

This fundamental line of cleavage and contradiction runs not only between a man and his neighbor but also between a man and himself. Question your saints and sages, and what do they say concerning themselves? Simply the universal confession of inward contradiction and failure. "Video superiora, sequor inferiora." "Not what I would, that do I practise; but what I hate, that I do." That such a confession is universal on the part of those who are possessed of anything like acute moral perceptions and sensitiveness is generally acknowledged. The significance of this confession is not always clearly seen, in our day at any rate. The essential point is that man is at odds with himself and out of harmony with his own law, and hence out of harmony with every other law in the universe. The law which is con-

sciously broken by man is not merely a law legislated upon him from without by another, but also one declared by himself from within. And this it is that makes man the great enigma, because the great exception, in the world of our experience. Man alone breaks the great harmony by refusing the one law of obedience. Man alone fails to fulfil himself. All other beings fill their places and do their work. Every chemical atom is what it should be and does what it should do. Every star revolves in its own proper orbit and shines with its own proper light. Every plant and every living organism fulfils its appointed cycle and in one way or another contributes its part to the welfare of the whole. Man alone goes aside and falls short; man is the great exception, the one discord, in a universal and eternal harmony.

Of course, this fact is but another way of announcing and emphasizing the unique greatness of man. If he is the great exception, in the sense that he alone carries the burden of deputed sovereignty in the possession of a free and responsible will, then we can understand in a measure why he may not reach his true end. He alone of all beings must make *himself* and attain his end, not by a mechanical necessity, but by a free choice. He alone is great enough to sin. For good or evil, it is man's distinction to arrive at his appro-

priate destiny by no mere cosmic evolution but by an individual and responsible choice. The universe lacks a moral note until man, not as a mere cog in an unbreakable mechanism, but as a free citizen in a commonwealth, in his freedom yields it. The moral note is formed not of a single will, the one Almighty Power, but of the harmony of two, making one music. But that is not the vital matter just here. We wish to consider another aspect of the question first.

The perfection and grandeur of man's ideal world are the supreme argument of God, and that in two ways. Man makes his own world ideally, not as he will but as he must. The constitution of it is involved in the nature of experience and in his own nature. Reason antedates reasoning, mind precedes the dawn of consciousness, individually and collectively conscience is the self-sufficient criterion of moral action. Man thinks in accordance with laws which are immanent in his mental constitution, which he did not make and cannot abrogate. His deepest convictions, as we have seen, he cannot prove because they precede and condition all proof. His ideal world is so vast that only through ages of collective experience, experience "diligently revised and compared," does he begin to apprehend the schematic outline which he contemplates; it is infinitely

greater than he because it continually leads on his growing mind, potentially infinite, but never at a standstill. All experience conforms to the laws of his own mind. His experience is all of one piece; he cannot rid himself of the binding force of its regularity. Man himself, therefore, is consciously in the grasp of a mighty intelligence which is daily unfolding its secrets. Man lives upon every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God. To make the system which includes man, who so grasps and unifies it in his own consciousness and yet so transcends its utmost range, impersonal at the core is to talk the veriest jargon. The fact that this ideal world is our world as well as God's, that God's world of divine order and beauty is our world also, proves the nearness of God to us and our unity with Him. The perception of this ideal world is really forced upon us by our participation in the nature of God and through His continual self-revealing activity in us. This indicates an essential and natural unity between God and man. Our failure to enter into this divine world in which we are by nature citizens can be explained only as a lapse from our true nature through the misuse of freedom. The ideal world of man is due to his natural and inseparable union with God, the functioning of God in him which constitutes and keeps

him man. His actual world of anarchy and confusion is due to a personal failure, at the point of freedom and responsibility, to participate in the life of God which is his own life.

This sounds like old-fashioned evangelical anthropology slightly done over. It is the doctrine of the fall, the Adam and Eve story somewhat disguised. Even so, its claim to be a valid interpretation of life and experience cannot lightly be dismissed. It is possible to get rid of this conception of sin as due to a fall, historic and real, by either one of two ways. The methods are both of them radical and easy, just a thrust and turn of the critical surgeon's ready knife, but the cost of the operation is uncommonly high.

We can get rid of the notion of sin by denying human freedom and responsibility. But in so doing we destroy man's moral life, root and branch. If he is not free he is not moral; he is not even truly rational. Mechanical necessity is established as the fundamental principle in his life. He loses his distinctive place in the world. He is no longer man but a "conscious automaton." That this result is absurd and unbelievable, that it contradicts the primary deliverances of consciousness and man's own life as human being, makes it none the less logically necessary in the premises. If man is free, then so far the doctrine of sin stands. If

he is not free, the doctrine of sin goes, but so does everything else worth while.

But one can also get rid even of the notion of sin as a historic lapse from God by the simple affirmation that sin or moral evil is an evolutional necessity, a natural phase in development. But this supposition also destroys our moral world. As we have already said, sin is either catastrophic or congenital. If it is not catastrophic but congenital, then it is simply a normal phase of the life of the universe, necessary, not that which "ought not to be." But this leaves remorse, which is the tragic shadow cast by the greatness of man's soul upon itself, unexplained, and the idea of the moral imperative as inherent in our constitution without basis in fact. We have no right to blame ourselves for being wrong when we are only immature. We have no right to impose upon ourselves in infancy a law which really applies only to those fully grown. And it would be extremely difficult to find anywhere along the upward road of development a point where we could with propriety condemn ourselves for not having attained. As one thoughtful writer puts it, "evolution is very seriously embarrassed whenever it grapples with the problem of sin. This wilfulness on man's part, his repeated refusals to obey the law of right, cannot be accounted for

by the doctrine of survivals merely; his action is personal and owes its origin chiefly to man himself. The consciousness seems to be practically contemporaneous with the thought of God and self."[1] An interpretation of man in terms of evolution must keep within the pale of reason by remembering that whatever pre-human experience man may have had, human history begins with man as such. Reason, religion, morality, and sin are terms applicable to man and to man as man. The theory of evolution has no legitimate application here, nor has the rather precarious theory of universal primitive savagery and the doctrine of ascents in general. If man arrived by a slow process of development at the human level of freedom and responsibility, instead of by an immediate act of creation, this tells nothing as to the use made of his human powers when once attained. A primitive man may be either fallen or unfallen. And the certainty that man must have entered into the world under favorable conditions and in harmony with its law gives strong evidence to the contrary of any supposition that regards his actual moral status as the outcome of normal development.

This alluring theory which preserves the unity

[1] Jordan, Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth, p. 235.

and harmony of the universe does so at the cost of our moral ideals and breaks up on the facts. Man is not normal nor could he be produced by a process of normal development. The universe is not unified in him except ideally. We do not yet see him in his rightful place at the crown of the cosmic order, and this disharmony is due, and must be due, to a lack of harmony with God, which is a thwarting of our divine constitution and the breaking of a natural tie which binds us to God. In God dwell all the harmonies of the universe. A restoration to fellowship with God would annul the disorders of human life and make man a sharer in these eternal harmonies which have their seat and home in the bosom of God.

These considerations, drawn from a contemplation of human life in its more general aspects, are greatly strengthened when we turn to the more direct expressions of the religious consciousness.

It is of course a commonplace to assert, on the ground of the universality and persistence of the religious instinct, that the human mind is persuaded of the fact that man belongs to a divine order of existence. This is, by common consent, the first, the deepest, and the most permanent of all ruling ideas among men. At bottom, through

all of its development and in all the phases of its application, in dependence, in trust, worship, prayer, and service religion is grounded in the one idea that man belongs to Deity, that somehow mysteriously man shares a common life with God. This religion has always consciously and unconsciously affirmed. It is acknowledged, by modern thinkers at any rate, that religion is an entirely natural and normal expression of human nature and that it is a permanent constituent of human life. Religion has been a part of man's life from the beginning, has accompanied him through all his history, and has developed with his development. He has not left it behind him as he has emerged from savagery, but has brought it with him to each successive level in his ascent. Religion is not a thing apart, the exercise of a special faculty, a temporary phase of development. It is man himself in the deepest and fullest expression of his unfolding self-consciousness. "Religion is just ourselves functioning in a particular way." Being thus ourselves functioning in a particular way, it touches and involves our entire life. It enters into and conditions all human activities. It is the fulfilment of individual existence, it is the elementary social bond, it is a basis of sanctity in human relationships. And here is the point: The history of religion affords

most convincing testimony to the essential abnormality of human life. This evidence is both outward and inward and not a little of it is the direct expression of self-consciousness.

Theoretically religion represents man's conscious relationship to the ideal and the perfect. It is his construction of the divine order. Man worships only that which is to him the highest and best. So interpreted it becomes a matter of wonder and of humiliation that the human mind could become so distorted as to personalize and idealize many of the well-known objects of worship. We are not here referring to primitive notions and vague ideas, dim but earnest gropings for truth in the early twilight of experience, but to the monstrosities of religious development which involve the darkening of the human intelligence and the perversion of its normal instincts. What shall we make of the worship of brutal and murderous force, of impure imaginations and unholy passions of men? Nor is it left to us to conjecture whether these peculiar religious developments are normal or not. It is the practically unanimous verdict of careful students that these lower forms of religious development are permeated through and through with selfishness. These religious monstrosities are the portentous shadows of man's restless egotism magnified to the dimensions of

Deity. Here is the true explanation of Caliban upon Setebos. When religion is based upon selfishness, and religious exercises are controlled by the motive of *do ut des,* then Deity is made in the image of man, and of man, not in terms of his aspirations, but in terms of his passions and desires. It is a striking fact that man retains his sense of relationship with Deity where he has lost a true or adequate conception of God's character and has degraded that relationship into a scheme of exchange and barter to cover and satisfy his selfishness. The fact that man continues to be religious even in his moral degradation and that his religion shares that degradation proves that man cannot escape from the ideal world to which he belongs by nature, and that he cannot without effort and aspiration maintain a normal relationship to the very world of which he himself is a part. In this case the cosmic process does not mechanically achieve his fulfilment and perfection. It is a personal undertaking, and success can be achieved only through the fulness of a personal life which finds its end and the motive of its activity, not in self, but in God. The service of God, not the pursuit of God, leads toward the open vision.

Paul's philosophy of history (Rom. 1), which finds the cause of the moral degradations as well

as the intellectual contradictions and confusions of heathenism in a religious perversity, a refusal to read the open secret of God's revelation and to keep Him in the thought, is justified by two considerations. One has already been suggested, in the undoubted fact that selfishness is at the root of these perverted religious systems. It is also indicated by the self-contradictions of polytheism and by the element of absolute self-delusion in idolatry. Polytheism is self-contradictory in the sense that it always involves an implicit monotheism. In polytheism, habitually, epithets are applied to the gods which logically involve the existence of one God only. For example, when Bel is called "Lord of all Being" by the Babylonians the existence of any other to whom the title might be applied is logically denied. This is a very widespread fact in polytheism and deserves far more careful investigation than it has yet received.[2] But here is the general law: Wherever ethical earnestness has tended to become intense, there the movement toward monotheism has become most pronounced. A principle internal to religion itself and corrective of the confusions and degradations of polytheism has an opportunity to operate. It has been seriously suggested that the unique religious development of Israel was con-

[2] See Sweet: Roman Emperor Worship, pp. 118ff.

ditioned upon this very fact. Moreover, there is also the element of delusion which may almost be called autointoxication. It is the element of *prima facie* absurdity involved in idolatry which draws and merits the scorn of prophets and apostles. But it is quite clear that in its theory idolatry is not absurd at all. No one worships "stocks and stones" as such. The idolater always knows when his attention is called to it that he is not worshiping the thing but the spiritual reality which the thing expresses or symbolizes. "Me not worship tree—me worship spirit in tree," was the reply of the native when asked why he placed food at the foot of a sacred tree. Actual blindfold idolatry is a lapse from the theory of the symbolic worshiper who frames himself an image or representation of Deity.

The entire system of magic points in the same direction. Professor Gwatkin holds that the essential difference between religion and magic is that in religion we trust the higher powers, in magic we do not. Magic is due to the attempt to make religion automatic, which in turn is due to the substitution of man's will for God's. From a selfish point of view a system of magic is indefinitely preferable to a system of religion which makes an issue to turn, not on the correct performance of a rite or the pronunciation of a for-

mula, but upon the will of God. To the believer in magic it always works when correctly performed. The believer in religion must let the fatal issue rest on the will of God. The very process of deterioration may be seen in at least one notable instance. In the Egyptian Book of the Dead there is a description of the process of judgment in the presence of Osiris by which the future destiny of men is determined. The basis of judgment is conduct, and the entire conception is thoroughly ethical. Under this chapter is a rubric, or rule for its use, which states that if a ceremonially correct copy of that scene be made on a brick and deposited in the mummy case of the deceased person he will triumphantly pass the judgment of Osiris. This is magic, the substitution of a mechanically infallible method of attaining blessedness for a method involving a moral probation. The evidence within our reach indicates that egoism has been the degrading influence in religion and that these perversions are not steps in evolution but represent degeneracy from the point of view of a normal development. The internal conflict of ideal and actual, of normal and abnormal man is again evident.

There is still another group of facts which must be canvassed in this connection. We have already noted that men are conscious of a relationship to

Deity even when their conception of Deity has become both dim and distorted, and that they are religious even when they are not moral even from their own point of view. This is important, and its significance is often quite overlooked, for it indicates the priority of the religious tie over every other and its persistence in spite of all the vicissitudes of character and experience. Now, the rending of the ethical bond, which holds men in moral unity with God while their religious unity remains, has one of two results, either it degrades the idea of God and restores unity to the life by hallowing that which is unholy, or it leads to a system of sacrifice and expiation through which is accomplished the reunion of the consciously guilty wrongdoer to fellowship with his Deity. The frequent confusion between ceremonial and moral guilt throws an interesting sidelight upon the situation. The essential and primary factor is the disturbed relationship to Deity, and from this point of view the distinction between ceremonial and moral offences is immaterial. The institution of expiatory sacrifice is a practically universal feature in religion. Whether or not it is and has been from the beginning actually and unqualifiedly universal is not important. It is an essential element in the self-expression of the religious consciousness of the race at large. It rests upon the con-

viction that the relationships between Deity and man are subject to disturbance and that peace and happiness can be obtained only through a restoration to divine favor to be obtained by that which represents and embodies sacrifice. The additional fact that sacrifice and the ritual of expiation is a regular and habitual element of worship, not merely occasional and sporadic, indicates the consciousness that the normal and happy relationship between Deity and man has permanently been disturbed and that he needs a perpetual reconciliation.

A little broader sweep of observation will bring to view a new group of most suggestive facts. There is in the widest range of literature an expression of the consciousness of contradiction and conflict between man and his environment. This is to be found, for example, in tragedy which has for its subject that dark contradiction between man and his fate. The tragedy of crime, the tragedy of disappointment and defeated hopes, the tragedy of misfortune, all alike turn upon the assumption of man's essential greatness, his capacity to know God and to be blessed, in contrast with his unhappines, defeat, and shame. On no other basis than this assumption of ideality in the constitution of human nature could a tragedy about it be written. Moreover, the great elemental

tragedies have turned, like Prometheus Bound, upon the relationship of God and man. It is the instinctive premise of creative art that somehow man belongs to God and that in right relationship to God his life would issue in happiness and peace. Tragedy is the epic of the fallen man.

So also, strangely enough, is comedy. In tragedy we deal with the sufferings, the crimes of man. In comedy the subject is rather human foibles, inconsistencies, and follies. And here the presumption is that there is something abnormal about foolishness, that man was made to be wise. All literature implicitly refers to the ideal world and is ever eager to recognize and to depict the ideal man in relationship to it. Standards of judgment differ but the lure of the perfect sways all alike. All literature is conscious of the ideal world as reflected in the mind and heart of men. It is also painfully conscious of the element of contradiction between man and his own ideal constitution, his environment and the harmonious processes of the world in which he lives. At its best literature strives to disclose a way whereby this contradiction may be resolved.

As an ancient poet expressed the prevalent idea of the deeper thinkers, Deity must be and could be propitiated:

The gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength,
Excelling thee, may yet be mollified:
For they when mortals have transgressed or failed
To do aright, by sacrifice and prayer,
Libations and burnt-offerings, may be soothed.
—Iliad, Lord Derby's Translation, book iv, lines 185-188.

In words like these the deep and pervading consciousness of sin in relationship to Deity and a need of reconciliation have found expression. In Plato, the greatest of the Greeks, this idea is formulated with great clearness and expressed with characteristic felicity and beauty. Both in the Phædrus and in the Republic Plato deals with man, ideal, actual, and in prospect, and utters the following memorable sentence which is worthy to be inscribed over the gateway of approach to Christianity: "Virtue is the gift of God."[3] This, then, is the account that man universally gives of himself. That he belongs to God's ideal and perfect world but that he has forfeited, through wilfulness and refusal to trust and obey God, his share in that world. He has forfeited his inheritance and needs to be restored to God in order to attain peace and happiness. Man is consciously the son in the far country.

[3] See Cocker, Christianity and Greek Philosophy, ch. XV.

He owns the fatal gift of eyes,
That read his spirit blindly wise,
Not simple as a thing that dies.

Here sits he shaping wings to fly:
His heart forbodes a mystery:
He names the name Eternity.

That type of Perfect in his mind
In nature can he nowhere find.
He sows himself on every wind.

He seems to hear a Heavenly Friend,
And thro' thick veils to apprehend
A labor working to an end.

The end and the beginning vex
His reason! Many things perplex,
With motions, checks and counter-checks.

He knows a baseness in his blood
At such strange war with something good,
He may not do the things he would.

Heaven opens inward, chasms yawn,
Vast images in glimmering dawn,
Half-shown, are broken and with-drawn.

Ah! sure within him and without,
Could his dark wisdom find it out,
There must be answer to his doubt.

—Tennyson, The Two Voices.

CHAPTER IX

CHRISTIANITY AND UNBELIEVING SCIENTISTS

IS there something in the study of the physical sciences which *per se* tends toward religious negation? Many would answer this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative. A current saying has come down to us from the Middle Ages to the effect that when you meet three physicians you will find two atheists. George Romanes, at the end of the third of his famous articles on The Influence of Science on Religion, says: "As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears that the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly of a destructive character."[1] On the basis of the widely heralded "conflict between science and religion" the popular verdict would probably be that it is extremely difficult for a physicist to be a believer in religion.

The evidence is not convincing. Even if it were true, as we do not believe it is true, that

[1] Thoughts on Religion, edited by Bishop Gore, p. 91.

a catalogue of eminent physical scientists would show a majority in the ranks of unbelief, it would by no means prove that they were unbelievers because they were scientists. There are many sociologists and psychologists who are unbelievers, which does not prove that either of these subjects of study has any inherent tendency to produce unbelief. The same may be said of the study of law. In all these groups of students and thinkers the fact that many of those most profoundly versed in the technical arcana of their subjects have been convinced and ardent believers in religion effectually disposes of the notion that the unbelief of others is due to the necessary and intrinsic operation of the subjects in which they are engaged. As a matter of fact, the unbelief of a scientist, while expressing itself in scientific terms, may be due to circumstances altogether apart from his scientific occupation. That is to say, that particular scientist's unbelief may be due primarily to personal or individual factors, and only secondarily and indirectly to the influence of his scientific studies.

It is the purpose of this chapter to make an analysis of the religious ideas and experiences of certain men, eminent in the domain of the physical sciences, who have also left on record their ideas on the subject of religion. We shall

trace the genesis and growth of their religious ideas so far as these are within our reach through published expressions of opinion, with special reference to the relationship of these opinions to ascertained scientific fact and legitimate inference based upon such fact. No unbelief not so grounded and conditioned can legitimately be termed scientific.

We shall begin with George John Romanes. Reference has already been made (see pp. 25ff) to the interesting and suggestive religious experience of this distinguished biologist. We shall now follow his intellectual processes somewhat in detail. The study is particularly valuable for our present purpose because his various early essays and subsequent notes represent the movement of one mind, self-recorded, "from a position of unbelief in The Christian Revelation toward one of belief in it."[2] A condensed statement of Romanes' negative argument, as expressed in A Candid Examination of Theism, follows.

The author, first of all, rejects the idea that the mystery of existence is explained by theism any better than by atheism, on the ground that this involves a shifting rather than a solution of mystery. He rejects the ontological argument in the form of the statement, "The heart needs a

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

God," on the ground that it does not involve objective reality. The universe cannot be interpreted in terms of man's wishes.

He rejects the same argument in a supplementary form as, "Our theistic aspirations point to God," for the reason that purely natural causes may account for such a belief. He rejects, by a general denial, the idea that the conception of God is a necessary thought. The argument from the analogy of human volition is rejected as a "monstrous stretch of inference."

He then takes up the argument from causality, which he states in the form of a syllogism thus:

1. All known minds are caused by an unknown mind.

2. Our mind is a known mind.

3. Our mind is caused by an unknown mind.

To this he replies: (1) It does not account for mind (in the abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin. If the premise is admitted it would be an explanation of mind. It all depends upon the assumption with which one starts out. (2) The idea that mind must be self-existent or caused by another mind is not warranted, "for anything within the whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence." It is to be noted here that this statement involves a denial that

mind is *sui generis*. He also says in this connection that "what we call matter and force are to all appearances eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal." So far as our experience goes "mind is invariably associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force and many facts go to prove and none to negative the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least, is associated with, a corresponding degree of cerebral organization. There is thus both a quantitative and qualitative relation between intelligence and cerebral organization."

The argument from the freedom of the will and the moral sense to the personality of God is rejected by a bald denial of the fact upon which the inference is based. "The theory of the freedom of the will is at this stage of thought utterly untenable. It is negatived deductively by the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism." The evidence is overwhelming that the moral sense is the outcome of a purely natural evolution and that the human conscience has grown out of the sense of pain and pleasure.

The argument from special design is rejected, first of all, on the ground that from the truth of

mind in nature (granted) we could not infer any specific divine cognitions behind or in the natural processes. All we can be sure of is "the ubiquitous operation of general laws."

The broader design argument based upon the universal cosmic order he meets by the statement: "It is as certainly true that all the exquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it is certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended and impenetrable."

The correspondence between the human mind and the intelligible cosmos is due to the fact that the former is the product of the latter.

He rejects teleology from the scientific point of view as unnecessary, and from the psychological standpoint as offering no satisfactory solution of the problem of being. He argues as above that in the inference from cosmic harmony, of a directing intelligence we postulate "an unknown mind" which does not help us.

He then reaches the conclusion that "so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God." From the point of view of science, the hypothesis of God is superfluous. This negative conclusion is based upon the following postulates: (a) The

persistence of force, (b) the eternity of matter, (c) the universality of natural law.

His cosmogenic creed is formulated thus: "Cosmic harmony results as a physically necessary consequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter." This last statement should be carefully studied because it is the formulated creed of the atheist who speaks in terms of physical science. As stated more tersely by Haeckel: "There is no God but necessity."

It is a great temptation to turn aside at this point and criticise the preceding argument in detail. It could be done so very easily. It would not require a very keen logician to drive a coach-and-four through those propositions in almost any direction. But we are studying the mind of Romanes, and will therefore permit him to review his own positions.

In the Rede lecture of 1885 we find that already Romanes has moved away from the positions maintained so stoutly in the Candid Examination. In this lecture he announces that science is approaching the "conclusion that there is no motion without mind." Clinging at this time to his old position "that there is no mind without

motion," he combines the old view and the new in the hypothesis, "there is no being without knowing." This statement, as Bishop Gore rightly points out, is compatible with pantheism or theism, according as one interprets it. The lecture involves a searching critique of materialism and shows that, seven years after the publication of the Essay on Theism, Romanes has broken loose from the rigid atheism into which he had betrayed himself.

In scattered notes of the year 1893 the editor finds the following noted by Romanes among the "certainties" attained by the human mind in the course of its investigations:

"Logical priority of mind over matter."

"The consequent untenability of materialism."

"The relativity of knowledge."

"The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of matter *within human experience* [italics mine], the principle of evolution and survival of the fittest."[3]

I call especial attention to the italicized words. The significance of this qualification will appear later. It appears also from the Notes that between 1885 and 1893 Romanes had read and come into substantial agreement with the argument in Knight's Aspects of Theism. Romanes

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 31f.; especially note p. 31.

himself reaches the conclusion that the argument from evolution is valid only against special design, not against the teleological significance of the cosmic order in the large.

The Rede lecture and the isolated Notes just reviewed represent the more or less negative process whereby the hitherto imprisoned mind of the great biologist broke loose from its bonds. The first and almost the greatest step is indicated in the words, "within human experience," of the notes of 1893. The idea that our great scientific generalizations concerning the "persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter" either preclude theism or render it superfluous by affording an adequate explanation of the cosmic order involves the monstrous assumption, that the sphere of force and matter is universal, absolute, and final. If there should appear anywhere in the universe a phenomenon which cannot be accounted for by the persistence of physical force or the primary qualities of matter the explanation based upon them is transcended and at the same time, as an explanation, discredited. This Romanes was in the way of finding out by 1893.

Our next task is to point out from the Notes the positive movement of Romanes' mind away from the negative to the positive acceptance of the Christian religion. In order to make this

intellectual movement quite clear, we shall state his ideas in a series of bald propositions, leaving criticisms and exposition to the end.

1. Experience modifies logic. His change of opinion was due in part to "the sub-conscious (and therefore more or less unanalyzable) influence due to the ripening experience of life" (p. 106). While his logical processes seem intrinsically cogent, he felt that he had erred, (1) by exercising undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, and (2) by failing to examine with sufficient care the validity of his premises. He says: "Never was any one more arrogant in his claims for pure reason than I was, more arrogant in spirit though not in letter, this being due to contact with Science" (p. 107).

2. This led to the false assumption that "the existence of God is a merely physical problem, to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his other and higher faculties" (p. 108).

3. This radical vice of method led him to overlook the higher nature of man as demanding a higher cause "than anything merely physical or mechanical" (p. 108).

4. Romanes holds that while in religion we should be pure agnostics so far as reason is concerned (see below for the meaning of reason in

this discussion), yet the arrival at this type of agnosticism is not the end of the matter—one "has then only begun his inquiry into the grounds and justifications of religious belief." Thus by exclusion he reaches the conviction that "there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a will objective to us" (p. 125).[4] "The discovery of mechanism in Nature does not negate the religious affirmation because if the supposed will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in natural causation, must appear to us when considered *en bloc* (or not piecemeal, as by savages) non-volitional or mechanical."

5. The common false hypothesis of religion and science which makes conflict between them possible is this: "If there is a personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation." The consequence of this false premise is that, to both parties, every extension of the realm of secondary causation is a further restriction upon the activity of God.[5] Science is only "the organized study of natural causation," and does not justify the dogmatism which foregoes the ultimate question at the descriptive frontier.[6] The

[4] *Cf.* also p. 128.
[5] See p. 91.
[6] See p. 129f.

false assumption is that only the miraculous is divine. Really "all natural causation is inexplicable."[7] Personality, however produced, is "seemingly an ultimate fact" (pp. 137, 139). Natural causation may be a producing force behind free-will without destroying the reality of freedom.

As a scientific man accustomed to make his reason sole arbiter of truth, Romanes says: "I was too jealous of [for?] my reason to exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires." "I cannot bring myself so much as to make a venture in the direction of faith" (p. 141). "The main ingredient of Christian faith is the moral element" (p. 148). Romanes says (of the former treatise): "I did not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of human nature, as distinguished from physical nature" (p. 164).

He concludes that Christianity has successfully met the twofold crisis of Darwinism and the higher criticism, and even that "Agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith; it is silencing all rational scepticism of the *a priori* kind" (p. 177). The Scripture text which seems to have meant most to Romanes is John 7:17.[8]

There are several remarks which should be

[7] See p. 131 and statement on p. 135.
[8] See p. 141 and elsewhere.

made in elucidation of the foregoing statements:

1. By the term "reason" Romanes always means the ratiocinative, or logical, faculty alone. By the rational process, therefore, he always refers to the process of inference whereby we arrive at the persuasion of truth. The fallacy which vitiated his entire approach to his subject in the Candid Examination was the failure to realize that reason so defined is purely an organizing faculty giving no positive knowledge except concerning its own processes. Romanes never entirely freed himself from this subtle fallacy (which enters into the very substance of Huxley's denfinition of agnosticism), for he naïvely contrasts the "above-board play of the syllogism" with the "under-hand cheating of consciousness" (p. 106). He seems to feel that he has deviated from the true path of scientific rectitude in allowing experience to modify logic, whereas, all that logic is expected to do is to allow itself to be modified by experience. If this were not so, what would be the value of scientific experiment?

2. The expression, "within human experience," in the notes of 1893 (p. 32) really goes far toward overturning the inverted pyramid of Romanes' early reasoning, because the moment one questions the universality of generalizations

concerning force and matter which form the basis of the atheistic creed, the reasoning itself at once loses power. Has science any way of demonstrating the persistence of force on the cosmic scale? Have we any way of proving that force is infinite, or of demonstrating the equivalence of various forms of energy throughout the entire extent of the universe and for its entire history? Are we altogether assured of the existence of "primary," or inherent, qualities of matter of a sort to account, even in part, for the harmony and beauty of the universe? We are far from certainty in these matters. We cannot offer demonstration here. And even if we could, it would be essentially futile because we should be simply explaining a thing by itself. In other words, atheism on the basis of scientific inductions with respect to matter and force, all legitimate hypotheses being admitted without question, is a complete *non sequitur*. This Romanes himself later came clearly to see.

3. It is quite clear that the negative conclusions reached by Romanes in his first inquiry were not forced upon him by any established scientific facts. He had simply reached the limit of inquiry by inductive scientific methods, which lies well this side of any positive convictions as to the spiritual world and the being of God. The limit

of his thought was due to the limitation of his method, and was the beginning of a fresh line of investigation by another and higher method. What in his early inquiry he considered the end of all inquiry in blank and final negation was but the beginning of new and most fruitful investigation along other pathways.

4. The scientific, or more strictly speaking the inductive, method of investigation induces a habit of mind involving a certain amount of inertia which has to be overcome by a positive and sometimes painful effort of the will. The adventure of faith involves certain "moral elements" which demand both self-abnegation and persistent effort.

Here we may appropriately take leave of this famous biologist who was far more than a biologist—in that he was a thinker and a seeker after God.

Professor Romanes has spoken somewhat disparagingly of Darwin's religious thinking. The words are well worth quoting: "What he (D.) says in his biography about Christianity shows no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. *His mind was too purely inductive for this"* [italics mine]. On the whole, I am inclined to agree with this estimate, which was Darwin's own repeatedly expressed.[9] There

[9] *E. g.*, Autobiography, etc., American edition, p. 66.

is one thing, however, which I feel bound to point out in the case of Darwin. Romanes specifies Huxley as a pure agnostic, namely, one who occupies the position "of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies beyond the sphere of sense-perception." Theoretically, of course, this was Huxley's position. Practically, however, as I shall endeavor to show in the next section, he was anything but a consistent agnostic. Darwin, I take it, comes immeasurably nearer being a typical and consistent agnostic. He confesses ignorance on all ultimate questions. Sometime I hope to present a systematic study of the mind of Darwin, a subject which has long exercised a great fascination for me. Now and here I can do no more than point out a few expressions which reveal his religious attitude.

It is a notable fact that in all the range of Darwin's writing there are few religious references of any sort. Of those which have come under my eye, almost all were forced from him by criticisms upon his work, or by the correspondence of friends seeking to draw him out. There is a noticeable impatience in many of these expressions—apparently the superficial irritation of an absorbed man who is called away from congenial work by what he deems an interruption. Theological or metaphysical thought always made a

demand upon him to which he felt little able or inclined to respond. He says, for example: "I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginnings of all things is insoluble by us, and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic."[10] In a letter to Miss Wedgewood, about 1860, he admits that he did not clearly follow a part of her argument in an article sent him, saying by way of explanation, "which probably is in main part due to my not being at all accustomed to metaphysical trains of thought."

These passages and others of like tenor which might be cited show clearly the inhibiting influence upon varied powers of lifelong absorption in a single line of specialized activities. We are, of course, especially interested in Darwin's attitude toward the question of design in nature. In addition, we wish to know how far his views on evolution or his knowledge of ascertained scientific fact forced him into whatever position of religious negation he adopted. Both questions may be very briefly answered, and the answer is full of valuable suggestion.

The fullest exposition *in limine* of his views on this subject which I have been able to find follows. He has difficulty, he says, "in looking upon

[10] Life and Letters, p. 66.

the cosmos including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting, I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the Origin of Species, and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt—can the mind which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that of the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?" Then follows the sentence already quoted in which he professes himself an agnostic. This statement, so naïvely self-expressive and characteristically candid, is worthy of very careful consideration. We are made the confidants of a decaying conviction. What is the cause of this progressive weakening of a strong persuasion, ending finally in doubt and nescience?

The only suggestion here that has even a remotely scientific tinge is his reference to the doubt suggested by the evolutionary theory of the origin of the human mind. Of course, this is yet a hypothesis, a mere belief, however strongly in-

trenched in his mind. But, supposing the belief to be true, does it justify the rather paralyzing doubt here based upon it? If it does, then some rather unexpected results follow. If we are to allow doubts as to the competency of our minds based on their lowly derivation, where shall we draw the line? If we cannot be theologians, sure of an answer to the obstinate questioning of our minds with their capacity "of looking far backward and far into futurity," can we be scientists and be sure that we have traced correctly the upward movement of mind from its lowly beginnings? The validity of scientific generalization demands a confidence in mind *as such,* irrespective of its origin. In other words, if we allow the theory of evolution to undermine our confidence in the trustworthiness of the instrument by which among other things we have built up the theory of evolution, it will break down long before we get to theology. Science has quite as much as philosophy to fear from such a theory. It ignores the familiar principle that an evolutionary process is to be interpreted in terms of its mature outcome, not its tentative beginnings. The mind of man was once the mind of an infant, but it is not on that account to be distrusted since now it is the mind of a man.

Darwin's hesitancy concerning the argument

for design is based mainly upon two considerations: (1) The darker aspects of nature as interpreted through the struggle for existence.[11] For example, he says (in a letter to Professor Asa Gray under date of May 22, 1860, Life and Letters, p. 249) "with respect to the theological view of the question raised in connection with the Origin of Species. This is always painful to me. I am bewildered. I had no intention of writing atheistically." Then, after speaking of the widespread suffering discernible in nature, he says: "I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect." Here we have the dominant note of his theological address—bewilderment, acute distress, and what I cannot help feeling to be a genuine sense of incompetence in face of profound and difficult problems. The usual agnostic tone of intellectual superiority, masked by an ostensible confession of ignorance, is lacking. That Darwin's views did not necessarily involve atheism or unbelief in God and revelation has been contended for so often and by such unimpeachable witnesses, as McCosh, Asa Gray, Joseph LeConte, Mivart, Romanes, Joseph Cook,[12] that we need not dwell upon it. It is interesting to note, however, that Darwin

[11] See Life and Letters, pp. 62, 63, 67, etc.
[12] See Monday Lectures, Biology, 1876.

himself felt that his scheme was by no means necessarily antitheistic—which means that his unbelief was not grounded in the demonstrated truths of science. In the letter to Professor Asa Gray, already quoted, he says: "Certainly I agree with you that my views are not at all necessarily atheistical.[13]

There is one other very famous passage from the biography of Darwin, which will let us into the very core of his thinking on the subject of design. It is also found in the correspondence with Asa Gray, who seems to have labored with his friend assiduously. Darwin says:[14] "Your question what would convince me of design is a poser. If I saw an angel come down to teach us good, and I was convinced from others seeing him that I was not mad, I should believe in design. If I could be convinced thoroughly that life and mind was [were?] in an unknown way a function of other imponderable force, I should be convinced. If man was made of brass or iron, and no way connected with any other organism which had ever lived, I should perhaps be convinced."

As an argument, or even as an expression of real difficulties, this statement is thoroughly worthless. As a psychological document it is of

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 248.
[14] Life and Letters, p 236f.

inestimable value. In the most unconscious way, it reveals the whole set of uncompromising prepossessions under the controlling influence of which Darwin approached the question of the divine in nature. (1) The first statement indicates that the divine in nature is beyond his apprehension. Only the divine outside of nature could convince him. In other words, only the miraculous can be divine. The second sentence indicates that, for the time being at least, Darwin had lost sight of the fact that both life and mind *as such* are imponderable forces. Could he possibly be unaware that even his penetrating eyes had never seen life itself? The third sentence is the most illuminating of all because it reveals the idea that a vital process with successive phases of movement cannot be designed. To show design, or the action of creative power, demands an immediate, isolated, mechanical fabrication on the spot. This is so utterly opposed to the impression made by the mysterious and yet beautiful processes of birth and growth on countless minds, the most brilliant and penetrating, that we need not consider it other than the weakness and idiosyncrasy of a powerful but not quite symmetrically developed mind. At any rate, it is quite clear that Darwin's unbelief was not scientific in the sense that even he felt it to be the inevitable

logic of known facts of nature. On the contrary, it looks very much like a stubborn intellectual prejudice that puts the scale of proof unreasonably high in order to block an unwelcome conviction. That gives me the opportunity to say that this element of bias or stubbornness was undoubtedly unconscious, for a more candid soul than Darwin it would be difficult to find.

It has often been pointed out (by the Duke of Argyll and others[15]) that Darwin in describing natural processes is compelled to use the language of design. For example, take this statement from the first chapter of Fertilization of Orchids: "If this [device for delaying insects in sipping nectar] is accidental, it is a fortunate accident for the plant. If this be not accidental, and I cannot believe it to be accidental, what a singular case of adaptation."

(2) Darwin's second leading objection to the idea of design was due to the difficulty of explaining every incidental detail as due to an immediate forethought and purpose of the Creator.[16] As this is no essential part of the design argument, we need not dwell upon it at length.[17]

I wish to approach the study of Huxley and

[15] See Reign of Law, ch. 1, and Unity of Nature, p. 283f.
[16] See Life and Letters, p. 264, and particularly Plants and Animals under Domestication, American ed., 1900, p. 414f.
[17] *Cf.* Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. 2, p. 277f.

Tyndall, these twin colossi of science, whom, following the prevalent fashion, we shall couple together, through a few isolated sentences from Romanes. "Huxley, in *Lay Sermons,* says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal sin' by science. The fact is, Huxley falls into the common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion."[18] "Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice and never is a thing to be proud of."[19]

"It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if He exists, can be known by reason [logic]. He must be known, if knowable at all, by intuition."[20]

Religious experience "may be studied objectively even if not experienced subjectively" and thus become the basis of rational conviction.[21] With these sentences in mind we shall study the religious thought of Huxley through three well-known and characteristic passages.

The first is the famous definition of agnosticism by its reputed inventor. "Agnosticism," he says, "in fact, is not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. * * * Positively, the principle may be thus expressed, in matters of the

[18] Thoughts, p. 150f.
[19] *Op. cit.,* p. 154.
[20] *Op. cit.,* p. 156.
[21] *Op. cit.,* p. 157f.

intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And, negatively, in matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That, I take to be the Agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the Universe in the face, whatever the future may have in store for him."[22]

This so-called "agnosticism" is simply the every-day working principle of any man who is at once intelligent and intellectually honest. The great limitation of the principle itself is that *no man ever has or ever can strictly live up to it.* It is simply a restatement of Locke's aphorism and, *per se,* has nothing to do either with belief or disbelief in religion. His convictions will overflow the banks established for them and in spite of himself and his principle he will believe beyond his demonstrations.[23] Conspicuously is this true of Professor Huxley.

Let us place alongside of this definition of agnosticism the same man's definition of evolution: "The whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual attractions according to definite laws of the powers possessed by the mole-

[22] Nineteenth Century, February, 1889.
[23] See Balfour, Theism and Humanism, p 145f.

cules of which the primitive nebulosity of the Universe was composed."[24]

Upon this statement I remark, first, that it is utterly incapable of inductive proof.

(a) It assumes as its basis and starting point what can never be altogether certain, a primitive nebulosity—whatever exactly that may mean, for the word "primitive" is very obscure in this connection.

(b) It assumes that the present molecules of the universe, with their powers practically unchanged, were present in the assumed primitive nebulosity.

(c) It assumes that nothing has been added to or taken from the original molecules, of which the universe was composed when it was in its primitive state.

Taking into consideration these three assumptions, it is quite evident that no inductive proof of evolution so described is either possible or even conceivable. Professor Huxley himself would have been the first to acknowledge this, and yet it is clear from countless passages in his writings that the great agnostic believed this account of the universe to be a true one. This seems to me a curious kind of agnosticism.

Moreover, this is just the beginning of bold

[24] Life of Darwin, II, p. 210.

and far-reaching assumptions involved in the above definition. Here is a partial, and only a partial, list:

(1) The universe, so far as its constituent molecules are concerned, was self-contained in its beginnings.

(2) Evolution is simply the movement, adjustment, and distribution of the original molecules of which the universe was composed.

(3) These molecules were free and active, since they immediately began through action and interaction to form the universe as it now is.

(4) These original molecules were *alive,* for they produced or became the living world. Organic life is simply one phase (inorganic movement being another) of the history of molecules the essential qualities of which remain unchanged.

(5) These original molecules were intelligent, for they entered into combinations according to certain ideal principles called "laws" and ultimately produced the world of intelligence, simply through native powers and mutual attractions.

We are not here concerned with the truth or falsity of this cosmogenic scheme. What interests us now is to relate a world-view so ambitious and speculative with the pure "faith" of agnosticism as Huxley defines it. And it simply re-

fuses to relate. The trouble is that there is not enough positive evidence to justify the confident assertion of a single one of the considerable group of assumptions which we have just reviewed. It is fair to say that the principle of agnosticism, in both its negative and positive applications, has been violated by its most conspicuous apostle. Negatively, he has gone beyond his own intellectual sanctions in giving his adherence to the molecular theory of evolution just stated.

This theory logically involves abiogensis, for, as Huxley himself says: "If the hypothesis of evolution is true, living matter must have arisen from non-living matter." But concerning abiogenesis he says in the same context: "The properties of living matter distinguish it from all other kinds of things; and the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the living and non-living."[25]

He also says: "For abiogenesis, there is at the present moment not a shadow of trustworthy evidence." A very simple logical combination of Huxley's own statements finds him profoundly convinced of a system of interpretation which is neither demonstrated nor demonstratable. I,

[25] See Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 9th ed., pp. 679, 689, *et passim.*

for one, do not blame him, but surely he ought to be consistent and not refuse to do in religion what he does in science. We may note in passing that his particular theory of evolution also logically involves materialism, which Huxley elsewhere expressly repudiates, once at least, by calling it "a short-hand idealism."[26] We shall not, however, really penetrate the mind of Huxley until we canvass a statement of his on the subject of the Christian religion.

In a personal letter to the Dean of Wells (quoted by permission in Gore's Incarnation of the Son of God, p. 266) under date of April 27, 1877, Professor Huxley says: "I have not the slightest objection to offer *a priori* to all the propositions in the three creeds. The mysteries of the Church are child's play compared with the mysteries of Nature. The doctrine of the Trinity is not more puzzling than the necessary antinomies of physical speculation; virgin procreation and resuscitation from apparent death are ordinary phenomena for the naturalist. It would be a great error, therefore, to suppose that the Agnostic rejects Theology because of its puzzles and wonders. He rejects simply because in his judgment there would be no evidence to warrant the

[26] Lay Sermons, p. 156f.

Theological propositions even if they related to the commonest and most obvious every-day propositions."

What does this amazing statement mean? It is obviously a betrayal of his case. Huxley reduces the obstacles to belief in Christianity, drawn from the transcendent character of its affirmations, to a minimum, and then calmly asserts the insufficiency of its evidence to justify belief in a system which demands no exceptional weight of proof. This position cannot be maintained. Every close student of theistic and Christian evidences, whether believer or unbeliever, well knows that the balance of argument is quite otherwise. The only tenable position of anti-Christian negation is in the unique and transcendent character of the Christian facts or interpretations of fact. But this statement, worthless as an argument and untenable to the point of grotesqueness, is yet a valuable sidelight on the mind of Huxley.

Compare Huxley's eagerness to believe beyond the evidence in the matter of evolution, abiogenesis, materialistic idealism, and all, with his seeming utter inability even to estimate the weight of Christian evidences, and the clue to his unbelief lies in your hand. Huxley's paradox really means that the inductive method *as applied* in the

physical sciences does not reach to the spiritual realm and that the apprehension of God is something more than the attainment of a scientific generalization.

On the other hand, it is important to notice that Huxley's negation is not the logical or necessary outcome of any unified scientific observations. It is really not lack of evidence that bars the way to faith for him, but a certain inward bias of mind, an unresponsiveness of disposition to which the testimony fails to make an adequate appeal. It is not too much to say that Huxley's attitude reveals an anti-theistic bias which neutralizes the force of his thought as a scientist. On the logic of his main position as an agnostic I can see no reason for his not being a convinced Christian theist, as many men certainly have been. This consideration lends additional meaning and something of pathos to the words of John Fiske regarding his relationship to Huxley: "In our many talks, however, I always felt that along with abundant general sympathy, there was a discernible difference in mental attitude. Upon the proposition that the foundation of morality is to * * * give up pretending to believe that for which there is no evidence, we were heartily agreed. But I often found myself more strongly inclined than my dear friend to ask the Tennysonian question

'Who forged that other influence,
'That heat of inward evidence,
'By which he doubts against the Sense?' "

The case of Huxley's friend and colleague, John Tyndall, is particularly interesting because in him a certain tendency, merely discernible in Huxley, comes clearly to the surface. Tyndall exhibits two important, and yet in a measure contradictory, traits.

One is the operaton of what we may venture to call a mass-psychology among scientists, an almost partisan solidarity which leads them to proclaim the sufficiency of science in face of their own declared sense of its limitations. For example, in a famous address on the Scientific Use of the Imagination (1870) Tyndall spoke of "these evolutionary notions" (meaning, of course, theories of the Huxleyan type) as "absurd, monstrous and fit only for the intellectual gibbet." Yet we find him so conformed to the scientific tendency of the time as to attempt a new definition of matter in order to strengthen the attack upon the idea of supernatural creation. This new definition of matter involves the simple, though logically somewhat saltatory, process of ascribing to matter the qualities of mind.

But, as has been pointed out a score of times

and yet not often enough, Tyndall does not so modify the notion of matter so as to save the uniqueness of mind but "persists in treating mind as if it were capable of being adequately represented by molecular changes of matter in the ordinary acceptance of the word."[27] This is done in spite of Tyndall's recognition and acknowledgment of the impassable chasm between mental and physical phenomena.[28] In other words, Tyndall is a materialist in spite of the logic of his own scientific observation and analysis, as well as his deeper feelings.[29]

Another tendency is discernible in the working of Tyndall's mind—the conflict between his sober judgment as a scientist and his irresistible impulse to high-flying speculation when his imagination and emotions are kindled.

We have already discovered three Huxleys: (1) The inductive scientist, (2) the religious agnostic rigidly applying the inductive method in negative fashion to the things of the spirit, (3) the speculative physical philosopher outflying his slow-footed inductive processes by far-reaching suppositions as to what "must have been" in the remote past, or will be in the still more remote future.

[27] Orr, Christian View of God and the World, p. 145.
[28] Fragments of Science, p. 87.
[29] See Additions to Belfast Address, authorized edition.

We find ourselves compelled to make a similar critical analysis of Professor Tyndall. For example, he says in one place: "Those who hold the doctrine of evolution are by no means ignorant of the uncertainty of their data, and they yield no more than a provisional assent."[30] This cautious statement is to be compared with what has been called "the high-faluting metaphysic" of the following: "For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalculae or animal life, not alone the noblest forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will and all their phenomena were once latent in a fiery cloud."[31]

The conclusion to which we are led by a study of the mental processes of these men is very simple and very obvious. It is that as scientists, keeping at home in their own departments, they have no answers to ultimate questions, and that only by the illegitimate extension of their methods into fields where they do not apply are these quasi-scientific negations attained.

Another feature of their thinking is to be

[30] Fragments of Science, 1st series, p. 166.
[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

noted. Through exclusive attention to the inductive method as *applied departmentally* in the physical sciences, they have become not more but less competent to deal with spiritual problems. As an illuminating example, take this statement from the Belfast address: "If Mr. Darwin rejects the notion of creative power acting after human fashion, it is certainly not because he is unacquainted with the numberless exquisite adaptations on which the notion of a supernatural artificer is founded." One hardly knows which is most striking in this statement, the skill with which the rejected idea of creation is discredited in the very statement of it, the fatal admission with which the denial is accompanied, or the childlike confusion of ideas upon which the whole contention rests. The Duke of Argyll is quite right in saying that the propositions which underlie this statement "have been refuted the moment the definition of them has been attained."[32]

We may fittingly bring this discussion to a close by a rapid glance in conjunction at two men whose close and peculiar relationship to each other forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of modern thought. I refer, of course, to Herbert Spencer and John Fiske. Both these men would naturally be classed as philosophers,

[32] See Unity of Nature, American ed., 1884, p. 277f.

but there is good reason for grouping them with the scientists. In both the approach to philosophy was through science, and with Spencer particularly the interpretation of science was a master passion throughout his work.

As is well known, Fiske was a disciple of Spencer. Spencer ranks as an agnostic—the philosophical agnostic *par excellence*. Fiske was a convinced theist and an able exponent and interpreter of theism. And, what is the remarkable thing, Fiske always claimed that his theism was the logical carrying out of Spencer's ideas. He also maintained consistently that Spencer's agnosticism was no more intended "to refine God away into nothing" than St. Paul's statement "who hath known the mind of the Lord," etc.[33]

I can see in this claim for Spencer little more than a student's enthusiasm and partiality for his favorite teacher. Nevertheless, in all matters pertaining to Spencer, Fiske has a right to be heard. Moreover, in the latest and so far as I know most discriminating biography of Spencer (by Elliott, in Makers of the Nineteenth Century Series) it is asserted: "Spencer professed himself to be an Agnostic, but his agnosticism travelled in the course of years from the verge of Atheism to the verge of Theology" (p. 227).

[33] Through Nature to God, p. 149f.

There must be, therefore, some justification for Fiske's claim that Spencer's system logically involved theism.

There are two elements in the mental history of Spencer which I wish to make clear in the interests of this discussion. First, his religious negations, of whatever sort they were, had no logical basis in physical science. This cannot be made too emphatic. As a matter of fact, Spencer's philosophy in general was not really grounded in science. As his biographer, who is at once sympathetic and discriminating, says: "The whole of Spencer's philosophy was worked out by the deductive method" (p. 84).[34]

Second, Spencer's system was due to an idiosyncrasy of mental temperament having no direct connection with objective scientific facts. His biographer points out that as a young man he took naturally to mechanics and mathematics, and that his system of thought partook of these two sciences. "His philosophy is in many respects Euclidean in form and his scheme of phenomena is such as may be seen in imagination; the world is laid out on the plan of a geometrical diagram" (p. 57). This accounts, in a way, for Spencer's curiously illogical attitude toward the three possible views of the world involved in atheism, pan-

[34] See also for fuller exposition, p. 56ff.

theism, and theism. Elliott, with more severity than I should venture to use, calls Spencer's doctrine of the "Unknowable" "a tissue of meaningless verbiage, the commonest and most discredited type of metaphysics" (p. 223).

We turn with renewed interest to Spencer's far more interesting and attractive disciple Fiske. The latter, at any rate, never leaves us in doubt as to what he thinks and means to say. The foremost fact in Fiske's treatment of religion so far as our present interest is concerned is that it is frankly and, as he feels, solidly grounded in science. He speaks with enthusiasm "of the unshakeable Theism which is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution." He holds that "the Doctrine of Evolution, properly understood, does not leave the scales equally balanced between Materialism and Theism, but irredeemably discredits the former, while it places the latter upon a firmer foundation than it has ever before occupied."[35] He maintains that Haeckel's cosmic atheism was "never reached through a scientific study of evolution; it is nothing but an echo from the French speculation of the 18th Century." He says also: "When we have once thoroughly grasped the monotheistic conception of the Universe as an or-

[35] Through Nature to God, p. 9.

ganic whole, animated by the omnipresent spirit of God, we have forever taken leave of that materialism to which the Universe was merely an endless multitude of phenomena" (p. 11).

Fiske's argument for immortality, drawn from Spencer's definition of life, is one of the most thrilling logical achievements I know of anywhere in religious literature. He argues on the basis of nature's continuity and upward movement through successive and expanding areas of vital correspondence, for an unseen and eternal environment for man's spiritual being (p. 190f.).

He derives his religious interpretations direct from evolution thus: "Of all the implications of evolution with regard to Man, I believe the very deepest and strongest to be that which asserts the Everlasting Reality of Religion" (p. 191).

And his final word in this vital book (which should be read in connection with his Destiny of Man, 1884, and Idea of God, 1885) runs thus: "We have at length reached a stage where it is becoming daily more and more apparent that with the deeper study of Nature the old strife between faith and knowledge is drawing to a close."[36]

The gist of this whole investigation, which might be indefinitely enlarged without any essen-

[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 194.

tial modification of its outcome,[37] is contained, or at any rate suggested, by an anecdote related by James Martineau in the preface to his great Study of Religion.[38] An eminent English positivist who had become a personal friend of John Fiske, heard that the latter had expressed in The Destiny of Man a belief in individual immortality, and exclaimed: "What, John Fiske say that? Well, it only proves, what I have always maintained, that you cannot make the slightest concession to metaphysics without ending in Theology!"

This is the great lesson which long ago we should have learned. The physical sciences are *ex necessitate* positivistic—they can deal only with phenomena. The moment that ultimate questions as to being and cause are raised the sciences become silent and *Science,* a broader and diviner word altogether, must be allowed to speak. And what she says is this: No questions such as these can be answered apart from God. In religion based on knowledge and knowledge perfected in

[37] For example, it would be extremely interesting to study the mind of the lamented W. K. Clifford. It would, however, scarcely advance the discussion beyond the point to which we have already brought it. Clifford died when his mind was about at the stage of development represented by Romanes' early Essay on Theism. Prof. James (in The Right to Believe, q. v.) has gone to the bottom of Clifford's mind and shown us, among other things, that he had just begun to think.

[38] Second ed., Oxford, 1900.

religion the reason and heart are enabled to make one harmonious music. The enlightened mind finds a meaning in

> Those first affections,
> Those shadowy recollections,
> Which, be they what they may,
> Are yet the foundation light of all our day,
> Are yet the master light of all our seeing;
> Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
> Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the Eternal Silence: truths that wake,
> To perish never!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction.

The following list of books is not the result of any systematic or formal compilation but is drawn from a common-place register representing many years of personal reading. It is, therefore, rather unusually individual. I have listed the books, or some of them which have helped me in the formation of very slowly maturing convictions. It is not to be understood that I agree with all the opinions expressed in these works which utter many thoughts of many minds. In not a few instances, I emphatically dissent from the views entertained by writers whose works I list. This document is not an "index expurgatorius" nor a voucher of unimpeachable orthodoxy even from my own point of view. I have named books which seem to contribute something of importance to the subjects under discussion.

Section I.

Historic Apologetics with especial reference to the Early Church.

1. Ayer: Source-book for Ancient Church History (N. Y., 1913), pp. 55f. 69f.

2. Cruttwell: Literary History of Early Christianity (Lon., 1893), Book III, pp. 257f.

3. Ebrard: Apologetics (Eng. tr., Edin., 1886, 3. vols.). The most profound and exhaustive monograph on Apologetics obtainable. It covers the entire field of controversy up to the date of writing.

4. Bruce: Apologetics (N. Y., 1907), Par. I. Ch. I. Bruce's book forms a bridge from what may be called the Old Apologetic to the New. It does not stand quite squarely on either bank but is valuable as indicating the issues involved and for its historical review.

5. Origen against Celsus: Ante Nicene Fathers (N. Y., 1902), Vol. IV, pp. 395ff.

Section II.

The Deistic Controversy.

6. Butler: Analogy of Religion (Bp. Butler's Works, ed. by W. E. Gladstone, N. Y., 1896). Within its well defined limits, for it proceeds upon the assumptions of Deism, Butler's work is irrefutable. It is a great religious classic

and has a value far beyond its controversial range.

Section III.

The Modern Era.

7. Bushnell: Nature and the Supernatural (N. Y., 1903). This great book is, of course, not strictly up to date, especially as regards the principle of causation, but still possesses great significance and value. The famous tenth chapter should be read by every thoughtful man.

8. Lightfoot: Essays on Supernatural Religion (Lon. and N. Y., 1889).

9. Lotze: Microcosmus (Edin. 1885). This great essay deals with finality with two of the major problems of Theistic philosophy: (a) The relationship of mechanism to final causes, (b) The significance of personality as a category of interpretation for the being of God.

10. Caldecott and Mackintosh: Selections from the Literature of Theism (Edin., 1904). This volume covers the development of Theistic statement from Anselm to Ritschl and is a source-book for the history of modern Theism.

11. Knight: Aspects of Theism (Lon. and N. Y., 1893). This book deserves especial mention as having so profoundly influenced the mind of Romanes. See above, p. 274.

12. Otto: Naturalism and Religion (Eng. tr., N. Y., 1907).

13. Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism (2 vols., Edin., 1906. Gifford Lectures for 1896-8). This monumental work reviews with consummate richness and power the entire modern field of Science and Philosophy in their bearing upon the Theistic position.

14. Cambridge Theological Essays.

A Symposium on Modern Theological Problems (Lon. and N. Y., 1906).

15. Balfour: Theism and Humanism (N. Y., 1915). An argument so ably conducted that one cannot fully realize its power until after a second or third reading.

16. Martineau: A Study of Religion (Oxford, 1900). Martineau was the greatest rationalistic theist of modern times. This book exhibits the unshakeable rational foundations of Theism. Read by way of contrast the same author's Seat of Authority in Religion, and his devotional works.

17-18. Drummond: Natural Law in the Spiritual World (1883). The Ascent of Man (1894). These two books of Drummond's interpret Nature and Evolution from the point of view of one who is at once a Scientist and a con-

vinced and ardent theist. They introduced a new era in the religious interpretation of nature.

19. Jones (W. Tudor): The Spiritual Ascent of Man (1917). A clear, convincing statement of present-day science in relationship to religion. Of inestimable value.

20. Griffith-Jones: The Ascent through Christ (N. Y., 1900). A study of Christian anthropology and Soteriology in the light of evolution. This volume gives a wide outlook upon the literature and philosophy of evolution and is thoroughly positive and constructive.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Illingworth: Personality, Human and Divine (N. Y., 1903), The Divine Immanence (1898), The Divine Transcendence (1911), The Doctrine of the Trinity (1909), Gospel Miracles (1915). These five books of Illingsworth's are among the very noblest products of modern Christian scholarship. The author combines wide reading, profound meditation, and spiritual vision in such a way as to make his works prophetic.

26, 27, 28. Campbell (Geo. Douglas, 8th Duke of Argyll): The Reign of Law (N. Y., 1884), The Philosophy of Belief (N. Y., 1896), The Unity of Nature (N. Y., 1884). Three related volumes which discuss fundamental problems

with abundant knowledge and deep insight. The Duke's discussion of natural law has influenced all subsequent thinking on that subject.

29, 30, 31, 32. Fairbairn, A. M.:

Religion in History and in Modern Life (Lon., 1885), The Place of Christ in Modern Theology (N. Y., 1893), The Philosophy of the Christian Religion (N. Y., 1905), Studies in Religion and Theology (N. Y., 1910). Fairbairn was generally acknowledged by all schools of thought to be the greatest theologian of his generation. His chief interest lay in the significance of Christianity as an expression of the universal religious consciousness.

33. Bowne: Personalism (Boston, 1908).

This brilliant and suggestive book deals with the philosophy underlying Theism. As a critique of the mechanistic scheme, it is entirely satisfactory.

34, 35. Fitchett: The Unrealized Logic of Religion (Lon., 1905). A keen, witty and effective analysis of the process of verification as applied to religion. The Beliefs of Unbelief (N. Y. and Cin., 1907). This book is defined as "Studies in the Alternatives to Faith."

36. Foundations, by Seven Oxford Men (Lon., 1913). A Symposium on Christianity

and modern problems by a group of distinguished Anglican leaders.

37. Church, R. W.: Gifts of Civilization (Lon., 1880). An almost forgotten book of great value. The author discusses with great charm and vigor the influences of Christianity upon civilization.

38. Orr, J.: The Christian View of God and the World (N. Y., 8th Ed., 1907). Dr. Orr's books form in themselves a library of Christian interpretation. I list only the greatest of them —the others should not be forgotten.

39. Gwatkin: The Knowledge of God, etc. (2 vols. Edin., 1908). These lectures cover the history of what may be termed "Theistic Experience" from the earliest times onward to its culmination in Christianity. For very wide reading, note and follow up Gwatkin's references.

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41. Van Dyke: The Gospel for an Age of Doubt (N. Y., 1896). A well-known and effective restatement of Christian faith for our age.

42. Ballard, F.: Miracles of Unbelief (Edin., 1901). A cogent discussion of the dredulities of unbelief—particularly valuable for its quotations from modern writers.

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44. Zahn: Introduction to the New Testament (Eng. tr., 3 vols., Edin. and N. Y., 1909).

45. Burkitt: The Gospel History and its Transmission (3d ed., 1911). A radical book which comes to some very constructive conclusions.

46. Harnack: Series on the New Testament. See text.

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

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